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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an attempt to discover 
a center of unity in Tate's criticism, fiction, and 
poetry. Other studies have isolated individual themes - 
the old South, the fragmentation of modern life, morality, 
and religion - but have failed to relate these themes to 
a common center. Several studies have attempted to 
relate Tate's early work to his recent conversion. No 
study has discovered ; single philosophical center from 
which secondary themes follow and which controls both the 
content and form of Tate's fiction and poetry. This philo­
sophical center is epistemological, the problem of knowl­
edge.
Investigation of Tate's critical writings 
reveals that he treats every subject from an epistemological 
perspective. His early essays treating the tradition of 
the old South conclude that the South's integrated culture 
resulted from a perfect mode of knowledge, a total vision 
of reality. Modern man because of historical circumstances 
is Incapable of this perfect mode of cognition. Tate also 
founds his aesthetics upon bis eplstemology. The perfect 
work of literature contains total knowledge of the world 
because its author possesses total cognition. The modern
lv
writer is incapable of perfect cognition and, consequently, 
is incapable of writing perfect literature. The tragic 
situation of modern man trapped by history in an age in 
which total cognition is impossible is the dramatic 
situation of the protagonists of Tate's poetry and fiction. 
Tate's epistemology, which demands a single act of cogni­
tion ("seeing") In which past and present, singular and 
universal are known, is also the basis of the form of his 
poetry. In bis pre-conversion poems, he eliminates all 
abstract statement and forces the symbol or image to 
support the idea.
After discovering Thomism and embracing Catholi­
cism, Tate continues to write from an epistemological 
perspective. He rejects, however, historical determinism 
and judges that total knowledge depends upon a way of 
knowing, Thomistic abstraction. If the modern poet writes 
as he knows, beginning with sense data, he too can write 
perfect literature. Tate writes three poems and several 
essays from this new perspective. Neither poems nor 
essays are entirely successful.
The philosophical center of Tate's better work - 
criticism, fiction, poetry - is epistemological, the pro­
blem of knowledge. The supposition that perfect knowledge 
is impossible in the modern world creates great dramatic 
force in Tate's pre-conversion poetry and fiction and the
v
poetic form baaed upon his early theory of cognition - 
a form that strives to embody the universal In the 
singular - gives to his poetry structural tension and 
power. Tate's adoption of a new philosophical position 
from which he writes poetry Inductive In form and alle­
gorical In content, seems to have dulled his creative 
genius which for stimulation requires an Insoluable 
problem, an Inescapable position, the problem and posi­
tion of the Impossibility of total knowledge In the 
modern world.
vl
INTRODUCTION
The mutability of the human condition need 
not inevitably be tainted with sadness. Of necessity 
the years have changed Allen Tate, but not for the worse. 
The turgid, confusing style of his early essays has been 
polished to an almost Augustan smoothness. The bellig­
erent and intolerant tone of his early criticism has 
been replaced by a becoming humility and charity, or, at 
least, urbanity. As the style and tone changed, so too 
has changed the attitudes of his critics. The early 
notices were brief and perfunctory; some even abusive 
and heavily sarcastic.1 But since the publication of 
Cleanth Brooks» Modern Poetry and the Tradition in 1939, 
Tate has been the subject of a number of long and serious 
studies, the most important of these being J. M. Bradbury*s 
The Fugitives and R. K. Mainers* The Last Alternatives.
The latter is a book-length study and at least for the 
present is the best work on Tate.
1. W. S. Knickerbocker, "Fiction of Powder Puffs, Tatian
Esoterics." Sewanee Review. XLVIII (July, 19lj.O), 3l£-21.
1
2In each of these later studies the critic 
attempts to discover either In Tate's poetry or In his 
criticism some one unifying principle. Each attempts 
to discover a different center of unity, a different 
solution to the perennial problem of the one and the many.
Only two of the critics agree upon a common center;
2 ^Vivienne Koch and Richard Foster^ both consider Tate
to be a romantic. For them it is this latent romanticism,
present even In the apparently classical work, that gives
to Tate's creative and critical thought a unity.
The study of each critic has its own particular 
value and no one of them completely eliminates the others. 
While one might disagree with, for example, Koch's conclu­
sion, nevertheless her study of Tate's poetry has many 
valuable insights. The very diversity of the conclusions 
arrived at by the authors of these books and articles 
attests to the complexity and density of Tate's creative 
and critical thought.
Nor does Tate himself provide much help In the
2. "The Poetry of Allen Tate," Kenyon Review. XI (Summer, 
19^9), 355-78.
3. The New Romantics (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1962), pp. 107-132.
3■•arch for a central unifying principle of art and of 
crltlolsm. Vltb becoming modesty be introduces one 
of bis books by disclaiming any system of thought.
It will be obvious to anybody who bas done me 
tbe bonor of reading my essays over a number of 
years, that I had to learn as I went along. But 
it was always necessary to move on, in tbe inter­
vals between essays, and to tblnk about some­
thing else, suob as a room where one might write 
them, and whether the rent could be paid. Another 
matter for the mendicant poet to think about was 
poetry Itself, and even bow be might write some 
of it. I could echo without too much self- 
revelation Poe*s famous (and humorless) excuse 
for having published so little verse: there is too 
much else that one must do - a distraction that 
frequently Includes the prospect of not doing 
anything. I am not sure that I wanted to write 
more than three or four of these essays; the others 
I was asked to write; one can do what one does.
I never knew what I thought about at, ;hlng until 
I bad written about it. To write an essay was 
to find out what I thought; for I did not know 
at the beginning how or where it would end.1*-
Tate Is not unduly modest, for he is no sys­
tematic thinker. As one of his critics remarks, it is
far easier to tell what be Is against than what he is
c
for.-' This is not to say that Tate is unintelligent, but 
that his intelligence is intuitive rather than analytic. 
His essays are studded with startling and valid Insights
k. The Man of Letters In theJtodem World (New York: Meridian 
Books, Inc., 1955), p. 6.
5>. Howard Nemerov, "The Current of tbe Frosen Stream: An 
Bsaay on tbe Poetry of Allen Tate," Furloao. Ill 
(February, 19l|.8), ol.
kbut these sane •■•ays ere singularly devoid of in­
ductive and deductive reasoning to support the isolated 
conclusions.
Ransom, Tate's early mentor and life-long 
friend, has not been remiss in censuring this failure 
in systematic tbougbt.
I do feel entitled to lmpeacb your treatment 
as exposition. I feel you are in contact with red- 
bot truth, for you continually drop glowing and 
impressive sparks whenever you wax critical.
But you tend to rely successively on tbe sparks, 
when we want a continuous blase. In other words, 
you get hold of a beautiful intuition and im­
mediately antagonize your followers by founding 
a Church thereon...I should think you ought to get 
your own consent to a little subordination among 
your (seemingly) perfectly Insubordinate ideas.
It is poetic, Modern, and pluralistic to exalt 
each in turn to the pinnacle; but the net result 
is confusion.
But in spite of Tate's admitted inconsistency 
and lack of formal logic, there is, I believe, In all 
of his work - criticism, fiction, poetry - a unifying 
principle or unifying problem. Furthermore, I do not 
believe that any one of Tate's critics has discovered 
this oenter of unity. The romanticism, authoritarianism, 
classicism, hlatorlclsm that each critic stresses are
6. Quoted bv Louise Cowan, The Fugitive Group: A Literary 
History (Baton Rouge x Louisiana State University Press, 
1959), p. 160.
all present in Tate*s work but are present as corollaries 
of a more basic principle. It is my purpose In tbls 
study to discover tbe essential principle In Tate's 
critical writings and to observe its application both 
in bis fiction and in bis poetry. Obviously, it would 
be an injustice to a nan wbo admittedly is not a pro­
fessional philosopher to ignore otber facets of his 
genius. Consequently, having once established by means 
of the orltlcal writings Tate's intellectual center of 
unity, I shall Indicate it but briefly in the analysis 
of his fiction and poetry. One central principle or 
problem may veil be tbe efficacious cause of Tate's 
creative achievement, but to understand the achievement 
Itself more than a knowledge of the intention is necessary. 
Total understanding, Aristotle Informs us, requires know­
ledge of the four causes; efficient (Tate), final (bis 
oenter of unity), and matter and form (the poem or story). 
It is in its existential state that art la art, that 
form has been Impressed upon matter. Tbe purpose of my 
analysis of the fiction and poetry will not be the mere 
demonstration of an idea but rather the demonstration of 
a highly complex and successful art form in which all of 
tbe parts have been Integrated by tbe artist to a unified 
whole.
6What ia Tate*a Intellectual center of unity?
It la a problem not a principle, a problem not uniquely 
his. It mlgbt be lntereatlng - but of little value In 
tbla atudy - to trace tbe same problem from Coleridge, 
who hoped hla phlloaophy and poetry would neutralize 
each other, through Keats, who dealred to prove tbe axioms 
of phlloaophy on bla pulaea, to Arnold, who Bought a 
total Integration of life In art, Plato conatructed hla 
phlloaopblcal ayetern In an attempt to aolve thla problem 
which baa troubled phlloaophera even to tbe preaent day. 
Tate'a oenter of unity la, I believe, tbe aame problem, 
tbe problem of knowledge. All of the 111a of the twentieth 
century he aeea aa arlalng from a partial and Imperfect 
knowledge. Modern man and modern aoclety are fragmented 
becauae of flawed knowledge. From lmperfeot vlalon (tbe 
terma "seeing" and "knowing" are uaed synonymously by Tate) 
atom the almleaa motion, the materlallam, tbe atheism, 
tbe split personality, the failure In art and life of 
modem man. Becauae of bla lack of what Schopenhauer 
calls pure contemplation and what the Oriental religions 
define aa absorption, modern man la alienated from his 
own tradition, from nature, from Ood.
Tate la not unlike Sooratea In hla belief that
7virtue, at least social and artistic virtue, can be 
achieved through knowledge. However, unlike Socrates,
Tate is trapped In a set of historical circumstances 
that render the acquisition of true knowledge Impossible. 
This Is the tragic situation of nearly all tbe pro-t *
tagonlsts of the fiction and poetry. These sensitive and 
Intelligent observers are painfully aware of the In­
sufficiency of modern life. They are equally aware of a 
Golden Age now past In which life was an Integrated whole. 
But tbe motives that Inspired men In the heroic age no 
longer Inspire modern man. He lacks tbe "arrogant cir­
cumstance" In which he might attain total knowledge.
Because they are trapped by blstory in an un­
heroic age, both Tate and his protagonists rage with a 
hopeless violence against their deterministic fate*
Perhaps the objects of his satire, those hollow optimists 
whose heads are stuffed with abstractions, are more 
fortunate than are he and his protagonists, Tbe former, 
at laast, like the modem politicians, do not realise 
that they live In hell.
Tate*B conversion to Roman Catholicism pre­
sents something of an objection to tbe thesis that the 
problem of cognition Is the Intellectual and artistic
8canter of bis thought. If faith Is the term toward 
which Tate's thinking tended, then a Newman-like search 
for authority might well be his Intellectual center. I 
first considered tbe center of his thought to be a re­
versal of the scholastic dictum, fldes quaerens lntai lactnpi.
a kind of lntellectus quaerens fldem. Nor was I alone in 
7
this belief. However, more careful reading of the essays 
and poems written after his conversion, has forced me to 
change my opinion, and I believe that my analysis of both 
will demonstrate tbe validity of the cognition thesis.
Furthermore, Tate's present position is an 
anomalous one. He has divorced Caroline Gordon and 
resiarried. By reason of bis second marriage be is ex­
cluded from the reception of tbe sacraments. Theologically 
his act deprives him of the virtue of charity; he retains, 
however, faith and hope. But this is a moral and canonical 
question and need not detain us. It Is also a question 
of little practical Import, for Tate's literary output 
in the last ten years has been negligible. It is my 
contention that Tate's conversion to Catholicism, far from
7. John M. Bradbury, The Fugitives! A Critical Account
(Chapel Hill: TJrlversity of North Carolina Press, 1958).
p. 121.
9being a term of Intellectual movement, was ratber a hindrance 
to bia art and marked tbe conclusion of bis creative 
career. With tbe resolution of his problem by faith,
Tate lost the source of his poetic inspiration. Both 
tbe essays and the poetry stemming from faltb are in­
ferior to bis earlier work. Faith did not provide Tate 
as it did Eliot with an inspiration for an "Ash Wednesday." 
Whatever may be tbe personal disposition of his soul,
Tate’s poetlo sensibilities seem never to have moved 
beyond "The Waste Land."
With the mention of Eliot's poem, the question 
of Influences arises. It is all too easy to write Tate 
off as a derivative poet and thinker, an odd melange of 
Eliot and Ransom. To do so is to ignore the obvious 
fact that contemporaneous writers are bound to share 
common themes and common attitudes. Tbe French sym­
bolists, Freud, a post-war taedium vitae and despair, 
an impatience with familiar forms and worn ideas were 
all part of the seltaelat of the 1920's. It is, then, 
extremely difficult to determine whether two writers 
are similar because one Influenced the other or because 
both drew from a common source. I believe that in the 
course of this study it will become apparent that although
10
Tate nay have learned from Ransom, Eliot, Ford Madox 
Ford - from wbom, incidentally, be says be learned every-
Q
thing be knows about writing - and others, be quickly 
changed what he learned to something uniquely bis. No 
reader could ever mistake Tate's mature poetry for Ransom's 
or Eliot's, I shall, then, treat Influences but In­
cidentally, noting tbe differences rather than the 
similarities.
In summary, I purpose in this study to establish 
a center of unity in Tate's thought. This center is, I 
believe, an epistemological one, tbe problem of total 
cognition, of grasping the object concretely with all of 
its temporal ramifications. I shall prove the existence 
of this center from the critical essays. Having once 
proved its existence, I shall place only incidental em­
phasis upon it in the consideration of the fiction and 
poetry.
8. "Random Thoughts on the 1920's." Minnesota Review. I 
(Fall, I960), 1*9.
SECTION I
THE CRITICISM OF ALLEN TATE
In tbe preface to hie collected essays Tate 
warns tbe reader to expect no unity: "Tbe book can
therefore be expected to bare as little unity as my 
previous critical volumes: If my Interests of the moment
happened to coincide with an editor*s, an essay or a 
review was tbe result."7
Though Tate admits no unity, yet a unity of 
theme does exist In these essays no matter how dive*jifled 
their subject matter. The subject matter of the essays 
I shall divide Into four general headings: tradition,
aesthetics, practical criticism, and faith. Tbe third 
division I shall treat briefly, not because Tate*s practical 
criticism Is unimportant but because these excellent 
studies must be read to be appreciated. In them Tate*s 
Ideas are not so much In evidence as are his marvelously 
critical sensibilities and unerring good taste. The
9. Collected Easavs (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1959), p. lx. 
This edition of the collected essays Is regarded as 
the "official" edition. In referring to It I shall 
give In the footnote the title and pagination of the 
essay being considered. To avoid an awkward series of 
lblds.. I shall give the page of tbe quotation In 
the text.
11
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order that I shall follow in this first section is almost 
a chronological biography of Tate's mind: his thinking 
on tradition, aesthetics, poetry, and Catholicism.
CHAPTER I
TRADITION
The word "tradition" immediately calls to mind 
T. S. Eliot and his essays on the subject. Undoubtedly 
Tate read them and was Influenced by them, but his own 
essays on tradition differ considerably from Eliot*s.
Both writers relate tradition to history; Tate by the 
"long and short view," Eliot by the "historical sense."
Both seem to give to their terms the same definition; in 
Eliot's words "the historical sense Involves a perception 
not only of the pastness of tbe past but of the present."10 
For Eliot, however, tradition is an objective thing to 
which the modem poet conforms and to which be adds: "Ve
say: it [the new poem] appears to conform, and is perhaps
individual, or it appears individual, and may conform; 
but we are hardly likely to find that it Is one and
„ H
not the other. Tradition is a body of thought, ex­
perience, and art that can Increase but which abandons
10. "Tradition and the Individual Talent " The Sacred
Wood (London: Methuen and Co., 1920), p. I4.9.
11. Ibid.. p. $1.
13
11*
nothing In its growth: "which changes, and that this
change la a development which abandons nothing route.
which does not superannuate either Shakespeare, or Homer,
12or the rock drawing of the Magdalsnlan draughtsmen."
Thus, though the poet within the tradition possesses 
a conscious habit of mind which simultaneously grasps 
past and present, yet tradition Itself Is objective, is 
that which Is known, not a mode of knowing.
Tate uses many of Eliot*s terms. Certainly he 
believes that true knowledge somehow perceives tbe tem­
poral sequence not as a series but as a whole. Never­
theless hla concept of tradition Is essentially different 
from Eliot's. To Tate tradition Is not an object known, 
but la a way of knowing. It Is the very process by 
which reality Is totally perceived; It Is the subjective 
act of the knower.
Tate, like Eliot, or perhaps because of Eliot, 
views modem civilization as a wasteland, a posltlvlstlc 
Jungle of endless means without ends. Because the members 
of this wasteland have no final purpose, they are con­
cerned only with Immediate, measurable results. Hence 
their lives are fragmented Into a thousand means without
12. Ibid.. p. 57.
15
final cause; they are unceasingly restless, revolving 
around and around lllce the damned souls of Dante's Inferno 
because they have no fixed destiny. Infected as they 
are by positivism, they are cut off from tradition, for 
they view history as a measurable quantity subject to 
abstract laws, and fall to perceive the concrete qualita­
tive differences of the past. Fragmented modem men lack 
not only knowledge of the past but even of the present. 
Theyve blind, or at least myopic, and have but a 
partial vision of reality; for they lack, as Tate tells 
us In The Fathers, the great Inner metaphor that makes 
total knowledge possible.
To rediscover total knowledge and the conditions 
requisite for Its existence, Tate returns to his own 
tradition, that of the South. In four essays written 
over a period of fifteen years, he worries tbe problem.
His two most recent attempts at a solution: In 1959* "A
Southern Mode of the Imagination,"1-^ and In 1962, "William 
Faulkner,"1^ add little that Is significant to his 
thought and echo the same themes which he developed more 
fully In earlier essays.
PP* 551|.-<>8
111. Hew Statesman. LXIV (September 28, 1962), 1^ 08.
16
Tate made bis flrat attempt to define tra­
dition and to establish Its relationship to cognition 
in 1930 in "Religion and the Old S o u t h , T h e  title gives 
some hint as to the direction of the solution. The style 
of the essay is brilliant and explosive; Tate packs, 
with precious little exposition, nearly all his thinking 
on cognition, history, and tbe South into this single 
essay. Most astounding is the conclusion, a total reversal 
of the case prevented, a deduction that in no way follows 
from the premises*:' .
There are, Tate informs us, three ways of 
viewing reality: the religious, tbe scientific, the
symbolist-Bergsonlan. Of tbe three only tbe religious 
view grasps total reality. The method of science is to 
abstract from reality its predictable and measurable 
qualities. The method of Henri Bergson and the symbolist 
poets is to abstract the unpredictable and wholly contingent 
qualities. Only the religious mentality grasps the total 
complexus of qualities as they exist in reality; only the 
religious mind views reality as an object of contemplation.
Tate, in distinguishing the modes of cognition, 
uses a myth or fable to illustrate bis thought. He
15* Sfi* Sll., PP. 305-22.
17
compares reality to a horse. Thus religion contemplates 
tbe whole horse; science abstracts mechanical horse power; 
Bergson and the symbolists concentrate upon the variations 
In the horse's actions.
Having distinguished the three modes of cogni­
tion. Tate then applies them to history. There is a 
certain inconsistency in his application since he abandons 
the symbollat-Bergsonlan mode of cognition. Hegel and 
the modern historians are guilty of viewing history 
scientifically, of reducing the concrete past to a series 
of causes and effects. This "long view" errs for it 
omits concrete contingency, and Its cognition is so ab­
stract that Christ and Adonis appear as but different 
manifestations of a vegetation myth. The "long view" 
of history destroys tradition. Opposed to abstract his­
tory is the "short view" (Hesiod's and Cynewulf's) 
which grasps the past with all its concrete qualities. 
Historical vision of this type is religious and achieves 
total cognition, which is oftpable of viewing Christ truly 
as unique and separate. This is tradition.
Europe was able to preserve tradition - total 
cognition - because it was able to defend religion against 
tbe attack of science in the form of Occam's rasor. It
18
accomplished this defense by Inventing dogma, an ab­
straction of the myth that la religion.
Tate then applies his cognitive premises to 
the South which once had a tradition because the Southern 
mind was capable of viewing reality whole, of seeing, to 
use Tate's metaphor, tbe "whole horse" as an object of 
contemplation and not merely aa a thing to be used. The 
South turned the same fullness of vision upon the past: 
"They looked at history as the concrete and temporal 
aeries - a series at all only because they required a 
straight metaphorical line back Into the past, for tbe 
series, such as It was, was very capricious, and could 
hardly boast of a natural logic." (p. 319)
But the tradition broke down and was lost.
Why? If Tate Is to be consistent, the failure of Southern 
tradition must somehow be linked to a failure In cogni­
tion. He Is consistent, and be traces the Southern failure 
precisely to this cause: "Because the South never created
a fitting religion, the social structure of the South 
began grievously to break down two generations after 
the Civil War." (p. 316) Not only did the South lack a 
proper religion, it also failed to devise a dogma to 
defend tbe religion it had against Northern abstractionism:
19
"Not haying a rational system for the defense of their 
religious attitude and its base in a feudal society, 
they elaborated no rational system whatever, no full- 
grown philosophy; so that, when the post-bellum tempta­
tions of the devil, who, according to Milton and Aeschylus, 
is the exploiter of nature, confronted them, they had 
no defense." (p. 320)
The Southern mind never fully comprehended 
Itself because of a false religious symbol, a symbol 
Inadequate for an agrarian society which required a 
feudal religion. Unfortunately, it had the symbol of 
a capitalistic religion: "The South's religious mind
was Inarticulate, dissenting, and sohlsmatlcal. She 
had a non-agrarian and trading religion that had been 
Invented in the sixteenth century by a young finance-capi­
talist economy: hardly a religion at all but rather a
disguised secular ambition." (p. 316)
Tate concludes with an amazing non seaultur. 
Having stated the premise that there can be no tradition 
without the proper religious symbol, be then admonishes 
the South to recapture Its lost tradition by violence.
The whole argument up to this point seemed necessarily 
to lead to the conclusion that only an appropriately
20
feudal religious symbol would restore and preserve 
the Southern tradition. For some reason Tate avoids 
the logic of his own premise; perhaps beoause he feels 
that such a solution Is impossible in the fourmlllante 
cite that is modern society.
However, It Is not Tate*s failure In logic 
that Is of Importance but rather the eplstemology that 
he has devised. There are in this system three degrees 
of knowledge; scientific, contingent, and religious. The 
first and second degrees are imperfect knowledge; the 
former too abstract, the latter too variable. The third 
degree of knowledge alone provides the whole truth, not 
only of external reality but also of history.
Eleven years later on a radio-panel discussion 
Tate expressed the same theory in simpler and clearer 
language: "But, apart from biographical considerations,
don*t you think that Pascal feels that the spiritual 
life has a supremacy and is a separate order of truth 
and is not to be invaded by scientific truth? It's 
a different order of truth altogether.
16, Huntington Cairns, Mark Van Doren and Allen Tate, 
|nv^atlon^to Learning (New York: Random House,
21
Briefly, then, Tate begins to devise a system of 
Ideogenesls that be will add to and modify but wblcb he 
will never change essentially, a system in which the 
mind attains total truth by means of an inner religious 
symbol. This symbol can exist only within a traditional 
society and conversely preserves the society in which 
it exists. From this position arise both the tragedy 
and crisis of modern society, for its members are doomed 
to remain fragmented by half-knowledge, the inner 
religious symbol being non-attainable in contemporary 
clrcumstanoes. The stark despair of this situation 
creates a kind of existential anguish, an anguish that 
sets the mood of each of Tate*a major poems. In them 
the protagonist is trapped in a shadow world much like 
Plato's cave; he is conscious of a non-attainable past 
in which men saw the whole of reality, but he is equally 
and despairingly conscious of his own predicament, a 
predicament from which there is no escape, of which 
"violence1* is rather a description than a solution.
The crisis of half-knowledge, of Imperfect vision creates 
the tension of "The Ode to the Confederate Dead," "The 
Cross," "The Mediterranean"; the same crisis is the situa­
tion of the characters In Tate's fiction, of John Hermann
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in "The Immortal Woman," of Lacy Buchan in The Fathers.
To Tate it ia the crisis of modern civilization, of a 
society fragmented by the half-knowledge that abstraction­
ism gives. Salvation will come to the Individual, will 
come to society, through total knowledge. It Is difficult 
to understand how Melners can justify bis thesis that 
Tate*s Intellectual and artistic center is a moral one. 
Explicitly in his expository prose, implicitly in bis 
imaginative work, Tate seems almost Gnostic. He Is 
moral only In the sense that Socrates was moral, for 
both equate virtue and knowledge. To Tate both reli­
gion and a consciousness of evil are essential not for 
morality, which may or may not be an accidental adjunct, 
but for cognition. Without the inner symbol that an 
accepted faith provides, total knowledge of reality is 
Impossible. Tata's concept of cognition is analogous 
to Arnold's concept of culture-"the sheer desire to 
see things as they are" - though Tate omits the volitional 
quality which Arnold defines as the essential part of 
culture! "The desire for removing human error, clearing 
human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the 
noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier 
than we found it, - motives eminently such as are called 
social,- come in as part of the grounds of culture, and
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the main and preeminent part."1? It Is not that Tate 
omits these soolal qualities of Arnold, but that In his 
system knowledge and volition are one.
Five years later In 1935 Tate returns again to 
the same problem of cognition, but he views It from
a slightly different perspective. "The Profession of
18Letters In the South" does not make pleasant reading. 
Tate Is Irritable and scolding and his tone manifests 
Itself In a slangy diction that Is bitter rather than 
sprightly. Words like "racket" and "jabber" are oddly 
at variance with the Involved periods.
What particularly exacerbates Tate Is the 
Isolation of the American artist. France, even today, 
treats the man of letters with respect and admiration, 
and regards him as an Integral part of society. But not 
only the Isolation of the American artist disturbs Tate; 
he Is even more annoyed at the artist's dependence upon 
a competitive market controlled by the North, so that 
Southern writers are forced to be subservient to Northern 
reviewers. He makes a number of practical suggestions, 
the most Important being a publishing center In the 
South,
1?. Culture and Anarchy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1912), 
P. 7.
18. ili., pp. 265-81.
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Tate*a financial difficulties may be of 
Interest but not of importance. The querulous, 
carping tone, the practical suggestions are but obiter 
dicta. The substance of the essay centers once again 
on the problem of cognition, and Tate presents an 
Interesting addition to his eplstemology. His major 
concern Is with the failure of the South to produce a 
great literature. At first glance all the requisites 
were there* a tradition, a cultured and educated aris­
tocracy with leisure and intelligence, an organic 
society, an agrarian economy, a religion "nearer to 
Aquinas than to Calvin, Wesley or Knox." (p. 269) And 
yet the South failed to create anything of significance. 
Tate assigns three causes to this failure - a political, 
an economic, and an eplstemologioal. The first and 
second are accidental causes; the third Is essential.
The first oause of the South*s failure to 
produce a literature was, according to Tate, that genius 
concentrated upon politics rather than upon the arts: 
"Assuming, as I do not tblnlc I am allowed to assume very 
confidently, that this society was a good soil for the 
high arts, there was yet a grave fault In the Intellectual 
life. We like to think that Archlmago sent the nightmare
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down from the North. He did. Bat it was partly rooted 
in the kind of rule the South had, which was aristo­
cratic rule. All aristocracies are obsessed politically. 
(Witness Henry IV. Parts One and Two; Henry V.) The beat 
intellectual energy goes into politics and goes of 
necessity; aristocracy Is class-rule; and the class 
must fight for interest and power.” (p. 271)
The second Is not, Tate informs us, peculiar 
to the South; it can be traced back to Lord Chesterfield 
and the breakdown of feudal society: Milton, Invited by
the Earl of Bridgewater to write Cornua, was "at home" 
at Ludlow Castle. As a poet be was "a spiritual member 
of the society gathered there.” (p. 275) This was a 
traditional and Integrated society as yet unfragmented 
by capitalism. Quite the opposite is true of Johnson 
and Chesterfield. They participated in no social and 
spiritual community; their relationship was purely 
monetary: "For the flattery of a dedication the noble­
man was loftily willing to give bis patronage, a certain 
amount of money, to an author who had already comple ted 
the work, an author who had faced starvation in isolation 
from society.•.The Earl of Chesterfield was a capitalist, 
not a feudal noble as Egerton to some extent still was:
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Chesterfield had lost the community; he required of the 
arts a compliment to the power of his class." (p. 276)
Thus Tate traces the Isolation of the artist to an 
economic cause. I do not wish to force his thought; 
however, he does seem to be restating In negative terms 
his former thesis that for total vision - and this 
Includes artistic as well as oognltlonal - spiritual 
community in a traditional society Is necessary.
The third cause of the South*s literary failure 
Is the essential cause, for even if the political mania 
and economic Isolation had been absent, yet the South 
would have failed because of fundamental flaw In Its 
mode of cognition. The Southerner could not fully under­
stand himself nor could be have a profound realisation 
of Southern life. He was doomed to a superficial kind 
of knowledge because he was out off from the soil by 
the Negro. A great culture, Tate declares, demands 
a self-image arising from the soil, and only a free 
peasantry provides It: "All great cultures have been
rooted In peasantries, In free peasantries, I believe, 
suob as the English yeomanry before the fourteenth 
oentury: they have been the growth of the soil. This,
of course, was not the case In the South. The white man
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got nothing from the Negro, no profound image of him­
self in terms of the soil.••The oltisen of Natohes 
lived in a place but he could not deepen bis sense of 
life through the long series of gradations represented 
by his dependents, who stood between him and the earth.” 
(p. 273)
Tate advances his eplstemology one step: to 
possess full knowledge man must live in a traditional 
society that provides him with the proper religious 
symbol, but this Inner symbol Is inadequate. He also 
needs for exact self-knowledge and for a profound sense 
of life an image that arises from the soil. Tate seems 
to be attempting to define some form of dualism, an 
eplstemology dependent upon two poles, myth and place, 
one inner and the other outer. His thinking is certainly 
not developed, nor does it possess clarity. However, it 
does appear to be a vague attempt at solving the sub­
jective-objective character of knowledge.
A year later in 1936 in the Phi Beta Kappa 
address delivered at the University of Virginia, Tfcta
expands and modifies his thinking on cognition. "Vhat
19Is a Traditional Society?" is remarkably lucid and 
urbane; it is marred by none of the crabbed constructions
19. Qp . clt.. pp. 29U-30U.
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and vitriolic diction tbat taints "The Profession of 
Letters in tbe Old South." Tate immediately advises 
bis audience tbat be speaks not as a literary critic, 
not as a poet, but as a moralist. If he believes this, 
he deceives himself, for once more bis concern Is episte- 
mologlcal not moral. It Is knowledge, not proper conduct, 
tbat concerns him.
Tbe problem be considers In this address is 
tbe fragmentation of modern life In which a man's life 
and bis work are separate entitles with no vital relation 
between them. In a traditional society tbe two are 
Inseparable] "The presiding spirit (Jefferson) of that 
tradition was clear In Us belief tbat tbe way of life 
and tbe livelihood of men must be tbe same; that tbe 
way we make our living must strongly affect tbe way 
of life; tbat our way of getting a living Is not good 
enough if we are driven to pretend tbat It Is something 
else; tbat we cannot pretend that It Is something else; 
tbat we cannot pretend to be landed gentlemen two days 
of tbe week If we are middle-class capitalists tbe 
five other." (p. 295) In delineating this tradition 
Tate seems again to echo Arnold's humanistic Ideal of 
self-perfection: "They were so situated economically and
28
and vitriolic diction tbat taints "The Profession of 
Letters in tbe Old South." Tate immediately advises 
bis audience that be speaks not as a literary critic, 
not as a poet, but as a moralist. If be believes this, 
he deceives bimself, for once more bis concern is eplate- 
mological not moral. It is knowledge, not proper conduct, 
tbat concerns him.
Tbe problem he considers in this address is 
tbe fragmentation of modern life in which a man’s life 
and bis work are separate entitles with no vital relation 
between them. In a traditional society tbe two are 
Inseparable: "The presiding spirit fJefferson) of that
tradition was clear InhLa belief tbat the way of life 
and tbe livelihood of men must be tbe same; that the 
way we make our living must strongly affect the way 
of life; tbat our way of getting a living is not good 
enough if we are driven to pretend tbat it is something 
else; tbat we cannot pretend that It is something else; 
that we cannot pretend to be landed gentlemen two days 
of tbe week if we are middle-class capitalists tbe 
five other." (p. 295) in delineating this tradition 
Tate seems again to echo Arnold*s humanistic ideal of 
self-perfection: "They were so situated economically and
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politically that they were able to form a definite con­
ception of their human role...They knew what they wanted 
beoauae they knew what they, themselves, were. They 
lived in a social and economic system that permitted 
them to develop a human character that functioned In 
every level of life, from the economic process to the 
country horse-race." (p. 297)
But the basis of this Ideal society was not 
economic, neither was It political. The traditional 
society described by Tate existed because Its members 
possessed a total vision of reality. Tate, In describing 
this vision, outlines three modes of cognition. Tbe first 
and perfect mode Is the religious Imagination which Is 
timeless and unhlstorlc. Essential to this mode Is the 
major myth of religion. The second and Inferior mode 
Is tbe historical Imagination, a religious Imagination 
Minaue. By means of the minor myth of history a know­
ledge of reality sufficiently adequate to sustaining a 
traditional society Is possible. Tbe third mode of 
cognition that Is totally Inadequate for human life and 
which attains no reality Is positivism. In this third 
mode of cognition there Is no Inner myth, no Imagination, 
no truth. It Is a mockery of knowledge and to It can
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be traced all the evils of modern life. This third 
mode la the aclentlflc method, a rootleaa abatractlon 
attached neither to inner myth nor to outer reality:
"It la Just abatract method - from which plain, abatract, 
Inhuman hlatory dlffera not a hair . . . The blatorical 
method then may be briefly deacribed - by one who doea 
not believe in lta uae - aa the way of diacoverlng 
historical 'truths' that are true in some other world 
than that inhabited by the historian and hla fellow 
men: truths, in a word, that are true for the historical
method." (p. 299)
%
To give dramatic force to bia argumentation,
Tate turns to Eliot's "The Waste Land." In hla analysis 
of the "A Game of Cheaa" section, he demonstrates great 
skill in a criticism that is brilliant, Illuminating, and 
sensitive. Without doubt, Tate, when he turns his band 
to practical criticism, proves tbat he is one of the best 
of eontextuallst critics.
Tate views "Tbe Waste Land" as a symbol of man 
at the present time, and he does not hesitate to make 
the meaning of that symbol explicit: "What does this mean?
It means that in ages which suffer the decay of manners,
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religion, morale, codea, our Indestructible vitality 
demands expression In violence and chaos; it means that 
men who have lost both the higher myth of religion and 
the lower myth of historical dramatixation have lost 
the forms of human action; it means tbat they capitulate 
from their human role to a series of pragmatic conquests 
which, taken alone, are true only in some other world 
than that inhabited by men." (p. 301)
Once again Tate analyzes tbe modern predicament 
in epistemologlcal - not ethical - terms. Modern man 
moves aimlessly, lives an empty and fragmented life 
because be does not know, cannot see where be is going, 
cannot comprehend himself and the temporal relation of 
the present to the past. Time, human nature, art, labor, 
life, bis own existence are all incomprehensible to him. 
Integrity of life will come to modern man only when he 
achieves totality of vision.
The ideogenesls outlined by Tate in this 
address differs little from tbat formulated in 1930 
in "Religion and the Old South." However, he does make 
certain modifications: tbe historic myth is now adequate 
as an inner symbol and the "image from the soil" theory
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Is replaced by economic condition. Thus the loss of the 
higher and lower myths of religion and history are now 
attributed to a fragmented economy: "The middle-class
capitalist does not believe In the dignity of the material 
basis of his life; his human nature demands a homogeneous 
pattern of behavior that his economic life will not 
give him. He doubtless sees In tbe remains of tbe Old 
South a symbol of the homogeneous life. But the ante­
bellum man saw no difference between the Georgian house 
and the economle basis that supported It. It was all 
of one piece." (p.302)
These modifications, however, are slight and
tbe same duality remains, an Inner universalizing aym-
20bol and outer experience. Tate holds desperately to 
these two poles, avoiding pure Idealism on tbe one band 
and raw empiricism on the other. He concludes bis address
20. The term "duality" here and throughout this study 
refers to tbe source of cognition and not the kind 
or value of knowledge. Obviously there Is nothing 
original in Tate's division of knowledge Into value 
types. Plato established two modes, drr t (know­
ledge) and^/^-a. (opinion); Aristotle and Aquinas 
held a distinction between sanlentla and sciential 
Kant. Fichte. Novalla. Goethe and their Scotch spokes 
man Carlyle divided cognition Into reason and under­
standing; Newman distinguished between rbal and 
notional assent; today Karl Barth holds a like 
distinction. It Is Tate's explanation of the source 
of his various degrees of knowledge that is both 
original and Interesting, and tbat establishes tbe 
cognitive orisis of the protagonists in the poems and 
fiction.
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with an attempt to bind together Into one unit the Inner 
myth and the outer economic circumstance: "The higher 
myth of religion, the lower myth of history, even ordin­
ary codes of conduct, cannot preserve themselves; Indeed 
they do not exist apart from our experience. Since the 
most significant feature of our experience Is tbe way we 
make our living, the economic basis of life Is the soil 
out of which all the forms, good or bad, of our experience 
must come.11 (pp. 303-01;)
What Tate demands of knowledge is, I believe, 
clear enough; however, the argument by which he demon­
strates his system Is still somewhat deficient and Is 
dangerously close to a vicious olrcle. If tbe two myths 
of history and religion provide man with the whole truth 
- Tate tells us that they do - whence then arises the 
error that separates man's life from bis livelihood? Isn't 
the lesser truth that sees life and Its economic basis 
as one already contained as a conclusion In a premise 
In tbe higher and total truth provided by the myth?
Tatet attempt to preserve realism and to avoid solipsism 
Is admirable; the Insight is valid, but the logic Is 
faulty.
Jk
Since Tate la an Intuitional rather than a 
systematic or analytic thinker, the logic or lack of It 
In hla exposition la not aa Important aa la his con­
clusion. He presents hla readers with a duallstic system 
of eplstemology In which Inner symbol is related to and 
dependent upon outer experience; In which thought and 
action are one In tradition. He also gives them a 
hierarchy of knowledge that Is analogous to tbat of 
the classical scholastic system In which there are three 
degrees of certitude. The first degree Is moral cer­
titude based upon tbe usual actions of men; history pro­
vides this certitude. The second degree Is physical 
certitude based upon the laws of nature; for example, 
tbe law of gravity which only a direct and miraculous 
Intervention of God, the First Cause of all causes, 
can suspend. The third degree Is metaphysical, based 
upon the very essences of things. It, for the scholastics, 
Is absolute and Immutable, for even God cannot change 
essenoes.
The mental process by which one attains cer­
titude Is abstraction. The mind removes from the ex­
ternal object grasped by the senses the concrete and 
Individuating details so that the concept which remains
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has only common or general qualities. Just as the cer­
titude attained by abstraction has three degrees, so too 
does abstraction. The first degree prescinds from the 
singularity of a material object and considers matter 
as matter, not as this or that matter. This Is the 
degree of the physical sciences, chemistry, physics, 
biology. The second degree abstracts the concept of 
matter and retains only the notion of extension. Its 
certitude Is mathematical - Descartes attempted to base 
his metaphysics on this second degree. Tbe third degree 
abstracts extension and retains only the concept of ex­
istence. being as being. Its certitude Is metaphysical 
and transcendental; tbat is. it transcends the categories 
of Genus and Species and can be predicated analogously 
of all existing and of all possible beings. The know­
ledge of the first and second degrees Is universal and 
can be predicated unlvocally only of those beings within 
a given species.
I do not Intend by this lengthy excursion Into 
scholastic eplstemology to Imply that Tate follows the 
system, but merely to Indicate that be gives us something 
analogous to it. Positivism by means of abstraction 
arrives at a partial and Imperfect knowledge of reality.
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The myth of history attains a full and adequate know­
ledge, but a knowledge limited to time and to the realm 
of historical event. The myth of religion achieves a 
timeless and unhlstorlc knowledge.
I am aware of the ever-present temptation to 
read Into another man's thought one's own Ideas; to 
translate bis vocabulary Into one's own terms. However, 
what should begin now to be evident Is that Tate la 
struggling with the perennial problem of tbe unlversals, 
a problem that has haunted Western philosophy from the 
time of Plato. Like a modern-day Abelard, Tate In 
probing his tradition Is Intolerant of sociological and 
economic methods. His mind Is philosophical and demands 
ultimate answers; consequently he traces the difference 
In action between a traditional and modern society to 
a difference In knowing. He Is satisfied, apparently, 
with bis explanation; be Is not satisfied with his anal- 
ysls of the process of knowledge. That total knowledge 
once existed he Is certain; be Is not so certain bow It 
existed or whether It can ever exist again.
The problem of knowledge, then, Is central 
to Tate's thinking not only on tradition and modern 
soolety, but also on aesthetics. Tbe same problem forms
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the core situation of his poetry and fiction. From It 
arises much of the symbolism and Imagery of his poetry.
In so far as Tate has a center of unity, the problem of 
knowledge la that center. Other critics have attempted 
to make of Tate a metaphysician and to reduce his creative 
and orltlcal work to certain first principles. Thus 
Howard Nemerov finds the Parmenldean problem of the 
One and tbe Many to be the central metaphysical dilemma 
of Tate's poetry: "Metaphysical poetry Is a poetry of
tbe dilemma, and the dilemma which paradoxes and anti­
theses continually seek to display Is the famous one at 
which all philosophies falter, the relation of the One 
with the Many, the leap by which Infinity becomes finite,
essence becomes existence; tbe commingling of the spirit
21with matter, the working of God In the world. Nemerov*s 
essay Is admirable, and his division of the structure of 
Tate's poetry Into "essence and commentary" Is enlightening. 
However, I feel that, although Tate's poetry may be 
metaphysical, his thinking Is not. Metaphysics Is an 
attempt to explain reality; eplstemology Is an attempt 
to explain our knowledge of reality.
21. Op. olt.. p. $1.
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Perhaps Delmore Schwartz is closer to an 
essential analysis when he reduces Tate’s ideas, drawing 
largely from "Religion and the Old South," to an attitude 
toward nature which la neither a mystical giving over of 
oneself nor a scientific aeries of patterns but rather 
facing nature with a series of ideas founded on concrete 
past experience. "One must have deep inside one’s being 
a vast metaphor controlling all the rest; it is such 
vast metaphors, the symbols by means of which we are 
enabled to live our lives, which constitute the essential 
subject of Tate’s poetry. Not, however, in a simple way: 
the metaphors are grasped by the poet existentlally, and 
by this Is meant tbat the poet contemplates the metaphors
by which be lives with an intense sense of the concrete
22circumstances of his being." Excellent though the 
analysis may be, it Is, I believe, too limited in the 
souroes used. A careful reading of more of the essays 
might lead Schwartz to change his conclusion that Tate 
writes from a metaphysical base. One does not face nature 
with a series of ideas; tbe inner symbol is not an object 
known, not a metaphysics, but is that by which one knows.
22. "The Poetry of Allen Tate," Southern Review. V (Winter, 
191*0), 1*21*.
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In a sense it is the very act of knowing.
F. Cudwortb Flint falls into the same error 
of confusing epistemology and metaphysics when he writes,
"He [Tate] has formulated...what appears to be a meta-
2 ^
physic arising from his own experience."'
The error of reducing Tate's thought to one
principle - and it is not peculiar to the critics just 
quoted - is partially Tate's own fault. Brilliant though 
his essays are, they are equally difficult because of a 
certain intuitionalism in exposition, and penetrating but 
tangential asides. It is easy enough to seize upon an 
aside or a random conclusion and hold it up as a first 
principle. Even Cleanth Brooks does not escape this 
temptation when he discovers the historical thesis of the 
past viewed as quality rather than quantity to be an 
essential principle and applies it most satisfactorily 
to his explication of "Aeneas at Washington. Certainly 
this historical distinction is present both in Tate's 
prose and poetry; however, it is present as a conclusion 
and not as a principle. The quantitative and qualitative 
ideas of history both result from a certain type of cog­
nition, and point as effects to their respective causes.
Only by seeking out the key problem in each essay, the
23. "Contemporary Criticism," Southern Review. I (Winter, 
1936), 223.
21+. Modern Poetry and the Tradition (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1939;, pp. 98-9.
l+o
dramatic situation or attitude of the protagonist In each 
poem and In each work of fiction can we arrive at a center 
of unity that is not a principle but a problem. The sub­
jects change; tbe tone, a problematical one, does not 
change•
In 191+5 In "The New Provincialism,"^ irritated 
by the world planners, Tate returns to tbe subject of 
tradition. Influenced by Christopher Dawson*s theology 
of history, be discovers a new villain, "the decadent 
humanism of the Greek half of our tradition." (p.266)
Tbe historical cause of modern evil may vary - Tate
has a rather naive tendency to trace economic and social
26conditions to one source - but the effect is ever the 
same, positivism: "We do not ask: Is this right? We ask:
Will this work?" (p.286)
But Tate*s basic thinking is little Influenced 
by Dawson and it remains essentially the same. Only 
the name of tbe historical cause of the modern dilemma
25. QSjl olt.. pp. 282-93.
26. Eliseo Vivas, in another context, takes Tate to task 
on exactly this point. "Mr. Tate traces to Descartes 
man's usurpation of the angelic imagination. It 
seems to me that this Is to credit a philosopher with 
far more power than any one man, even a Descartes, 
could possibly have wielded. Descartes was not 
possible without conditions of an extremely complex 
nature which existed prior to his advent." "Allen 
Tate As Man of Letters," Sawanaa Review. LXII (Winter,
195U), ll+i.
changes - tbe decadent Greeks, Descartes, Emerson,
Bacon, Occam. Having established the cause for the world 
situation, Tate now applies his former thinking about the 
South to this wider crisis. To do so he coins two new 
terms, "regionalism" and "provincialism." The bottles 
stay be new but tbe wine is old - the historical myth and 
pragmatlolsm. Literature - except In the South - he 
warns us, is becoming provincial and Dos Passos is the 
prime example of it: "New Crusoes, new Captain Singletons,
new Gullivers will appear, but Gullivers who see with 
not through the eye. It will not be a 'national* litera­
ture, or even an 'international'; It may be a provincial 
literature with world horizons, tbe horizons of tbe geo­
graphical world, which need not be spiritually larger 
than Bourbon County, Kentucky: provincialism without 
regionalism." (p.283)
Provincialism and regionalism are, then, two 
modes of cognition, the foraer a seeing (knowing) with 
the eye; the latter a seeing through tbe eye. The 
quantitative vision of pragmatism is a limitless ab­
straction: "Tbe provincial attitude is limited in time
but not in space." (p.286) The qualitative vision of
the historical myth la concrete and timeless: "Regionalism 
Is thus limited In space but ntt In time." (p.286) But 
regional cognition can be lost: "When the regional man,
In bis ignoranoe, often an Intensive and creative Ignorance, 
of the world, extends his own Immediate necessities Into 
the world, and assumes that the present moment Is unique, 
he becomes the provincial man. He cuts himself off from 
the past, and without benefit of the fund of traditional 
wisdom approaches the simplest problems of life as If 
nobody bad ever heard of them before." (p.286) Tate is 
expressing In new terms his old "Image from the soil" 
theory.
Tate dramatizes the same idea In hla novel,
The Fathers. Major Buchan and his daughter Susan both 
extend their Immediate necessities beyond the world 
of Pleasant Hill, which they erroneously conceive as 
timeless. Mrs. Buchan, on the contrary, possesses 
regional cognition through which she sees reality 
whole: "'He's here on business,* my mother said, and
looking back to that remark I know that she was a per­
son for whom her small world held life In Its entirety, 
and, who, through that knowledge, knew all that was
1*3
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necessary of the world at large."
Tate concludea "The New Provinciallam" with 
a direct application of hla terma to the Southern novel.
The provincial view of the South created a aerlea of 
second-rate novellata much pralaed by the provincial 
crltlca of the North. The regional view produced great 
wrltera: "Stark Young, Elisabeth Madox Roberta, Katherine
Anne Porter, Robert Penn Warren, Caroline Gordon, Ellen 
Glaagow...and William Faulkner, who la the moat power­
ful and original noveliat in the United Statea and one 
of the best in the modern w o r l d ( p . 292) But Tate 
adds gloomily that the South will ultimately be in­
fected by the provincialism of the North: "From now
on we are committed to seeing with. not through the 
eye; we, aa provincials who do not live anywhere." (p.293) 
Note again that Tate always equates "seeing" and "knowing"; 
this concept is basic to understanding much of hla Imagery, 
a kind of visible thought.
Tate telescopes the myth of religion and 
of history into one concept, regionalism. The three 
modes of cognition be reduces to two, the regional and 
the provincial. However, the dualism In his epistemology
27. The Fathers (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1960), p. 32
1*
remains, the Inner symbol and outer experience; and he 
has added one new concept, the direct dependence of 
successful art upon total cognition. There is once 
again a faint Arnoldian echo in this, an echo of litera­
ture as a true criticism of life. By equating knowledge 
and artistic creation or, at least, making art depend 
upon knowledge, Tate prepares the groundwork of his 
aesthetics.
Thirteen years earlier In 1932 he had formu­
lated, under the Influence of Eliot, quite a different 
theory of aesthetics. In two essays of practical cri­
ticism, “Emily Dickinson"^® and "A Note on Donne,
Tate, working from Eliot* s principle that poetry is 
thought realized In emotion, probes the historical 
conditions and psychological state that make this realiza­
tion possible. He begins, quite wisely, with the 
assumption that Donne and Dickinson are great poets; and 
furthermore, that they are very much alike. They are alike 
in that they “perceive abstraction and think sensation.n 
(p.201i) This rare sensibility, granting the existence 
of talent, demands a certain historical situation, a
28. Qp. oit.. pp. 197-213
29. pp. 325-32.
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situation In which a groat idea la breaking up. Donne 
lived In this situation and so too did Dickinson.
Religious ideas no longer retained tbelr status as symbols 
or myths but tbey were still an available "source of 
Ideas . . .  imbedded in a complete and homogeneous 
society." (p.209) These Ideas having lost their symbolic 
quality enter Into the poet's vocabulary: "Dante could
afford to be philosophical; the terms were a system that 
he acknowledged as truth. But It Is different with Donne; 
the vocabulary is merely vocabulary, and It lacks the 
ultimate, symbolic character of a myth." (p.331) The 
Ideas are still within the poet's culture and the poet 
Is disciplined in them; since he is no longer totally 
committed to them, they act only as a fixed point of 
reference for his sensibility, but they are still strong 
enough to protect him from a romantic yielding to nature 
or to himself: "But, I believe, Miss Dickinson and John 
Donne would have this in common: their sense of the
natural world Is not blunted by a too rigid system of 
ideas; yet the ideas, the abstractions, their education 
or their intellectual heritage, are not so weak as to let 
their immersion In nature, or their purely personal quality, 
get out of control. The two poles of the mind are not
separately visible; . • . There Is no thought as such 
at all; nor is their feeling; there is that unique focus 
of experience which is at once neither and both." (p.210) 
Tate gives, then, a very lucid definition of 
the unity of sensibility; he goes beyond Eliot and es­
tablishes both the psychological and historical reasons 
for the existence of Integrated sensibility. His opinion 
is quite different from that held in "The New Provincialism, 
but he does not bold It without certain misgivings. He 
Is only too aware of Dante and Hilton, poets who held a 
body of truths as absolute, as symbolic. He cannot 
quite relinquish the Idea of the inntr myth's necessity 
for knowledge and for art, and so his remarks are not 
without qualification: "The ideas, in fact, are no
longer the impersonal religious symbols created anew in 
the heat of emotion, that we find in poets like Herbert 
and Vaughan. They have become, for Donne, the terms of 
personality; they are mingled with the miscellany of 
sensation. In Miss Dickinson, as in Donne, we may detect 
a singularly morbid concern, not for religious truth, but 
for personal revelation. The modem term is self-exploi­
tation. It is egoism grown Irresponsible in religion 
and decadent in morals. In religion it is blasphemy;
U7
in society it means usually that culture is not self- 
contained and sufficient, that the spiritual community 
is breaking up." (p.208)
In his political, economic, historical 
thought, and even In his practical criticism when he 
abandons the text to draw general conclusions, Tate for 
thirteen years was remarkably consistent. The terms 
vary over the years; the divisions of the cognitive modes 
Increase or decrease, but the epistemology remains 
essentially the same. The Ideal knowledge is duallstlc, 
depending upon an inner symbol - now religion, now history, 
now regionalism - and upon outer experience - an image 
arising from the soil, an economic situation in which 
life and livelihood are one. Ideal knowledge is time­
less, attains external reality not only concretely and 
contingently but as a continuum in which past and present 
are one. By means of ideal knowledge, unity and purpose 
of individual and social action are achieved, the personal 
life of the citizen and the communal life of society are 
Integrated. Imperfect knowledge is abstract, Infinite 
in quantity but Isolated in time; It is rootless and un­
related to external experience. As a total abstraction 
It is purely logical, exists only in the mind, is never
ontological. This Is tbe knowledge that positivism 
gives. Because it abstracts life from livelihood, 
means from ends, past from present, practical from 
contemplative, quantitative from qualitative, virtue 
from action, it fragments man's life, fragments society, 
creates a vast Inhuman, mechanized hell. The sensitive 
man realizes that he lives in hell, realizes that men 
did not always live so, realizes that for himself there 
is no exit from bell because the one escape, total 
knowledge, is for him impossible.
We too back to the world shall never pass 
Through the shattered door, a dumb shade- 
harried crowd 
Being all infinite, function depth and mass 
Without figure, a mathematical shroud.30
(Last Days of Alice)
30. In quoting Tate's poetry I shall use tbe same pro­
cedure as used with the essays, giving in the text 
itself the name of the poem and the page. The edi­
tion I shall use is the most recent, Poems (New York 
Charles Scribner's Sons, I960), p. 116.
CHAPTER II
THE AESTHETICS
The generic title "New Critics" Implies a 
similarity among those so named, a common body of criti­
cal principles, and a standard methodology. And such an 
Implication Is not totally Incorrect, but It does re­
quire qualification, a qualification too seldom made by 
students of the new critics. In general, scholars attempt 
to formulate a historical synthesis by tracing certain 
critical themes to a common source. They tend to view 
T. E. Hulme as the fountalnhead of the new criticism and 
his "Romanticism and Classicism" as tbe basic seminal 
work. They consider T. S. Eliot as his chief disciple, 
the one who expanded and developed Hulme*a original but 
tenuous Insights. According to this view the main body 
of modern critics would be analogous to the medieval 
coanentators on Aristotle with Eliot bolding Aristotle's 
place and the commentators providing useful but unoriginal 
elaborations of their master Eliot. Robert V. Stallman's 
study of "The New Critics" Is a good example of this pro­
cedure, though It Is not a unique one. He begins his 
critique by establishing the one theme basic to all modern
U9
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criticism.
There is one basic theme in modern criticism; 
it is the dissociation of modern sensibility.
The loss of a spiritual order and of integrity 
In tbe modern consciousness is T. S. Eliot*s 
major promise. Tbe issue of our glorification 
of tbe scientific vision at the expense of 
the aesthetic vision is the central theme in both 
the poetry and the criticism of the Southern poet- 
crltlos. It is this theme of spiritual disorder 
which the late Paul Vallry exploited; it shows 
through the current of the critical writings of 
I. A. Richards, P. R. Leavls, Yvor Winters, R.P. 
Blackmur, and the Southern critics. The New 
Critics, while differing among one another in 
theory or in practice, are as one through the 
unifying relation of this obsessive burden.1
Stallman devotes tbe remainder of his article 
to a grouping of critics under certain secondary themes. 
His study is valuable as a synoptic view - one of the most 
complete - of tbe modern critics. There is, however, the 
almost unavoidable danger in a study of this kind of 
blurring the differences in establishing the similarities. 
If critics as dissimilar as Tate, Blackmur, Burke and 
Winters are lumped together, critics as similar as Tate, 
Ransom and Eliot become almost Identical. In establishing 
tbe central principles of one of these three, the meta- 
crltlc presumes that he understands those of tbe other 
two. Thus W. K. Wlmsatt equates Ransom*s "structure" and
1. "The New Critics," Critiques and Essays in Criticism 
(New York: Ronald Press Co., 19U9), p. P Q .
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"texture” to Tate's "extenelon" and "Intension."2
John Bradbury finds that Tate is influenced by Eliot when
he writes on tradition and by Ransom when he writes on
■i
poetics.-' There is, I suppose, a certain Justice in this. 
The New Critics tend to quote one another with approval 
and usually direct their attacks at those outside the fold, 
the academic scholars and the scientists. Their own 
differences rarely get into public print.^ However, my 
main concern is not Tate's similarity to Eliot or Ransom 
but his originality, bis own unique criticism, if there 
be one.
To Identify this original element It might be well 
to begin by attempting to Isolate the dependent or similar 
elements. I am well aware of the risk Involved in this 
procedure, for even Identical terms do not in their 
independent context have identical meanings. Tate uses 
many of Eliot's and Hulme's terms but he places a special 
emphasis upon the cognitive quality of these terms. His 
use of the key term, "tradition,” as we have seen, Is an 
example of such a usage.
2. The Verbal Icca (Lexington* University of Kentucky Press, 
19514.), P. 7“
3. Op . clt.. p. IU j..
I4.. An exception to this rule is the correspondence between 
Tate and Ransom quoted by Louise Cowan. From it emerges 
Tate's youthful and overly vain sensitivity rather than 
any basic conflict in ideas. Qp. clt.. passim.
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Both Eliot and Tate are In perfect agreement 
concerning the essential social and aesthetic evil of the 
twentieth century, dissociation of sensibility. From this 
soclo-aesthetlc principle flow certain conclusions: 
dissociation of Intellect and emotion, confusion of faith 
and reasop, the dichotomy between art and science, the 
necessity of a cultural point of reference, preferably 
religous.
The motif, ubiquitous In modem criticism, of 
dissociation of sensibility was first formulated by 
Eliot In the essay, "The Metaphysical Poets." Today 
It seems strange that this slender essay could have had 
such far-reaching and revolutionary critical effects.
Since the formulation has become a locus classlcus of 
modern criticism, it merits full quotation.
In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensi­
bility set In, from which we have never recovered; 
and this dissociation, as Is natural, was aggra­
vated by the Influence of the two most powerful poets 
of the century, Milton and Bryden. . . But while 
the language became more refined, the feeling 
became crude. The feeling, tbe sensibility, ex­
pressed in the Country Churchyard (to say nothing 
of Tennyson and Browning) Is cruder than that In the 
Coy Mistress.5
5. Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 
1950), p. 214-7.
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Tate repeatedly rephrases this principle in 
various contexts, some of which we have already seen.
He applies it not only to literature but to economic 
and social conditions as well. This is the principle basic 
to his thought on the Old South and tradition; but as we 
have seen, he expands tbe principle, gives various histori­
cal explanations for the existence of this pysychological 
condition, and twists it into an eplstemologlcal context 
that is little more than implicit in Eliot. Perhaps Tate's 
clearest statement of dissociation is framed in scholastic 
terminology in "The Angelic Imagination,"^
Here we have the Cartesian split -- taste, feeling, 
respect for the depth of nature, resolved into a 
subjectivism which denies the sensible world; for 
nature has become geometrical, at a high level of 
abstraction, in which "clear and distinct ideas" 
only are workable. The sensibility is frustrated, 
since it is denied its perpetual refreshment in 
nature. (P.I4I1.2)
The dissociation of Intellect and emotion is 
hardly a distinct conclusion but rather a rephrasing of 
the initial statement, a fuller definition of sensibility. 
Eliot, In the same essay, indicates the unification of 
sensibility in Chapman and Donne In these words: "In
6. Op . clt.. pp.U32-5U.
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Chapman especially there is a direct sensuous apprehension 
of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling, which 
is exactly what we find in Donne. Tate's paraphrase 
of this, in discussing Emily Dickinson's poetry, is that
Q
"she perceives abstraction and thinks sensation." But 
note the slight variation. For Eliot, the poet recreates 
thought into feeling; his act is a reflective, conscious 
act, one which the philosophers would call reflective 
judgment. Tate, however, eliminates conscious reflection; 
sensation and thought are perceived in one and the same
9
act, an act termed simple applwhenslon by philosophers.
Even when directly borrowing from Eliot, Tate modifies the 
principle in favor of a more unified epistemology.
Eliot formulates another basic principle in an 
essay on William Blake in which he establishes the necessity 
of a culture of traditional and unified religious ideas 
for the genius of the poet. Blake lacked a traditional 
culture and his art suffered as a consequence. "What
7. Qp . clt.. p. 2^6.
8. "Emily Dickinson," Op. clt.. p. 2014..
9. I know of no philosopher who holds this theory. Scotus 
approaches it with hie haeceltas (Hopkins's "inscape").
The Thomlstlc theory is that tbe universal is known by 
the first act of the Intellect and the universal as exist­
ing In the concrete object is known by a second reflective 
act of judgaent.
55
his genius required, and what It sadly lacked, was a 
framework of accepted and traditional Ideas which would 
have prevented him from Indulging In a philosophy of his 
own, and concentrated his attention upon tbe problems 
of the poet.*1^
Tate applies one principle of dissociated 
sensibility to Donne and Dickinson, as we have seen, In 
words almost directly quoted from Eliot: "A culture 
cannot be consciously created. It is an available source 
of Ideas that are imbedded In a complete and homogeneous 
society.** (p.209) Tate expands the concept of dissociation 
to conclusions that are only latent In Eliot*s use of It. 
This principle provides Tate with a basis for value 
judgments of poets and enables him to establish a literary 
hierarchy. Poets of the first rank would be Dante and 
Milton who bad an acoepted faith, for whom religion 
functioned as an Inner myth. Poets of the second rank 
would be Dickinson and Donne who had a source of Ideas 
Imbedded In a homogeneous society but for whom religion 
had ceased to function as a myth. The third class of 
poets would be the romantics who had lost all concept of 
religion. As a consequence their poetry derived either 
from personal semaatlon conceived as a center of conscious­
ness or from philosophical egoism (Shelley and Byron)
10. Op . olt.. pp. 279-80
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dramatizing itself against a background of society or 
history. With the advent of romanticism the dissociation 
of sensibility is complete; there are ideas, there are 
sensations, but there Is no thought sensation or sensed 
thought.
Tate applies this principle repeatedly in his 
literary evaluations. Since the principle is one of 
historic determinism, modern poets according to its 
canon have no chance of high evaluation. Ironically,
Tate himself is doomed to mediocrity by his own prin­
ciple. Pound, MacLelsh, Bishop, Robinson, Cummings, Crane, 
though praised for certain metrical niceties, are yet 
damned In the over-all picture. Of Cumming's poetry Tate 
writes, nNo single poem introduces tbe reader to an im­
plicit body of idea beneath its surface, a realm of
„H
meaning detached once and for all from the poet." Of 
Bishop he remarks, "Where shall the poet get a form that 
will permit him to make direct, comprehensive statements 
about modern civilization? Doubtless nowhere. As a
feat of historical insight the 'fora* of *The Return*
1 PIs commonplace; yet the poem is distinguished." Pound's
11. Reactionary Essays on Poetry and Ideas (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 231.
12. Ibid.. p. 59.
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poetry he discovers to be provincial rather than regional: 
"Mr. Pound is a typically modern, rootless, and inter­
nationalized intelligence. In place of the traditional 
supernaturalism of tbe older and local cultures, he has 
a cosmopolitan curiosity that seeks out marvels, which 
are all equally marvellous whether it be a Greek myth 
or the antics In Europe of a lady from Kansas."1-^ As 
an explanation of the failure of Robinson's narrative 
poems he offers: "Our age provides for the poet no epos
or myth, no pattern of well-understood behavior, which 
the poet may examine in the strong light of his own 
experience.”^  Tate's final judgment of MacLeish's 
"Conquistador” is a gesture of impatient dismissal:
"It is the present fate of poetry to be always beginning 
over again. The kind of 'culture' in 'Conquistador* is 
purely literary; the kind of experience In it is the 
sentimentality of moral isolation. The refinement of 
the craftsmanship hovers over a void.” -^^
13. Ibid.. p. 14-6. 
1I4-. Ibid., p- 199.
15. Ibid., p. 209.
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But It Is bla friend, Hart Crane, that Tate 
sees as tbe tragic figure of modern poetry, tragic In 
tbe Greek sense of being doomed by historical fate to 
failure; tragic In his suicide, a direct result of his 
romantic egoism. Crane was Influenced by Rimbaud but, 
while Rimbaud achieved disorder from order, with Crane 
"the disorder Is original and fundamental. That Is the 
special quality of his mind that belongs peculiarly to 
our own tlme."^ Crane*s poetry suffers not from surface 
defects but from a "defect of vision." And because he 
could not know, not only his poetry was condemned to 
certain failure but bis very suicide was Inevitable. 
"Suicide was the sole act of will left to him short of 
a profound alteration of his character. I think the 
evidence of this Is the locked-ln sensibility, the 
Insulated egoism of his poetry."1*^ Tate writes not 
only of Crane but of the twentieth century. The tragedy 
Is not thtt of one man but of us all. Tate composes a 
dirge, a dirge for Crane, but even more so for the future 
of modern poetry. There Is, there can be no hope of great
16. p. 26.
17. Ibid.. p. 29.
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literature in an age of dissociation* Tate elegizes 
the frustration of his own genius as much as the loss 
of Crane, and In his elegy there Is no word of solace, 
no glimmer of hope, no possible solution.
In the great epic and philosophical works of 
our tradition, notably the Divine Comedy, the In­
tellectual groundwork Is not only simple philoso­
phically} we not only know that the subject Is 
personal salvation, Just as we know that Crane's 
Is the greatness of America: we are given also the 
complete articulation of the Idea down to the 
slightest detail, and we are given It objectively 
apart from anything that the poet is going to say 
about it. . . .It is a game of chess; neither side 
can move without consulting the other. Crane's 
difficulty Is that of modern poets generally: they 
play the game with half of the men, the men of 
sensibility, and because sensibility can make any 
move, tbe significance of all moves is obscure. 18
Melners asks the obvious question, "If the poet's 
discipline in the mysteries of form and his ability 
to objectify his sensibility In form is a matter of 
history, what Is tbe sense of trying to write poetry?"^ 
Neither Melners nor Tate offers an answer.
Undoubtedly many other parallels between the 
thought of Eliot and Tate can be drawn but these, I
18. Ibid.. p. 33.
19. Ibft Last Alternatives: A Study £f £&£ AliAH 
Tate (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1963T, p. 37.
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believe, are the essential ones. What should be noted 
Is that Tate always pushes the principle beyond Eliot's 
application. I do not think that Eliot would ever be so 
desperately pessimistic about the future of modern poetry. 
Certainly he never is in print. Furthermore, Tate insists 
upon a certain unity of vision, a type of cognition that 
is utterly foreign to Eliot's thought. Even when be 
borrows, Tate places a uniquely personal slant on the 
loan.20
The relationship between Tate and Hansom is so 
close that most commentators consider them to be identi­
cal in thought. Since Tate and Ransom developed their 
aesthetics together during the early Fugitive period at 
Vanderbilt, it is extremely difficult to say who influenced 
whom. Ransom was older and had tbe advantage of being
20. It is not my purpose here to criticize Tate's position, 
nor am I qualified to comment on his philosophy of 
history. However, there seems to me to be a somewhat 
unorthodox procedure in Hulme, Eliot, and Tate by 
which a philosophy of historical determinism is de­
duced from aesthetlo judgments upon individual poems. 
The poem is judged by an £ priori set of principles, 
and then its worth or lack of worth is explained by 
historical circumstances. Although there is a very 
definite relationship between cause and effect, yet 
in this method is history ever proved to be the sole 
cause of the poet or of his poem? Does this procedure 
not smaok slightly of tbe old logical fallacy, post hoc 
ergo pronter hoc? Finally, is not this philosophising 
about conditions outside the text precisely the sort 
of thing for which Tate and tbe other New Critics so 
berate the scholars? It is a procedure too gratuitous, 
too abstract, too Cartesian.
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Tate's instructor, but as bo hlmsolf admits, bo learned 
as mucb as be taugbt. It was Tate and not Ransom who
introduced Eliot's work to the Fugitives and defended it
21against tbeir attacks, (Eliot from tbe Fugitive days 
bas been a point of departure for Tate and Ransom.) 
Apparently, though Tate defended Eliot and "The Waste 
Land," he never convinced Ransom, who easily accepted 
Eliot's dicta on tradition (because it coincided with his 
own thinking), but could never accept Eliot's aesthetics. 
For Ransom "The Waste Land" Is a literary failure, all 
texture and no structure. It exemplifies tbe worst in 
modern poetry and is ontologically Incomplete: nPoetlc 
texture without logical,structure is not tbe right 
s t r a t e g y . S t r o n g e r  than his dislike of Eliot's 
structureless verse Is his dislike of Eliot's critical 
and aesthetic approach. He mistrusts Eliot's historical 
criticism, for it remains a historical judgment, not a 
critical judgment. He asks, "What is a historical critic 
exactly? And how does historical learning offer any 
basis for criticism?"*^ Ultimately this sort of criticism
21. "In Amloltia," Sewanee Review. LXVII (Autumn, 1959),
532.
22. "Waste Lands," Literary Re view. Ill (July 11*, 1923), 
825.
23. The Hew Criticism (Norfolk: New Directions, 191*1), 
p. 11*0.
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causes Eliot to become "a practitioner of Arnold's 
'touchstone1 method of judging poetry."^
However, it Is Eliot's theory of the poet's 
depersonalization that most annoys Ransom. He begins 
his attack by taking exception to the clumsy chemical 
metaphor used by Eliot to Introduce his theory in "Tra­
dition and tbe Individual Talent," and concludes that 
Eliot has reduced the whole poetic process to automa­
tism. Nor can Ransom tolerate Eliot's loose and 
unpbllosophical talk about intellect and emotions.
Emotions play no part In criticism,for the critic 
cannot discuss them objectively since they are totally 
subjective. The only Judgment the critic can justly and 
philosophically make concerns not the emotions but the 
objects of the emotions. Ransom can find no rational 
justification for Eliot's famous statement concerning 
thought reduced to feeling, nor can he discover any 
special unity of sensibility in the metaphysical poets.
He concludes, "'Keelings' and 'emotions' are the jargon 
of poetic theory with the new critics, and with the 
best ones It Is Eliot's usage which provides tbe sanction. 
Tbe half-communication that results Is painful to the
2k. Ibid.. p. II4.6
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bumble reader and suggests tbat there Is something esoteric 
to the vocation of criticism, and that Eliot Is Initiated 
but the humble reader Is not."^
Ransom calmly and beretically affirms the value 
of paraphrase, apparently judging It to be no fallacy. 
Paraphrase reveals the structure of the poem; analysis 
considers the texture. He holds a strict dualism, and 
admits no Hegelian synthesis of thought and feeling, 
structure and texture. The mind cannot feel thought, 
nor can It think sensation. "We must not like some 
philosophers become the fools of tbe shining but Imprac­
tical Ideal of 'unity' or of •fusion.1 The aspiration 
here Is for some sort of fusion of two experiences tbat 
ordinarily repel one another: the abstracted exercise 
of reason In hard fact and calculation; and the Inclusive 
experience of literally everything at once. But we cannot 
have our theory magical and Intelligible at the same 
time.1,26
Finally, Ransom rejects Eliot's easy distinc­
tion between philosophical belief and poetic assent. Ransom 
comments, "Had Mr. Eliot served his 'literature* with half
25. Ibid.. p. 150.
26. Ibid.. p. 18J+.
I
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the seal he served his 1 religion*t He believes In be­
lieving the religious dogmas, not the affirmations of 
poetry. I can see no necessity for waiving the Intellec­
tual standards on behalf of poets. If Dante's beliefs 
cannot be accepted by his reader, it Is the worse for 
Dante with that reader, not a matter of Indifference as
Eliot has argued. If Shelley's argument Is foolish, It
27makes his poetry foolish.”
It should be apparent that Ransom's position 
Is anything but identical to Tate's. Implicit In his 
rejection of Eliot Is a rejection of many Tatean themes - 
historical criticism, religious myth, unity of knowledge, 
dissociation of sensibility. Nor Is that all; Ransom 
Is not hostile to the positivist philosopher, John Dewey; 
he rather admires science and tbe methodology It has 
established, and he sees little difference between 
hypothesis and revelation; he Is grateful for the orderly 
thinking of science. If all this is not clearly a rejec­
tion of Tate's position, Ransom makes that rejection 
explicit. In the Acknowledgment prefixed to 
Body. Ransom mentions obligations to Allen Tate and owns 
to sharing his views on poetry. In The New Crltlclsm,
27. Ibid.. p. 208
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however, he cats the aesthetic ties gently but decidedly:
Eliot is one of the foci of a distinguished group 
of literary men with whose sentiments I have 
always had complete sympathy; I am convinced of 
their rightness, but not of what I should call 
their righteousness; for they do not propose to 
have commerce with the world, Mr, Allen Tate 
begins a recent essay by remarking: [Tate repudi­
ates the sciences for the spiritual disorder they 
have created,] I have said probably nearly as 
much, and more than once; but increasingly now I 
feel that such a policy is too luxurious for my 
blood."28
Tate and Ransom are poles apart on nearly every 
essential aesthetic principle. Ransom is a dualist, a 
strict rationalist, a critic who, in principle at least, 
refuses to go outside the text. He and Tate are at one 
only in saying that poetry gives knowledge; but Ransom's 
definition of this knowledge - the logical content of the 
poem's structure - is certainly not Tate's definition.
In recent years Ransom seems willing to drop the theory 
of knowledge in poetry and to settle for a triad or trinity 
rather than for a dualism. His trinity is heart (emotion), 
lioad (Intellect), and feet (meter), each speaking a 
separate language. The poem is this and no more, no con­
crete universal: "The difference between Mr. Wimsatt and
28. Ibid., p. 200-01.
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me la that I abandoned much sooner than he does the 
attempt to make the concrete universal formulation 
work. "2^
Ransom always demands a clear definition of 
terms, a philosophical justification for theory, and a 
logical development of theme. He has no room in his 
system for mysticism or the occult. All is logical, 
neatly divided, and substantiated by the philosophy of 
Kant, ’’the apostle of aesthetic humanism" who reconciled 
the inner and outer world. Ransom is a systematic 
philosopher, and both his poetics and methodology seem 
far closer to Winters’s than to Tate's. For many years 
Ransom and Winters have battled; however, I cannot but 
feel that they have a mutual respect and admiration for 
each other, and if they are able to disagree, it is a 
debate within a system that both agree upon, a system 
that demands clarity, rationality, definition, and logical 
defense. Both of these great critics are far closer to 
the sensibility of the eighteenth century than to that 
of the twentieth. Tate and Eliot belong in this century 
and, though they do not propose to have commerce with the
29. "The Concrete Universal: Observations on the Under­
standing of Poetry," Kenyon Review, XVI (Autumn, 195k)*
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world, yet they share all the defects of that world 
they scorn.
I have often wondered why Tate refuses to 
apply his principle of historical determinism to the 
poetry of T. S. Eliot. In his frequent references to 
Eliot he is always respectful (an unusual emotion for 
Tate); when he directly considers Eliot's poetry, he 
confines his critique to a careful and laudatory study 
of the metrics, and contents himself with but one 
generalization, a paraphrase of Eliot's own principle 
of the poet's depersonalization: "For poetry, of all the 
arts, demands a serenity of view and a settled temper 
of the mind, and most of all the power to detach one's 
own needs from the experience set forth in the poem.
For some reason, never revealed by Tate, Eliot escapes 
the inevitable failure of the twentieth-century poet, 
the failure of Crane, Pound, MacLeish and the others.
Eliot by some trick of historical circumstance avoids 
dissociation of sensibility. How? Tate does not tell 
us. It may be - and this is pure speculation on my 
part - that Tate Judges Eliot to be like Donne and Dickin­
son, disciplined in a creed, possessing, if not religious 
myth, at least the traditional religious ideas. Perhaps
30. "T. S. Eliot," 0£. cit. , pp. 3^ 2-lv3.
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Tate feels that the modem poet can escape the doom of 
historical determinism by faith. If Eliot was con­
verted to Anglo-Catholicism, then faith is not impossible.
If Eliot’s poetic sensibility unified by faith could 
create a religious poem, "Ash Wednesday," in the twenti­
eth century, then complete poetry is possible even 
today. The fact of Eliot belies the theory of historical 
determinism, and Tate does not hesitate to recognize 
Eliot’s achievement: "It is evident that Eliot has hit 
upon the only method now available of using the conven­
tional religious image in poetry." (p. 3i|8) The achieve­
ment of T. S. Eliot may well be the motivating factor 
in Tate's own conversion, for by his conversion Eliot 
achieved, in Tate's judgment, a unification of poetic 
sensibility and, of necessity (in Tate's system), a 
unification of knowledge. If such is the case, then 
Bradbury's severe Judgment may be closer to the truth 
than are those of Meiners or Foster. To Bradbury Tate's 
interest in religion is essentially non-religious: "Thus 
Tate, too, accepts his religion in a metaphorical sense 
only. There is a difference, however,for Ransom's approach 
is essentially humanistic, Tate's ministerial. Ransom is 
interested in sanctions for a full life of the 'sensibility,' 
the faculty by which 'man not only lives his animal life 
but enjoys it' (Ransom's italics); Tate is interested in
the authority it confers."^ Meiners opposes this
judgment. To him Tate's essential and enduring attitude
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is "...a fundamentally religious attitude." Richard 
Foster goes even farther afield into a rather shaky 
theology of conversion - of which I am equally guilty in 
this "speculation." He is not bold enough to attribute 
Tate's conversion to literary reasons - a prudent reser­
vation - but I believe this is exactly what he does 
despite the verbal reservations, and I am not certain 
that he is wrong, though I do not agree with the specific 
literary reasons he proposes.
Allen Tate's conversion, a few years ago, to 
orthodox Christianity, juxtaposed with his colorful 
and instinctive romanticism of mind and sensibility 
assumes the role, for the modern romantic, of a 
kind of technical or symbolic salvation from 
Matthew Arnold. For Arnold had seen the romantic 
future of poetry and its critics coming, and if you 
were a committed traditionalist and anti-romantic 
you had to scorn and fear that vision and the pseudo­
religious devotions it implied. Of course one does 
not convert for literary reasons -- that is, to 
control or thwart one's tendency to turn into a 
romantic. But one does convert out of felt meta­
physical need and a sense of guilt, though sooner 
or later these may get translated into the intellec­
tual term of theology and its dependent ethical and 
political systems.33
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Speculation of this kind can never be more than 
speculation# The ultimate reason for a man's conversion 
is the action of God's grace upon his soul. To attempt 
to explain it by human motives, metaphysical or literary, 
is to misunderstand the nature of the Act of Faith. How­
ever, grace and nature work together in a real conversion, 
and often spiritual and human motives become confusedly 
intertwined. Perhaps it would be best to conclude this 
speculation with the observation that Tate's criteria both 
for total knowledge and superior poetry demand the myth 
of religion.
Before this speculation arising from Tate's 
attitude towards Eliot, I had considered Tate's dependence 
upon Eliot and Ransom. His debt to Eliot is greater and 
more obvious than that to Ransom, who, whatever his origi­
nal theories might have been, is no longer in agreement 
with Tate. I think it is safe to conclude that Tate's 
early discovery of Eliot ended Ransom's influence, and 
that Ransom has had little influence on the mature Tate.
Granting Eliot's influence, what is original in 
Tate's aesthetics? Almost unanimously the critics agree 
that Tate’s theory of poetry as knowledge forms the basis
of his a e s t h e t i c s . T a t e  is not unique in holding 
this theory; indeed it is one of the central tenets of 
the new critics, but Tate develops it more fully and con­
siders it to be more essential than does any other con­
temporary critic. However, the isolation of a theme is 
neither the explanation nor the understanding of that 
theme, and the majority of Tatefs critics do not go 
beyond the declaration of its existence. Those who do 
examine what Tate means by this theory usually conclude 
their analyses by defining Tate in relation to Ransom, 
Sliot, or even Winters. They draw analogies, but they 
do not define Tate by Tate. Thus, as we have seen, Wimsatt 
explains Tate by explaining Ransom. Murray Krieger is 
even more synthetic in his analysis and serenely lumps 
Tate, Ransom, and Winters together - what a violent 
yoking of opposites - and then proceeds to explain what 
they mean by telling us what Vivas means: "If we yield 
up the word knowledge, or the word truth, we might then
3i*. A divergent opinion is Clifford Amyx's. He believes 
that Tate's essay "Tension in Poetry" is a clear 
statement of his aesthetics. He concludes that the 
most valuable contribution to aesthetics in the 
twentieth century is Tate's division of poetry into 
the categories of "extension," "intension," and 
"tension." "The Aesthetics of Allen Tate, Western 
Review. XIII (Spring, 19^9), 135-U4-
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see these theorists as meaning something much like what 
Eliseo Vivas means when he speaks so often of poetry as 
presenting us with 'the organization of the primary 
subject matter (or the data) of experience.'"3^ Hoyt 
Trowbridge simplifies the problem by informing us that 
Tate’s theory and method are Platonic: "It [poetry] is 
the most complete mode of discourse because it unites 
extension and intension, abstraction and concreteness, 
the symbol and the icon —  science or pure prose, and 
myth or pure poetry. 'Tension' is Mr. Tate's name for 
this synthesis of meanings. . • That these concepts are 
Platonic universals, dialectically applied, must be 
apparent to every r e a d e r / ^  Trowbridge is not the only 
critic to reduce Tate's poetic knowledge to Platonic 
ideas. 37 fjot an  critics, however, agree that Tate is a 
Platonist; Rudd Fleming, for example, using "The Hovering 
Fly" as his chief source, discovers Tate to be a modern 
existentialist, a devout follower of Edmund Husserl.^®
The lack of unanimity among the critics as to what Tate
39. The Hew Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: University 
ofMinnesota Press, 199b)* P* 109.
36* "Aristotle and the 'New Criticism,'" Sewanee Review.
LII (Autumn, 19UJ+) » Skk*
37* Martin Svaglic, "Allen Tate on the Top of the Ladder," 
Poetry. LXXXIII (January, 195U>, 225-6.
36. "Dramatic Involution: Tate, Husserl and Joyce," Sewanee 
Review, LX (Summer, 1952), i+J+5— -
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moans Is almost a classic case of tot sunt sententiae 
quot sunt auctores. If it is the task of the critic to 
clarify and explain an author, then we can hardly abuse 
Tate’s critics for resorting to philosophical categories 
and comparisons* It is so much easier to understand 
Plato or Husserl or Thomas or Aristotle or Ransom than to 
understand Tate. Even so exact a scholar as Meiners is 
driven to explaining Tate’s meaning by telling us what 
Maritain says St. Thomas m e a n s .  39 Tiie cause of much of 
this confusion is Tate's own fuzziness of thought; how­
ever, the critics are at fault in failing to relate his 
aesthetic to his social and historical thought. If the 
problem of knowledge is the center of unity in the essays 
on tradition, in the poetry and fiction, it would seem a
39. Op. cit., p. 63. Meiners sprinkles his study with 
philosophical terminology. I am not qualified to 
judge whether his frequent allusions to Kant are or 
are not correct. However, he repeatedly misinterprets 
St. Thomas and confuses the meaning of Thomistic terms, 
learnedly quoted In Latin. For example, esse is in 
the Thomistic system the active principle; essentia is 
the passive principle. Meiners translates esse as 
essence. The basic metaphysical principle in thomisra 
is the real distinction cum fundamento in re” between 
esse and essentia. Without this distinctTon the 
analog!a entls referred to by Meiners is impossible. 
Consequently, I am led to conclude that he does not 
understand Thomism and that his attempts to relate 
Tate's ideas to those of St. Thomas clarifies nothing. 
He misinterprets one to explain the other.
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valid conjecture that the same problem might well be the 
basis oT his aesthetics. Furthermore, the tentative 
eplstemology devised by Tate as a solution to the problem 
of knowledge might be presumed to be at least latent In 
his Ideas concerning poetry as knowledge.
All this would seem to Imply that by clarifying 
Tate*s fuzziness of thought and by applying his eplstemo­
logy to his aesthetics I shall be able to present a clear 
and unified exposition of his theory of poetry as knowl­
edge. Such, unfortunately, Is not the casn. Tate never 
does solve his problem and his essays over the years 
repeat but never clarify or develop his position. I see, 
then, no advantage In a chronological survey of his 
writings. In any event, this has already been done by 
others with no marked success In clarifying the Issues.
In attempting to synthesize bis aesthetics I shall give 
and explain his answers to three questions: What Is not
poetry? What are the types of poetry? What Is poetry?
If Tate Is somewhat vague about the positive 
aspects of poetry, he Is never vague about what It Is not. 
Tate has always been a termlnallst critic, scornfully 
rejecting instrumentalism of any kind. Ironically, his 
thought Is ordered, logical, and devastatingly clear when 
refuting an adversary; logic, however, deserts him in the 
exposition of his own position. Jacques Barzun gives a
7$
not unfair description of Tate's method of attack:
"If indignant, he must be savage in his indignation, not 
superior. . . .He picks up an offending quotation with 
rubber gloves and a pair of tongs, denying all solidarity 
with his opponents."^ Who are Tate's opponents? In 
general, anyone who would use poetry as a means to some­
thing other than poetry. As early as 1926 he was quite 
clear that poetry was absolute, was an end in itself, 
could never be yoked to science. In his rejection of 
Edwin Muir's theory that science would replace the lost 
mythologies of poetry, he demands a poetry rooted in 
concrete reality: "It [Muir's theory] ignores the hopeless 
breach between the abstractionism of science, however 
familiar this may become, and the object itself, for 
which abstractionism stands and to which it is the busi­
ness of the poet to r e t u r n . I f  poetry is distinct and 
must remain distinct from science, it is equally distinct 
from politics; an end in itself, it can never serve 
politics from the auxiliary position in which Edmund Wilson 
would place it. Such a union would result in propaganda, 
not poetry.^
1+0. "Mr. Tate's 'Radical Dualism,'" Saturday Review of
Literature, XXIV (May 31, 19I+1) , 7.
1+1. "Tiresias," Nation, CXXIII (November 17, 1926), $09.
1+2. "Poetry and Politics," New Republic, LXXV (August 2,
1933), 308-11.
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In "Confusion and Poetry," Tate strikes out at 
the heresy that poetry is emotion.^ He reaffirms Eliot's 
principle that the poet's emotions have no poetic value 
in themselves but are elevated to poetry only when Joined 
with thought. Because they do not understand this basic 
principle, the New Humanists like More and Babbitt and 
the romantic critics like Van Wyck Brooks and Mumford turn 
poetry into religion. Tate in this condemnation applies to 
specific critics Hulme’s censure of romanticism as "spilt 
religion." If poetry is not emotion, according to Tate, 
neither is it religion.
In "Literature as Knowledge"^ he establishes 
a dilemma fundamental to his poetics, the subjective- 
objective content of poetry. Arnold, I. A. Richards, and 
Charles V. Morris in their failure to solve the dilemma 
reduce poetry to "irresponsible feelings." Their failure 
is caused by the neo-classical principles they apply to 
poetry, a fatal dualism of subject and form, content and 
emotion. Arnold fathered this heresy with his fallacious 
conception of "poetic language as a rhetorical vehicle of 
ideas." His abortive attempt to save poetry from science 
reduced it to something less than science: "Poetry is 
descriptive science of experience at that level, touched
I4.3. Sewanee Review, XXXVIII (Aprll-June, 1930) , 133-U9. 
0£. clt., pp. I6-I4.8 .
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with emotion." (p. 18) Arnold by reducing the poetic 
quality of the poem to external decoration gave the caae 
away to science. Richards and Morris, working from the 
same neo-classical dualism, conclude that the content of 
poetry has no external denotatum, is not relevant to ob­
jects and situations. Cut off from external relevancy, 
poetry for them "becomes either nonsense or hortatory 
rhetoric." (p. 3U) Before offering his own solution to 
the problem, Tate sets up the dilemma that traps Richards 
and the others.
The confusion and contradiction that we saw in 
Mr. Morris and in the early Richards came of 
trying to square a theory of interest-value with 
a theory of emotional projection which was not 
firmly based upon positivist knowledge. That 
contradiction is the clue to the "unintelligibil­
ity" of the doctrines if held separately. If you 
take the first alone, eliminating the second, you 
eliminate the "mind" and you get pure positivism: 
in thus eliminating cognition, you lose "every­
thing in which we go beyond the animals." If you 
take the second alone, and eliminate the external 
world in any of the four meanings that Mr. Richards 
gives to the phrase, you have a knowing mind with­
out anything that it can know. (p. 14.6)
David Daiches is the object of Tate's attack 
in "The Present Function of C r i t i c i s m . H e  begins 
the essay with a vicious salvo against positivism: Comte,
14.5 . 0£. eft., pp. 3-15.
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Dewey, Arnold, historical scholarship, the graduate 
school, the vulgar middle class, I. A. Richards, Carnap, 
and Morris he dismisses with withering scorn. Having 
vented his savage indignation on better than half mankind, 
he turns a more refined rage upon the "doctrine of rele­
vance." This doctrine would measure literature by some­
thing other than literature. It is an implicit admission 
that literature in itself and by itself is unreal, is 
unscientific, is an embarrassment to the modern pragmatic 
mind. To save literature the positivist would make it 
relevant to history (Daiches), to naturalism (Edmund Wil­
son), would make it designate but not denote (the "amiable 
insanity" of Carnap and Morris), would make it a thera­
peutic ordering of our minds with lies (Richards). Tate 
admits no rival claims; literature is absolute in its own 
knowledge; it is relevant to nothing but itself: "This 
essay has been written from a point of view which does not 
admit the validity of the rival claims of formalism and 
history, of art-for-art's sake and society. Literature 
is the complete knowledge of man's experience, and by 
knowledge I mean that unique and formed intelligence ofV
the world of which man alone is capable." (p. 15)
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In summary, Tate rejects instrumentalism of 
any kind. To him the value of poetry is terminal; 
poetry is an end in itself. It does not need to be 
defended by psychology, history, science, politics, 
naturalism. It is not useful for something else, is not 
relevant to something else. Poetry is not the poet's 
emotion, is not an intuition into nature, is not the poet's 
subjective world. Poetry is "a special, unique, and com­
plete knowledge." (p. 8)
Tate's answer to what poetry is not is clear and 
complete. His answer to what the types of poetry are is 
less specific; It Is rather a series of value judgments to 
be used as general norms. Thus in "Tension in Poetry"^ he 
sets up three categories of poetry, two of incomplete and 
imperfect poetry, the third of complete and perfect poetry. 
He begins his essay - so admired by Amyx, so ridiculed by 
Trowbridge - by separating poetry from mass communication:
"I am attacking here the fallacy of communication in poetry." 
(p. 77) Having declared that poetry is not communication - 
Miss Millay's verse fares very badly in this section - he 
distinguishes between poetry of denotation and of conno­
tation. Metaphysical poetry is a poetry of denotation in
1*6. 0£, cit., pp. 75-90.
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which the poet stretches the meaning of his poetic lan­
guage to its ultimate logical extension. Symbolist poetry 
is a poetry of connotation in which the poet forces his 
images to their ultimate intension. Neither poetry is 
complete: "It would be a hard task to choose between 
the two strategies, the Symbolist and the metaphysical; 
both at their best are great, and both are incomplete."
(p* 36) Complete poetry combines "extension" and "inten­
sion;" it is a poetry of "tension." "The remotest figu­
rative significance that we can derive does not Invalidate 
the extensions of that literal statement. Or we may begin 
with literal statement and by stages develop the complica­
tions of metaphor: at every stage we may pause to state 
the meaning so far apprehended, and at every stage the 
meaning will be coherent." (p. 83)
In "Tension in Poetry" Tate divides poetry 
according to qualities intrinsic to poetry, "extension," 
"intension," and "tension." In "Three Types of Poetry"^ 
he divides poetry according to the faculties of the poet. 
The two imperfect types, allegory and romantic irony, pro­
ceed from the poet's will; the third type, "the creative
1+7. 0j>. clt., pp. 91-111+.
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spirit," proceeds from the poet's Imagination.
In this essay I propose to discuss three 
kinds of poetry that bring to focus three attitudes 
of the modern world. I do not say all three atti­
tudes, because there are more than three attitudes. 
And there are more than three kinds of poetry.
The first attitude Is motivated by the prac­
tical will: In poetry until the seventeenth 
century It leaned upon moral abstractions and 
allegory; now, under the Influence of the sciences,
It has appealed to physical Ideas. It looks from 
knowledge to action. The second attitude has been 
developed from the second phase of the first; It Is 
a revolt against the domination of science; and in 
poetry it has given us the emotion known as "romantic 
Irony." The third attitude la nameless because It 
Is perfect, because It Is complete and whole. Criti­
cism may isolate the Imperfect, and formulate that 
which Is already abstract; but It cannot formulate 
the concrete whole. There Is no philosophical or 
historical name for the kind of poetry that Shake­
speare wrote. I shall call It, in this essay, the 
creative spirit, (p.91)
Allegory, like The Kaerle Queen, is either 
didacticism or propaganda. The poet, imitating the 
scientific Imposition of will upon nature, reduces his 
subject matter to a series of preconceived abstractions.
A restatement in paraphrase of these abstractions exhausts 
their meaning, for "they stand, not In themselves, but 
merely for something else." (p. 97) Allegory does not 
invite the contemplation of "the vision of the whole of 
life" but rather addresses Itself directly to the reader's
82
moral will. It is a form of rhetoric, a "pseudo-explana­
tion of unimagined material." (p. 9I4.)
With the rise of science, the romantic poet 
was deprived of the magical fictions by which he could 
affirm his will allegorically. He revolted and pitted 
his individual will against all forms of order, confusing 
order with science. He imposed his will rhetorically upon 
his material and built up a series of explanations congenial 
to his unscientific nature. Thus Shelley's poetry is 
filled with explanations for material he cannot experience. 
Shelley imposed explanations upon his material; the ex­
planation never rises from the depth of the situation or 
material Itself.
Great poetry like that of Shakespeare is the 
inner meaning of experience; it is a vision of the whole 
of life. Its "meaning is nowhere distinct from its 
specific quality." (p. 97) Edgar's reflection, "Ripeness 
Is all," is neither true nor false; it is "experienced."
"The specific merit of Edgar's statement as general truth 
or falsehood is irrelevant because it is an experienced 
statement, first from Edgar's, then from our own, point 
of view; and the statement remains experienced, and thus 
significant and comprehensible, whether it is true or
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false." (p. 93) Poetry of this quality proceeds not 
from the will of the poet but from his imagination:
"The power of creating the inner meaning of experience 
is a quality of the imagination." (p. 98)
It should be noted that Tate in his attacks 
upon false concepts of poetry and in his classification 
of poetry sets up a dualism and then resolves it into 
a unity. Complete poetry is neither extension nor inten­
sion but a union of both, tension. Perfect poetry is 
neither the abstract meanings of allegory nor the abstract 
ego of the romantic poet, but is "the middle ground of 
vision, and, with respect to itself, the vision of the 
whole, is not susceptible of logical demonstration."
(p. 113) Just as Tate, in his essays on tradition, re­
jects the partial knowledge of abstract science and of 
contingent symbolism, and requires a total knowledge 
encompassing both the abstract and the contingent, so too 
he rejects incomplete poetry that is either abstraction 
or pure sensation and requires that perfect poetry be a 
fusion of the abstract and the concrete. Poetry is the 
union of intellect and emotion, the union of the universal 
and the singular; it is the whole knowledge of the whole 
world.
Tate's adaption of Eliot's ideas, his violent 
opposition to instrumentalist critics, his divisions of
814-
poetry are not unrelated to his theory of poetry as 
knowledge. Rather are they a preparation for and a 
proof of this theory. A statement or theory may be 
proved by deduction or induction. It may be established 
by removing all opposing conclusions - a kind of proof 
by elimination; a Socratlc removal of error that the 
truth may appear. Tate’s conclusion to "Three Types of 
Poetry" demonstrates this procedure.
Since I have not set out to prove an argument, 
but to look into arguments that seem to me to be 
wrong, I will state a conclusion as briefly as 
possible: that poetry finds its true usefulness in 
its perfect inutility, a focus of repose for the 
will-driven intellect that constantly shakes the 
equilibrium of persons and societies with its 
unremitting imposition of partial formulas. When 
the will and its formulas are put back into an im­
plicit relation with the whole of our experience, 
we get true knowledge which is poetry. It is the 
kind of knowledge which is really essential to the 
world, the true content of its phenomena, that which 
is subject to no change, and therefore is known with 
equal truth for all time. Let us not argue about 
it. It is here for those who have eyes to see.
(pp. 113-11*.)
Over the years this formula varies but little.
In treating the knowledge that poetry gives, Tate proves 
by elimination and concludes with statement. He care­
fully analyzes and refutes the proponents of other theories 
and then terminates his essay with a statement - "not 
susceptible of logical demonstration" - of his position.
The wording of these statements remains fairly constant.
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Commentators on Tate have attempted to follow the 
development of his theory by making a chronological 
survey of its expression. But so far they have by 
this method failed to demonstrate a growth or change in 
Tate's thinking or to clarify the meaning of the theory. 
Bradbury finds that Tate never achieves a solution but 
escapes into suprarationalism.^® Meiners expresses the 
same conclusion in terms somewhat more favorable to 
Tate: "Yet I believe it was this very retreat from
certainty on purely aesthetic and historical grounds 
which later lead him to despair of finding any certainty 
on these terms, and to commit himself to a traditional
Kg
metaphysics, an explicitly religious p o s i t i o n . A n d  as 
we have seen, Richard Foster explains Tate's conversion 
in similar terms.
Perhaps these critics are correct; I have 
already inferred that religion appears to be the only 
escape from Tate's system of historical determinism. 
However, I do not think that Tate's "knowledge" is so 
mysterious as to defy rational explanation. If Tate 
himself never attempts a logical exposition of it, he 
does, nevertheless, provide a system of epistemology in
1*8. 0£. cit. . p. 110. 
1*9. 0£. cit. , p. 72.
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his essays on tradition, and it is not unreasonable to 
presume that this same epistemology is implicit in his 
poetics•
Tate's first and most ambitious attempt to 
establish a poetics is his essay "Poetry and the 
Absolute," He begins it by establishing a distinction 
between an ontological absolute and a created absolute, 
between metaphysics and art. In so doing he declares 
his independence of Ransom,
For in explaining the relation between the poet 
and his world, Mr, Ransom fails to touch the 
relation between the poet, or reader, and the 
poem. This relation conduces to an absolutism.
The problem of which lies outside the metaphysical 
enquiry into the nature of reality. To understand 
this relation is doubtless the chief end of 
criticism. And here the pertinency of the terms, 
monism and dualism, obviously disappears,
Tate proceeds on the assumption that the 
mind has an "irresistible need" for an absolute other 
than that provided by philosophy. Experience is dis­
ordered and is transient; the poet orders experience and 
renders it static by form. The poet thus establishes 
for himself and for the reader an absolute unity of
5>0. Sewanee Review, XXXV (January, 1927), i^ l.
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an experience, his reaction to it, and his immediate 
perception of it within the medium of language. This 
absolute, freed from the disorder and disturbance of 
ordinary human experience, is a perfect communication:
"If the perceptions which go to make up the poem, however, 
are perfectly realized, presented free of the disturbances 
out of which they have sprung, the poem will provide the 
same experience for others."^- Tate does not tell us 
why the absolutes of philosophy fail to satisfy the 
"irresistible need for absolute experience." Perhaps 
"experience" is the key word. Philosophical absolutes 
describe the metaphysical order of the universe, and 
description is a step removed from experience, from immedi­
ate and total perception. But the poem, though it presents 
experience freed from contingency, does not falsify experi­
ence. It Is real knowledge of the world: "The world of 
'The Funeral1 Is a section of the known world, the world 
knowable through Mr. Ransom's, or the history of philoso­
phy's general possibilities of knowing anything -- it is 
irrelevant which one. But there is a particular quality 
of a poem that makes it wholly unlike the portion of the
51. Ibid., p. 1*3.
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knowable world for which it stands; as a portion it is 
complete, it is f i n i t e . A l l  this is not very easy 
and has exacerbated more than one critic. What exactly 
do we know and how do we know it, and to what does our 
knowledge refer? Forster sees separation of art from 
the world to be "spectral exoticism," and the knowledge 
that art provides to be almost mystical, a "unique, 
unreferential, intransitive" experience.^
Tate frequently returns to the theme of poetry 
as knowledge in reviews and essays in Poetry, The New 
Republic, The Nation; but his treatment is only incidental. 
In 191+0 in "The ^resent Function of Criticism," as has 
been noted, he attacks the heresy of relevance and con­
cludes the essay with this definition of literature: 
"Literature is the complete knowledge of man's experience, 
and by knowledge I mean that unique and formed intelligence 
of the world of which man alone is capable." (p. 15) This 
is uncompromising enough but leaves the reader still some­
what in the dark. In the following year "Literature of 
Knowledge" appeared, and we might expect that it would 
offer something more illuminating, some explanation or
52. Ibid., p. 1+5.
53. "Narcissus as Pilgrim: Allen Tate," Accent, XVII 
(Summer, 1957), lo5.
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development of the concept of literature as knowledge. 
However, the major part of the article is devoted to 
a refutation of Richards, Morris, and Coleridge. As he 
nears the conclusion, though, Tate concentrates upon 
the knowledge theory. He approves of Richards1^ later 
work, Coleridge on Imagination and accepts both the 
antithesis Richards discovers in poetry and the Hegelian 
synthesis he attempts to achieve by means of the imagina­
tion. According to this antithesis the mind of the poet 
either reads nature as a symbol of something behind 
nature or creates a nature of his own feelings. The 
first supposition eliminates the mind; the second 
eliminates the known object. What knowledge, then, does 
poetry give? Tate answers, "It is neither the world of 
verifiable science nor a projection of ourselves; yet it 
is complete." (p. I4.7 ) The completeness is not "the order 
of experimental completeness aimed at by the positivist 
sciences." This "completeness" is abstract and no one 
can experience it. (Here, fifteen years later, Tate ex­
plains why the "absolutes" of philosophy mentioned in 
"Poetry and the Absolute" fail to satisfy man’s need for 
an absolute.) Literature is not of the experimental order 
but is of the "experienced order; It is, in short, of the 
mythical order." Tate returns to Richards for a definition 
of myths. They are not an escape from the hard realities 
of life, but "they are these hard realities in projection,
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their symbolic recognition, co-ordination and acceptance.'* 
(p. 1+7) He then concludes with a warning against a too 
rational criticism that tends to look beyond the poem.
This is ''learned ignorance;" the interest value of the 
poem is a cognitive one and "in the poem, we get knowledge 
of a whole object." (p. 1+8) Pragmatic criticism reduces 
literature "to a formed realm of our experience, the 
distinction of which is its complete knowledge, the full 
body of the experience that it offers us." (p. 1+8)
Before attempting an analysis of the theory of
poetry as knowledge, I should like to consider one more
text important both in itself and for the date of its
composition. "Reflections on American Poetry: 1900-1950" 
was first published in 1958. It is an essay ignored by 
all of Tate’s major critics, possibly because it destroys 
so many neat theses. Writing after his conversion and 
after his scholastic essays, Tate nevertheless returns 
to his former vocabulary, avoids scholastic explanations 
and religious escapes. Although he is not specifically 
formulating a theory of poetry, yet he presents one of 
the clearest expositions of his poetic theory. He does 
in this essay what he fails to do in others; he distlh* 
guishes between the poem and the poet, the knowledge in the 
poem and the knowledge necessary to the poet to create the
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poem. The knowledge in the poem is of the human condition 
the reader grasps this knowledge by means of language and 
rhythms.
The best American poets (Crane is one of a handful) 
have tried to discover new and precise languages by 
which poetry now as always must give us knowledge 
of the human condition -- knowledge that seems to 
reach us partly in the delight one gets from rhythms 
and insights that one has not already heard and 
known. What particular qualities go to make up an 
original poet now or at any time, I shall attempt 
to describe. It has seemed to me that the best 
American poets of our age have used a certain mode 
of perception, that I have named the aesthetic- 
historical.
What poets know and how they know it are 
questions that go beyond the usual scope of criti­
cism, for what a poet of the past knows is viewed 
historically, not for what it is, and we take it for 
granted. But with a poetry which is near us in 
time, or contemporaneous, much of the difficulty 
that appears to be in the language as such, is 
actually in the unfamiliar focus of feeling, belief, 
and experience which directs the language from the 
concealed depths that we must try laboriously to 
enter. 69-
Thus the poet renders (Tate refuses to use the 
word communicate) the knowledge he has gained of the human 
condition by means of form. He gains this knowledge by 
means of a certain mode of perception, the aesthetic- 
historical. Tate does not mean by this term a philosophy
Sk* Sewanee Review, LXIV (January, 1956), 66. The same 
article serves as the introduction to Modern Verse 
in English: 1900-1950 (New York: Macmillan OoTl T^58)* 
PP* 39-US.
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of art but rather a mode or type of cognition: "I have 
used the word aesthetic not to point to a philosophy of 
art. . . I mean a mode of perception, a hyperaesthesia 
that began with Poe and Baudelaire and that produced in 
our generation concentrated metaphors like Crane*s.n 
This form that the modern poet uses makes possible a 
rendering of his perception: "This controlled disorder 
of perception has been the means of rendering a direct 
impression of the poet’s historical situation. Tate, 
recalling perhaps his early distinction between the onto­
logical and created orders, refines his description of 
the creative process even further: "The verbal shock, the 
violent metaphor, as a technique of magic, forces into 
linguistic existence subjective meanings and insights 
that poets can no longer discover in the common world. 
This I take to mean that Tate no longer distinguishes the 
created from the ontological order but views language as 
a special mode of existence. Secondly, I believe that he 
restates here a theory which he had advanced in "Longinus 
and the 'New Criticism,,n that style and subject cannot
55. Ibid., P. 67.
56. Ibid., p. 69.
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b© separated but form a unit which if divided really or 
logically destroys the existence of both.^
In summary, Tate would seem to hold a quasi 
hylomorphism, The poem is a unit, an unum per se 
composed of matter (the poet's knowledge, insight, per­
ception) and form (metaphor, meter, language). However, 
one does not exist without the other; both come into 
being at the same time. The poet's mode of cognition 
is such that he perceives or knows in the act of creating. 
His knowledge is a special concrete form of knowledge.
To return to Tate's early epistemology, the poet perceives 
by means of an inner myth and by means of outer reality. 
The knowledge gained by this act of perception is neither 
abstract like that of science nor contingent like that of 
pure sense perception. It is both abstract and concrete, 
achieved in one act of cognition, and it must be rendered 
in the same fashion in which it was gained; subject and 
style become one in form. Rendered formless, this knowl­
edge becomes abstract and partial. This, I confess, is 
the clearest exposition I am capable of giving to Tate's 
theory of poetry as knowledge, and even this exposition 
may do violence to his thought. But if Tate does not mean 
this, he does mean something very much like it. He has to 
admit the existence of dualism but he refuses to accept
57. Op. cit., pp. 516-17
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either side of that dualism alone; always - in the poem, 
in the act of knowledge - the duality is reduced to a 
unity, to an unum per se. He admits a dualism that re­
sembles the act and potency of Aristotle, the essence 
and existence, substance and accidents, matter and form 
of St. Thomas. The dualism can be separated by the mind 
but cannot exist separated in reality. Tate transfers 
this metaphysical distinction, which is valid only in the 
ontological order, to the logical and psychological 
orders. The logical parts of the poem must exist as an 
ontological unity. The separate psychological acts of 
the mind must exist as one ontological act only. Tate 
continually demands in one order that which is valid only 
in another order. All orders of logic, ontology, psychol­
ogy are reduced by Tate to the order of epistemology. He 
confuses the existence that either a real or possible 
being has in man's mind and in objective reality. It is 
this confusion of epistemology, psychology, ontology, of 
sensate acts and intellectual acts, of the faculties from 
which these acts proceed that makes Tate's thought so 
extremely difficult to comprehend, to unravel. It is the 
synaesthesia of Baudelaire carried beyond the senses to 
the spiritual faculties of man. An example of this is 
Tate's use of the verb "see" to mean a special mode of
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cognition; a mode that is both intellectual and visual. 
It is Eliot's dissociation of sensibility pushed to 
philosophical absurdity, an absurdity in which the eye 
thinks and the mind sees. Tate's philosophy of art, his 
philosophy of knowledge are closer to Baudelaire’s 
"Correspondences" than he might care to admit. Odors 
may not be soft as oboes and green as a plain, but 
spirit and sense do become confusingly intermingled.
Tate concludes his survey of American poetry 
with an implicit criticism: "Modern American poetry, 
limited in scope to the perceiving, as distinguished 
from the seeing, eye, has given us images of the present 
condition of man that we cannot find elsewhere; and we 
ought to have them."^® The distinction between percep­
tion and seeing implies a defect in poetic cognition. 
This implication is reinforced by the use of the word 
"hyperaesthesia" earlier in the article, a pejorative 
word in Tate's vocabulary. He changes "hyperaesthesia" 
to "sensibility" in the introduction to Modern Verse in 
English, but he does not alter the distinction between 
perception and seeing. Tate continues to hold Eliot’s 
principle of the dissociation of sensibility, and he 
refuses to soften his severe judgments formerly made of
58. Ibid., p. 70
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modern poets. They suffer from a "defect of vision," 
which of necessity results from an aesthetic-historical 
mode of perception. Only an aesthetic-religious mode 
of seeing, as distinguished from perceiving, can grasp 
total knowledge, can create complete poetry. This is 
the last published article in which Tate considers the 
problem of poetic cognition and the position he holds, 
despite conversion, despite Thomistic philosophy, is 
exactly the same as he had held nearly thirty years 
earlier. Tate does not seem to have discovered in 
religion the escape from historical determinism that he 
once hoped for. No man in the twentieth century can 
"see." No poet can write great, complete, pure poetry. 
The best the poet can do is to indicate the hell that 
is the human condition in our age.
Tate's theory of poetry as knowledge has 
always generated opposition. Francis Roellinger points 
out Tate's failure to supply an external referent for 
his knowledge. By placing knowledge in the poem rather 
than in the object or in the knowing mind, Tate denies 
external verification and destroys criteria by which 
true knowledge can be distinguished from false.^
59. "Two Theories of Poetry as Knowledge," Southern Re­
view, VII (Spring, 1914-2) , 690-705.
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Murray Krieger comments ironically: "Indeed, this 
knowledge given by poetry is not, for our theorists, 
to compete with any other kind of knowledge. It is 
simply different from propositional knowledge and has 
to do with a world differently conceived in accordance 
with the difference of purpose. It is, then, a knowledge 
which has its own rightful place, a knowledge of experi­
ence with its fullness."^0
Tate himself is not unaware of the problem 
of relating poetic knowledge to the real world. In two 
remarkable essays, neither a direct consideration of 
the problem, he suggests a possible relationship. "Yeats's 
Romanticism"^ is an excellent study of Yeats's poetic 
method. Tate obviously admires Yeats whom he ranks above 
Eliot or Pound and compares to Dante. Yeats is in the 
tradition; he is unromantic; he has bridged the gap be­
tween sensibility and intellect. How did he overcome the 
modern curse of dissociated sensibility? According to 
Tate: by means of his mythology, which is not so much
a mythology as "a dramatic framework through which is
60* 0p» cit., p. 189.
61. 0£. cit., pp. 211|,-2L(..
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made visible the perpetual oscillation of man between 
extreme introspection and extreme loss of the self in 
the world of action.” (p.222) The system is the vehicle 
of profound insights; it is the means by which Yeats 
attains a knowledge of the world. So far the knowledge 
is in Yeats's "seeing" mind. How does it get into the 
poem and from the poem into the mind of the reader? It 
is embodied in the poem by means of imagery and symbol, 
which in turn act upon the reader so that he too can "see." 
"If we begin with the poetry we shall quickly see that 
there is some source of power of illumination which is 
also in us, waiting to be aroused; and that is true of 
even the greater number of fine peems in which the 
imagery appears upon later study to lean upon the eccen­
tric system." (p.219)
"The Hovering Fly: A Causerie on the Imagina-
fi?tion and the Actual World"0 is one of Tate's most re­
markable essays and one of his most significant attempts 
to relate literature to the actual world; but it is also 
one of his most difficult essays to discuss. Perhaps this 
is the reason that most commentators dismiss it as "occult­
ism. "
62. 0|>. cit., pp. II4.6-62
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It is not that; rather is it a demonstration through 
practical criticism of the abstract statement that 
literature is knowledge. Tate does not tell the reader, 
but he attempts to lead the reader to vision, to make 
him see. He frequently does this with a text - with 
Flaubert, Dante, Donne, Yeats, Eliot. And Tate is at 
his best when considering a specific literary work; at 
the conclusion of the essay we agree with his abstract 
thesis not because of rational conviction but b'cause 
of an experience through which he has lead us by means 
of practical criticism. Tate begins this essay with 
the assumption that literature reveals to us the actual 
world. This actual world can be the external empirical 
one or it can be the internal subjective one: "It is, 
in fact, no mere quibble of idealism if we decide to 
call the subjective field not only the world but the 
actual world, taking our stand on the assumption that it 
sufficiently reflects or gathers in or contains all that 
we can ever know of any other world or worlds that appear 
to lie beyond it." (p.l£0) The actual world revealed by 
literature is not the actual world reported by the senses
62. Ojd. cit. , pp. II4.6-62.
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at any given moment. Literature gives us an actuality 
that is coherent and moving, and it does this by means 
of the imagination which unifies and renders profound 
the world of observation, and it appeals in turn to the 
reader's imagination. Tate informs us somewhat gnomi- 
cally, "We may look at the hovering fly; we can to a 
degree know the actual world. But we shall not know the 
actual world by looking at it; we know it by looking at 
the hovering fly." This means "that in terms of the 
dramatic imagination the world and the fly are the same 
thing." (p„15>6)
Lost I should appear more gnomic than Tate, 
let me hasten to explain the "hovering fly." Tate is 
considering the death scene in Dostoevsky1s The Idiot.
The two lovers, Myshkin and Rogozhin, stand beside the 
bed of the girl they love. Nastasya lies dead upon the 
bed. The room is silent; suddenly the silence of sorrow 
and death is shattered by the buzzing of a fly, a con­
verted symbol whose abundant and sinister life stands for 
Nastasya's privation of life. The fly symbol, a product 
of the imagination, gathers into a single unity all of 
the dramatic events of the novel. The fly compromises
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our human order but it also extends that order; it 
"distends both visually and metaphorically, the body of 
the girl into the world. Her degradation and nobility 
are in that image. Shall we call it the actual world?"
(p.1^9) Tate is telling us that we cannot see the actual 
world with its multitudinous relationships unless we view 
it through an image - recall his distinction between see­
ing with and through the eye - an image that in one instant 
reveals reality with all its temporal and eternal com­
plexities.
As we face the morning’s world we see nothing, unless 
we have the peculiar though intermittent talent for 
it, so actual as Dostoevsky's fly or Prince Andre's 
empty heavens. Por if the drift of this essay have 
anything of truth in it, then our daily suffering, 
our best will towards the world in which we with 
difficulty breathe today, and our secret anxieties, 
however painful these experiences may be, must have 
something of the occult, something of the private, 
even something of the willful and obtuse, unless 
by a miracle of gift or character, and perhaps of 
history also, we command the imaginative power of 
the relation of things. (pp.l59-oO)
Positivism cannot report the actual world as it 
is; it can only describe its "physicalism," can look at 
it with the practical reason. To see the world requires 
a fusion of faculties or methods - grammar, philosophy, 
rhetoric. Looking with Just one reveals not the actual 
world but a partial world. Only the imagination as exer­
cised in literature achieves the fusion of the three modes,
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sees the actual world, permits the reader to see that 
world.
Are we not saying something very old when we 
assert that we may know an actual world in the act 
of seeing the hovering fly? We are saying that our 
minds move through three necessities, which, when 
in proper harmony and relation, achieve a dynamic 
and precarious unity of experience. Now that our 
oration is over I may say quite plainly that the 
three necessities -- necessities at any rate for 
Western man -- are the three liberal arts. And any 
one of them practiced to the exclusion of the others 
retires a portion of our experience into the shadows 
of the occult, the contingent, the uncontrolled.
(p.162)
The knowledge that literature gives has, accord­
ing to Tate, many referents to the world. It refers to 
the contingent world of the senses, to the subjective 
world of abstractions formed by the intellect, to the 
world of personal emotions, to the subjective-objective 
world of temporal and causal relationships. No one of 
these is the actual world; the actual world is all of 
these worlds fused by the poet's Imagination into a harmoni­
ous unity. The actual world as such exists only In litera­
ture and this actual world gets into the reader's 
imagination through language, meter, but most of all 
through symbol, througjh the "hovering fly," Tate borrows 
Coleridge's unifying power of imagination but he does not 
use it in quite Coleridge's way. The original vision of 
the poet is not by means of the imagination but is a mode
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of cognition, a ’seeing." Only Donne, Dante, Yeats, 
Dostoevsky - artists not of our dissociated age - can 
see this actual world. They can give knowledge because 
they have knowledge; the modern poet gives "images of 
the present condition of man"; he does not give knowledge 
of the actual world. The modern poets have imagination, 
but nevertheless they only "perceive." Presumably then 
the imagination is not a faculty of cognition but is the 
faculty by which the poet transfers his knowledge into 
the poem. Imagination is the faculty the poem illuminates 
in the reader who then sees the actual world. Imagination 
is a means to seeinsr but is not the act of seeing.
Much of the difficulty in understanding Tate's 
position is caused by his neglect of clear distinctions.
He is always concerned with a dualism of which he demands 
a unity, but the dualism in any given essay is elusive; 
it changes and becomes ambiguous. There is the dualism of 
cognition itself, of the intellect and sensation or feel­
ing; the dualism of subjective and objective; the dualism 
of subject and style; the dualism of the created and onto­
logical orders, Tate recognizes these dualities but only 
as logical fictions, as entities of the mind. In reality 
all dualisms are ontological wholes. Knowledge is both 
universal and concrete, timeless and contingent. Total 
knowledge is attained not by multiple acts of the intellect
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and senses but by one act that is both intellectual and 
sensate, a thinking sensation, a "seeing." Poetry is 
neither subjective nor objective; it is a fusion of the 
mind of the poet and of the external object. Poetry is 
neither style nor subject, form or content, structure 
or texture. It is style and subject as one, as dis­
covered simultaneously, as existing together, as incapable 
of existing separately. The knowledge that poetry gives 
is not the abstract proposition of the intellect, not the 
contingent world of the senses, not the rhetorical device 
used by the poet. It is the abstract, concrete, and 
rhetorical fused into one by the imagination.
What Tate requires in epistemology and in
poetry is the opposite of dissociation, union. It is
this same fullness or completeness that he demands of
criticism. His ideal is not a vain one. Nearly all
philosophical systems have attempted to resolve the
problem of the One and the Many both in epistemology
and in metaphysics. Kant's solution was the a priori
synthetic judgment. St. Thomas, following Aristotle,
formulated an ideogenesis of abstraction. But neither
Kant nor Thomas was so psychologically naive as to attempt
the union of concrete and abstract in one cognitive
** ✓
act. It is Tate's great psychological naivete, his 
ignorance of faculties, his confusing of the logical,
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ontological and psychological orders, his failure to 
distinguish the material from the spiritual that renders 
his system bewildering and, in the final analysis, philo­
sophically absurd. And finally, we might question the 
assumption upon which the system is based, the dissociation 
of sensibility. Was there ever a Golden Age in which 
men viewed reality whole, in which poets did not "perceive" 
but "saw"? Theologians do not grant intuition to Adam 
and Eve in Eden before the Fall. Even in that Golden Age 
- as Milton well recognized - man knew by ratiocination 
and only angels and devils enjoyed intuition. And if we 
can question the truth of dissociation, what proof do we 
have that the individual talent can be explained by the 
historical circumstance?
I have no ready answers to these questions and
h.
answers really are of little import. Tate’s system is 
analogous to Yeats's mythology. The myth, eccentric or 
not, worked for Yeat3. The system works for Tate. It 
provides him with many valuable insights, with a poetic 
technique - the violent metaphor that forces the universal 
into the concrete image - and it provides him with the 
dramatic psychological or epistemological situation of the 
protagonist trapped by history in an age in which vision, 
"seeing," is impossible. Unfortunately, the system traps
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Tate himself and historically determines him to write
imperfect, incomplete poetry; to perceive but not to see
the world. His is the fate of being born out of time.
He looks back not in anger but in envy and despair.
What were they like? What mark 
Can signify their charm?
They never saw the dark;
Rigid, they never knew alarm.
Do not the scene rehearse!
The perfect eyes enjoin 
A contemptuous verse;
We speak the crabbed line. {”To the Romantic
Trad it ionists ,rt 
p. 7)
CHAPTER III
THOMISM
Edmund Wilson writes of the shock of recognition 
experienced by certain American writers when they encounter­
ed their own ideas in another writer. Such a shock must 
have been Tate's when he read Maritain's The Dream of 
Descartes. For years he had attempted to formulate an 
epistemology and to apply it to his poetics by means of his 
theory of poetry as knowledge. With the reading of Maritain 
he discovered, apparently for the first time, that a school 
of philosophy had had for nearly eight hundred years a 
coherent and convincing system of cognition, a system that 
takes account of sensation and intellection, that clearly 
and distinctly separates faculties, their acts, and the 
objects of these acts. And, for Tate, the authoritarian 
and traditionalist, this system possessed the special 
merit of being rooted in an even remoter antiquity than 
that of the Middle Ages; it traced its heritage back to 
Aristotle. Nor is this all; Maritain provided Tate not 
only with a wonderfully complete epistemology, but also
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presented him with a convincing philosophical explanation 
of the dissociation of sensibility. According to Mari­
tain, Descartes was the archvillain who separated man's 
soul from his body, man's intellect from his sense 
perceptions. Tate generously acknowledges the gift with 
an honesty and humility unique in all his writings: "My
debt to Mr. Maritain is so great that I hardly know how 
to acknowledge it."^ If this seems slight praise, it seems 
so only taken out of the context of Tate's usual arrogance. 
He Is patient and restrained with Ransom; he is respectful 
to Eliot. He is intolerant of nearly every other critic 
and philosopher whom he mentions. Never before, to my 
knowledge, had he acknowledged an Intellectual debt.
Tate does not tell us when he discovered The 
Dream of Descartes nor what other books by Maritain he 
read. He refers only to The Dream of Descartes and 
to Situat ion de la Poesle by Maritain and his wife, Raissa. 
In any event he delivered his first Thomistic essay, "Our
m2Cousin, Mr. Poe, as an address to the Poe Society of 
Baltimore on October 7* 19i+9. He followed this in the 
next year with "The Angelic Imagination;" and in 1951 he
OP* cit. , "The Angelic Imagination," p. LUO* footnote 6. 
2. Op. cit. , pp. 1+55-71.
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read "The Symbolic Imagination: The Mirrors of Dante"^ 
as a Candlemas lecture at Boston College* The three 
essays can be considered as companion pieces, all 
written under the influence of Maritain.
In the first two essays, "Our Cousin, Mr. Poe" 
and "The Angelic Imagination," Tate considers Poe as a 
transitional figure, the first American artist to under­
stand the disintegration of the modern personality and one 
of the first to experience that disintegration in his own 
personality. Poe is the subject of the essays; Hulme and 
Eliot provide the basic assumption of modern dissociation; 
Maritain furnishes the terminology and the philosophical 
system. Tate's thought in the essays is not new, but his 
expression of that thought is. As we have seen, Tate 
had been concerned for years with the crisis of modern 
dissociation of sensibility. He had noted this disintegra­
tion of personality in many different forms and had offered 
various explanations of the fact. Essentially he had 
repeated over the years that dissociation Is caused by a 
fault of cognition, a flawed vision to which modern man 
and the modern poet are determined by historical circum­
stances. This epistemological explanation was the basic 
principle by which he evaluated poets. Nor are his
3. Op. cit., pp. l(.08-31.
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Thomlstic essays the first in which Tate applied the same 
principle to Poe. Both George Posey and Mr. Jarman of 
The Fathers are compared to Poe as men suffering from 
personality disintegration. The tragic flaw of George 
Posey is the same hypertrophy of feeling that Tate 
attributes to Poe. In the novel he describes the malady; 
he lacks at that time (1938) both the terminology to 
express it and the philosophy by which he can explain it. 
He uses both the new terminology and philosophy in "Our 
Cousin, Mr. Poe" and in "The Angelic Imagination."
Maritain1s central thesis in The Dream of 
Descartes^ is that Descartes by his methodical doubt 
separated man from his body. This separation left the 
intellect cut off from sense perception, the roots of 
knowledge. Man was no longer a being of sensation and 
intellection but an angel inhabiting a machine. Tate 
applies this Cartesian split to the Aristotelian triad, 
intellect, will, and sensation, and considers the effects 
of the split upon Poe's work. In "Our Cousin, Mr. ^oe" 
he considers Poe's hypertrophy of feeling; in "The 
Angelic Imagination," Poe's hypertrophy of will and 
especially of intellect.
T*ie Dream of Descartes (New York: Philosophical 
Library, l91+5n
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Tate begins "Our Cousin, Mr. Poe” with D. H. 
Lawrence's observation that because Poe's lovers have 
failed in life to subdue their women through the body to 
the biological level ,Tat which sanity alone is possible," 
these women retaliate in death by returning to devour their 
men. Tate refines this thesis, centering his observations 
around Poe's recurrent symbol of fire. All of the heroines 
burn with a "hard gem-like flame - bodyless exaltation 
of spirit." (p.l|.60) The lovers of the tales are inert, 
only one ever conceives a child, Morelia, but she proves 
to be only the vampire of Morelia herself returned from 
the tomb. Poe's heroes and heroines are "undead"; they 
never enter into a normal human experience but prey upon 
each other with a "pure" demoniac love. The reason for 
this is Poe's hypertrophy of sensitivity into sensation. 
Intellect and will extend beyond human moral limitations 
and, "circumventing the body into the secret being of 
the beloved, [try ] to convert the spiritual object into 
an object of sensation: The intellect which knows and the 
will which possesses are unnaturally turned upon the centre 
of the beloved which should remain inviolate." (p.ij.63)
The mysterious exaltation of the spirit so common to Poe's 
lovers is hardly the "pure" love that the nineteenth century 
saw it to be. "It inhabits a human body but tnat body is
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dead. The spirits prey upon one another with destructive 
fire which is at once pure of lust and infernal." (p.14.61) 
Tate illustrates his thesis with examples drawn from 
"Ligeia," "William Wilson," "The House of Usher," and 
"Korella." He sees the basic theme of "The house of 
Usher" to be one of symbolic incest. Since Roderick, a 
man of hypertrophic sensation but of no sensibility, can 
never quite achieve complete spiritual oneness with his 
sister, he destroys her; and she, the "undead," returns 
to suffocate him in a sexual embrace. Unity of this kind 
can be achieved only in mutual destruction. Symbolically, 
the fissured house becomes one only in dissolution.
The reason for Poe's horrifying vision of social 
reality is his dehumanization. There was no sensibility 
to link him to the world of men, only an awful Usher-like 
sensation. "He is like a child -- all appetite, without 
sensibility; but to be in manhood all appetite, all will, 
without sensibility, is to be a monster; to feed spiritu­
ally upon men without sharing with them a real world is 
spiritual vampirism." (p.1+69) Poe's impoverished sensi­
bility explains the Gothic ornateness of his tales; he 
creates a fantastic dead world because he has no real per­
ception of reality. Poe is the locked-in ego that feeds
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upon Itself.
If the effects of Poe's hypertrophic sensation 
are terrifying, the effects of hypertrophic intellect 
are even worse. In "The Angelic Imagination" Tate con­
siders these effects. He sees Poe as a great transition­
al figure, a man conscious of the fragmentation of modern 
society but as yet incapable of capturing this insight 
imaginatively in the complex dissolution of language 
that Rimbaud, Crane, Stevens, and Thomas achieve. Poe's 
chaotic world is held firmly in check by the superimposed 
order of eighteenth-century rationalism, but if the 
surface is controlled, the depths boil in confusion.
The dominating theme, subconscious until his 
last works, in all of Poe is "the angelism of the 
intellect." This idea in Poe seems to involve simul­
taneously epistemology and metaphysics. Poe, working in 
the Aristotelian triad, can never quite unify feeling, 
intellect, and will. He divorces the will from the "human 
scale of action" and thus from morality and from possi­
bility. Ligeia does not yield to the known world's 
causes and effects. She is beyond them. In th9 second 
divorce (that of intellect from feeling) Poe falls Into 
the Cartesian vortex. Since the intellect can know 
intuitively like the angels, it needs no demonstration
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for truth. Not only can the Intellect know Intuitively, 
but it can create. Poe transfers Pascal's analogy of 
the moral interaction within the Mystical Body to the 
physical universe. These ideas Poe presents in three 
colloquies, "The Power of VTords," "The Colloquy of Monos 
and Una," and "The Conversation of Eros and Charmion." 
Thus Agathos of the second colloquy, while yet a mortal 
man, created by his love and passion a "wild star.” But 
it is in Eureka that Tate finds the philosophical state­
ment of the vision that lies submerged in all of Poe's 
fiction: "The image of the abyss is in all of Poe's 
serious writings: The mirror in tWilliam Wilson;* burial 
alive; the 'tarn' into which the House of Usher plunges; 
the great white figure towards which Pym is being borne 
by a current of the sea; the pit over which the pendulum 
swings; the dead body containing the living soul of M. 
Valdemar; being walled up alive; the vertigo of the mael­
strom." (p.L(.52) Tate finds Poe's core thesis in Eureka: 
"In the original unity of the first thing lies the 
secondary cause of all things, with the germ of their 
inevitable annihilation." Eureka is a philosophy of 
annihilation. Just as all matter, animate or inanimate, 
proceeds from the first point of creation, all atoms tend 
to rush back to an ultimate point of unity. Total unity
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is achieved in utter nothingness, the return of matter 
to the point of origin, God. But this return is not 
of matter alone. God becomes God once again only when 
His divinity, diversified in human souls, is reassem­
bled to a spiritual point. "Think [says Poe] that the 
sense of individual identity will be gradually merged 
in the general consciousness -- that Man, for examole, 
ceasing imperceptibly to feel himself Man, will at 
length attain that awfully triumphant epoch when he
g
shall recognize his existence as that of Jehovah."
Tate sees this centripetal pantheism to be an annihila­
tion of God Himself: "If Poe must at last 'yield him­
self unto Death utterly' there is a lurid sublimity in 
the spectacle of his taking God alone with him into a 
grave which is not smaller than the universe." (p.(4.52) 
Poe, then, is the first man of letters to 
recognize the disintegration of the modern person; he 
recognizes it and he embodies it in himself. But he 
could only state its existence; he is incapable of 
realizing it imaginatively. For him synaesthesia and 
the magic of words remain an idea in his speculative
5. The Centenary Poe (London: Bodley Head Press, 19U9), 
pTl4.57
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intellect. His ideas are realized today imaginatively 
by the modern poets who deliberately defrange the 
senses and attempt to create a world from words that 
have no relation to reality. But if Poe possessed 
only the ordered language of the eighteenth century* 
nevertheless he cannot entirely conceal hie disintegra­
tion. His hypertrophy of feeling emerges in the latent 
vampire symbol and in the decay of his style when he 
is confronted with the human situation. He cannot 
describe a living reality because his sensibility is 
completely impoverished. Consequently, he lapses into 
bathos, a ’thick decor that simulates sensation.” fp.i4.68) 
"Everything in Poe is dead: the houses, the rooms, the 
furniture, to say nothing of nature and of human beings.” 
(P.I4.69)
Cut off from sensation, Poe’s spiritual 
faculties become hypertrophic and dehumanized. His will 
thrusts itself beyond the scale of human action, beyond 
death itself. Thus his heroines and heroes are ’’undead," 
are wills inhabiting dead bodies. Their hypertrophic 
wills cannot accept the limitations of human love; they 
eschew the carnal love of the human condition and circum­
vent the body to consume, vampirishly, the inner spirit 
of the beloved.
Poe's hypertrophic intellect, isolated from his
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impoverished senses, becomes angelic, seeks to know 
intuitively without the aid of the senses. But what is 
natural in an angel, intuitive knowledge, is monstrous 
in a man; and Poe's human intellect thrusts even beyond 
ar.gelism to superangelism, the power to create by 
thought. In Poe this dehumanization remains in the 
conceptual order; he defines his vision of the disintegra­
tion and dehumanization of society in the language of 
exposition* Today, eighty years later, Poe's premoni­
tion has become a reality; language itself is corrupted. 
The modern poet, cut olf from the world of nature by his 
hypertrophic feeling, is a superangel who creates a 
world by words: ’’But it TPoe's language] is never that
idolatrous dissolution of language from the grammar of 
a possible world, which results from the belief that 
language itself can create a reality: a superstition that 
comes down in French from Lautreamont, Rimbaud, and Mai­
ls rme to the Surrealists, and in English to Hart Crane, 
Wallace Stevens, and Dylan Thomas," (p,L(.37)
It seems strange that these ppwerful and re­
markably clear essays of Tate aroused so little critical 
interest.^* They are, I believe, two of the best studies
6 , John Paul Pritchard, for example, writes these essays 
off with one sentence: "Tate's more recent work has 
shown an almost Emersonian mysticism." Crltlclam in 
Arnerica (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, T9^) , 
p. 21*9.
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Tate ever made, and I regret that hie proposed book on Poe
has not as yet been published. Oddly enough the very sure-
ness of Tate, the ease with which he handles ideas, the
clarity of his distinctions, the assurance of his style in
these essays seem to bore the critics rather than to move
them to praise. Perhaps by 1953 - the year in which The
Forelorn Demon was published - the critics had had enough
of dissociated sensibility. At any rate, most of the
notices are perfunctory. Arthur Mizener is extravagant 
/
in his praise of Tate as the outstanding man of letters of 
the twentieth century. However, he fails to detect the 
new vocabulary, the clarity of thought, and the distinc­
tion of style.7 Eliseo Vivas in his review of the book, 
as we have seen, admires Tate's intelligence but admonishes
r - s
him for the philosophical naivete that attributes so 
much damage to Descartes. He too fails to recognize the 
Thomistic terminology and thought. Foster, concentrat int? 
too attentively on his thesis about Tate's romanticism, 
misses the Thomistic tone and the possible connection this 
intellectual ”conversion" may have with Tate's actual 
conversion. His only comment is: "It seems, actually,
that Tate has become his own Montressor, that in the end
7. "Among the Shabby Luclfers," New Republic, CXXVIII 
(April 13, 1953), 18-19.
119
he has lain down almost willingly where he never wanted
□
to -- in darkness with his cousin Mr. Poe." This is a 
neat but erroneous trope.
These two essays of Tate's are significant not 
only for their new terminology and distinction of style, 
but also for several incidental conclusions that he 
draws. He is almost amusingly condescending when he 
speaks with the clarity of his new vocabulary of Eliot's 
confusion: "I am nevertheless surprised that Mr. Eliot 
seems to assume that coordination of the 'various emo­
tions' is ever possible: the word gives the case away to 
Poe. . . I suppose Mr. Eliot means by it a harmony of 
faculties among different orders of experience." (p. U3U) 
And Tate rejects as ridiculous Poe's idea that the imagina­
tion is a cognitive faculty and, with Poe, he rejects 
Coleridge: "This is not far from the 'esemplastic power' 
of the Primary Imagination, a Teutonic angel inhabiting 
a Cartesian machine named Samuel Taylor Coleridge." (p . /4J4U-) 
He places knowledge in the intellect and harmonizes sensa­
tion and the "higher truths" by means of analogy: "He fPoe] 
may have meant analogy to the natural world, the higher 
truths emerging, as they do in Dante, from a rational 
structure of natural analogy: but he could not have meant
8. 0j>. clt., p. 126.
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all this.” (p.!4U(.) In rejecting Poe's angelism, an 
intellect exhausted because it has no real object, Tate 
gives a literal translation of the Thomistic principle 
upon which the psychology of abstraction is founded, nil 
in intellectu quod non prius fait in sensibus. Tate's 
rendering of this principle is: "The human intellect 
cannot reach Grod as essence; only Cod as analogy.
Analogy to what? Plainly analogy to the natural world; 
for there 1s nothing in the Intellect that has not 
previously reached it through the senses. (italics mine) 
(p.(4.53) Tate has at last found an answer to his problem 
of knowledge, a solution that establishes a knowledge 
rooted in concrete reality but capable of the highest and 
most abstract truth: "Had Dante arrived at the vision of 
Cod by way of sense? We must answer yes, because Dante's 
Triune Circle is light, which the finite intelligence can 
see only in what has already been seen by means of it.
But Poe's center is that place -- to use Dante's great 
figure -- 'where the sun is silent.'" (p.1+514-)
Poe for Tate is the prototype of modern man and 
of the modern poet. As modern man he suffers from a dis­
sociation of sensation, intellection, and volition; as 
modern poet he attempts to express this dissociation in 
ordered eighteenth-century prose. Dissociation of person-
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allty does not in Poe become dissociation of language. 
Howevei1, the modern writer extends the dissociation of 
his personality even to language.
If Poe is the prototype of the modern angelic 
imagination, Dante is the prototype of traditional man, 
of the integrated personality and of the integrated 
poetry. "The Symbolic Imagination" is Tate's answer to 
the crisis he reviewed in "Our Cousin, Mr. Poe" and "The 
Angelic Imagination." This excellent and thoroughly 
satisfactory essay, like those on Poe, failed to attract 
more than perfunctory attention from the reviewers. Both 
Bradbury and Meiners seem to miss the significance of these 
Thomistic essays, especially the significance of "The Sym­
bolic Imagination." They consider them to be Catholic in 
position, confusing or failing to distinguish between 
philosophy and theology, reason and faith. It is quite 
possible, as the example of Mortimer Adler attests, to 
accept Thomistic philosophy without accepting the Catholic 
Church. It is true that St. Thomas attempted to reconcile 
faith and reason. His synthesis was an answer to the double­
truth school of philosophy of the Sorbonne which held that 
a proposition could be true in philosophy and false in 
theology. Nevertheless, Thomas's philosophical system can 
be accepted In and by itself. It is from the philosophical
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position that Tate writes; his essays are neither 
Catholic nor non-Catholic. They are Thomistic.
"The Symbolic Imagination" begins with an 
attack upon modern poets in which he rephrases the judg 
ment made in the former essays.
The abstraction of the modern mind has obscured their 
way into the natural order. Nature oIfer3 to the 
symbolic poet clearly denotable objects in depth 
and in the round, which yield the analogies to the 
higher syntheses. The modern poet rejects the higher 
synthesis, or tosses it in a vacuum of abstraction.^
If he looks at nature he spreads the clear visual 
Image In a complex of metaphor, from one katachresis 
to another through Aristotle's permutations of genus 
and species. He cannot sustain the prolonged analogy, 
the second and superior kind of figure that Aristotle 
doubtless had In mind when he spoke of metaphor as 
the key to the resemblances of things, and the mark 
of genius.
6. Another way of putting this is to say that the 
modern poet, like Valery or Crane, tries to seize 
directly the anagogical meaning, without going through 
the three preparatory stages of letter, allegory, and 
trope. (p. I4.ll4.-i5)
The modern poet is cut off from external reality; he is 
a superangel who creates a work of words which have no 
relation to objects.
The symbolic poet, on the contrary, may portray 
the highest truth, even mystical vision, but he does so by 
way of the senses. He begins with the body of this world 
and by analogy leads his reader to the vision of the 
Invisible. He follows the advice of St. Paul: "Ever since
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the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, 
his eternal power and deity, has been clearly per­
ceived in things that have been made," (Romans, l/20)
Despite the timeless orders of both rational dis­
course and intuitive contemplation, it is the 
business of the symbolic poet to return to the 
order of temporal sequence -- to action. His pur­
pose is to show men experiencing whatever they may 
be capable of, with as much meaning as he may be 
able to see in it; but action comes first. Shall 
we call this the poetic Way? It is at any rate 
the way of the poet, who has got to do his work 
with the body of this world, whatever that body 
may look like to him, in his time and place -- the 
whirling atoms, the body of a beautiful woman, 
or a deformed body, or the body of Christ, or even 
the body of this death. If the poet is able to 
put into this moving body, or to find in it, a 
coherent chain of analogies, he will inform an 
intuitive act with symbolism; his will be in one 
degree or another the symbolic imagination.
(p.14.12-13)
The remainder of the essay is an examination 
of Dante's use of the mirror, a common object, in the 
Paradiso, The eyes of Beatrice are like a mirror; in 
them Dante sees himself and sees the world in reverse. 
Later at the source of all light, in the very central 
circle of the Trinity, he sees the reflection of himself. 
The Trinity is the source of light by which all else is 
seen, as, for example, a candle placed behind three 
mirrors is that by which we can see the triple reflections 
in the mirrors themselves (the example is Beatrice's).
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Thus all reality, all the saints, and Beatrice herself 
are mirrors which either reflect the "point of light" or 
reflect the world as it is in reverse. Finally, Tate 
speaks of the dramatic force of the epic moving Dante from 
the "dark wood" to the fullness of blinding light where 
he finds himself in the center of God's love. The climax 
has been rooted in a very simple symbol, a mirror. Step 
by step Dante has expanded this symbol throught the Para- 
dlso. The symbol expands to allegory, to analogy, to 
anagoge, but retains its startling force because it is 
rooted in human experience in a concrete and simple arti­
fact.
Tate's exegesis is ingenious and satisfying and 
my summary in no way does it justice* However, Tate's 
excellence in practical criticism is not the point at 
issue. What is at issue is the philosophical principle 
underlying the explication. First there is in Tate the 
basic assumption that unless a poet grasps reality whole 
in a complete act of cognition, he is incapable of writing 
complete poetry. Modern poets fail as poets because they 
fall as men. They attempt to know as angels, despising the 
common object grasped by sensation. They transfer their 
erroneous cognition to their poetic method; their metaphors 
and symbols are rootless abstractions, kabachreses stretched
from one abstraction to another. The symbolic poet
realizes that all knowledge begins with sensation, that 
there is no concept, however, lofty it be, that was not 
first in his senses. He knows by a combination of acts; 
by sensation, by intellection, even volition in choice or 
judgment. Consequently, his knowledge of reality is 
total; it is not the bodiless abstraction of false 
angelism; it is not the totally sensate knowledge of an 
animal; but it is human knowledge, knowledge at once 
spiritual and material, abstract and concrete. Neither 
the body alone nor the soul alone knows, but man - a 
union of body and soul - knows. Chesterton with his 
usual clarity and vigor expresses this difficult concept 
with simplicity and imagination.
He [St. Thomas] lays down the almost startlingly 
modern or materialist statement; "Everything that 
is in the intellect has been in the senses". This 
is where he began, as much as any modern materialist 
who can now hardly be aalled a man of science; at 
the very opposite end of enquiry from that of the 
mere mystic. The Platonists, or at least the Neo- 
Platonists, all tended to the view that the mind was 
lit entirely from within; St. Thomas insisted 
that it was lit by five windows, that we call the 
windows of the senses. But he wanted the light 
from without to shine on what was within. He 
wanted to study the nature of Man, and not merely 
such moss and mushrooms as he might see through 
the window, and which he valued as the first 
enlightening experience of man. And starting
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from this point, he proceeds to climb the House 
of Man, step by step and story by story, until 
he has come out on the highest tower and beheld 
the largest vision.9
The poet of the symbolic imagination, the 
complete poet, writes as he knows. he roots his poetry 
in the common thing, the object perceived by his senses.
If he chooses a symbol, he chooses, like Dante, a common 
one, one familiar to men. And though it is simple and 
common, the poet can, like Dante, lead his reader to 
ecstatic heights. If he uses a metaphor, one term must 
be rooted in time and place though the other term may 
extend into eternity and infinity. For the poet as for 
knowing man "there is nothing in the intellect which was 
not first in the senses."
These three essays are, then, something of old 
wine in new bottles. Basically the same ideas are here 
that we have seen in Tate's work as early as 1 9 2 8: the 
modern crisis of dissociation resulting from flawed cog­
nition; the crisis of modern poetry that produces no great 
poetry but a poetry of angel ism, a poetry that corresponds 
to the flawed angelic cognition of modern man. But the 
expression of these ideas is marvelously new and clear.
9. St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc.,
T?33T, pp7 lW-W.
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No longer does Tate offer clumsy metaphors about "whole 
horses," higher and lower myths, qualitative and quanti­
tative knowledge, images arising from the soil. He has 
at his command a terminology and a system of thought by 
which he can explain exactly what he means.
Is there anything new in these essays besides 
the vocabulary? The absence of any reference to histori­
cal determinism is new, Tate has replaced determinism 
with Thomistic causality. Descartes (a new historical 
villain) is the cause of modern dissociation. And with 
the introduction of causality Tate discovers an escape 
from the modern dilemma. He now realizes that no vague 
and inaccessible myth is necessary for total cognition. 
Modern man has the same faculties that pre-Cartesian man 
possessed. He has but to exercise his full potentiality, 
all of his apprehensive faculties, the exterior and in­
terior senses, the agent intellect, the possible intellect, 
the judgment, and he can know totally and fully. If he 
avoids the cause, angelism, he can avoid the effect, 
dissociation. The modern poet, victim of the angelic 
imagination, can, by a use of all his faculties, gain 
the symbolic imagination of Dante. The success or failure 
of the poet does not depend upon exterior historical
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circumatances, bat upon an Interior disposition of the 
poet, a determination to use the totality of his being 
in writing poetry. He must begin his poem where he begins 
to know: in the concrete object perceived by his senses.
Implicit in Tate's rejection of the angelism 
of modern poetry is a rejection of his own poetry and 
poetic method founded upon a false principle of cognition. 
Synaesthesia, katachresis, the violence that attempts to 
compress the abstract into the concrete symbol Is the 
poetry of angelism. Tate, at least for the moment, has 
solved his epistemological problem. Total knowledge is 
possible for modern man if only he will sacrifice the 
fallacy of angelism and will accept his humanity. Not 
by violence (as Tate once suggested) will man be saved, 
but by humility, the acceptance of himself as he is, body 
and soul. With this realization Tate abandons the tragic 
situation of the protagonist of his poems and fiction. Man 
is not a "stag charged both at heel and head," a victim 
of an irresolvable dilemma. The situation is false as is 
the assumption of historical determinism upon which it is 
based. "The Symbolic Imagination" was written in 1951.
The next year Tate issued "The Maimed Man," the first 
part of a long poem, a poem that was to proceed by letter,
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allegory, and trope to anagogical meaning. In it Tate 
was to exercise his new symbolic imagination. Hardly 
in the midway of his mortal life, Tate at the age of 
fifty-two abandoned the dark wood of the moderns and 
turned to "fresh woods and pastures new."
Teach me to fast 
And pray, that I may know the motes that tease 
Skittering sunbeams are dead shells at last. 
Then, timeless muse, reverse my time; unfreeze 
All that I was in your congenial heat.
10. "The Maimed Man," Partisan Review, XIX (May, 1952), 265.
CHAPTER IV
CATHOLICISM
This concluding chapter on Tate's criticism 
will, of necessity, be brief. The center of unity of 
his thought, the problem of knowledge, I have already 
demonstrated; the center of unity of his fiction and 
poetry is the same basic epistemological problem which 
I shall treat in the next two sections. Tate’s writings 
from a strictly Catholic point of view - theological 
rather than philosophical - are few, too few, in fact, 
to give support to any convincing hypothesis. And the 
fact remains that Tate as a living author could at any 
moment explode a too hastily formulated hypothesis with 
a fresh burst of creative or critical activity which 
would necessitate a reassessment of his Catholic writings. 
Until that time or the time of his death no final assess­
ment can be validly made.
However, from the evidence of the last twelve 
years, I believe that certain tenuous and temporary 
conclusions may be drawn. In general, I believe that 
whereas Tate’s highly eccentric and personal system of
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poetics and philosophy - like Yeats’s mythology - 
provided him with valid and original insights, (particu­
larly in his practical criticism and in his early poetry), 
Catholicism, on the contrary, fails to provide equal 
critical and poetic stimulation. Tate’s Catholic essays 
either verge on the erroneous or repeat mere catechetical 
statements that lack development of thought and origi­
nality of expression. And what is true of Tate's Catholic 
prose is equally true of his Catholic poetry. "The Maimed 
Man," "The Swimmers," and "The Buried Lake," though 
pretentious and difficult, collapse, as we shall see, 
under analysis.
I am aware that this interpretation is open 
to contradiction; however, there are no critics - even 
Meiners - who seem inclined to contradict it. The critics 
either patiently await greater critical and poetic activity 
from Tate before they draw conclusions, or they remain 
silent, respecting Tate for his past accomplishments. What 
is not subject to contradiction is the fact of Tate's long 
inactivity since the time of his conversion to Catholicism.
Many cogent reasons might be advanced to account 
fop this inactivity: his age (sixty-four); his unfamiliarity 
with a new body of thought and belief with which he might
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Justifiably wish to acquaint himself better before ven­
turing upon new work; his domestic problems (he recently 
divorced Caroline Gordon and has since remarried); his 
university commitments. Any one of these reasons and 
certainly the complexus of them all might serve as a 
reasonable explanation of Tate's recent inactivity and - 
if we grant the supposition - of the inferior quality of 
his Catholic writings. However, I should like to advance 
one more supposition: that Tate's peculiar sensibility Is 
one of crisis rather than of possession, of exploration 
rather than exposition.
William Van O'Connor distinguishes between 
poetry of exploration and of exposition,^ The distinction 
is an interesting one and one that can easily be applied 
to Tate's criticism and poetry. Tate's sensibility seems 
to demand a problem for which there is no solution, a 
situation from which there is no escape. The force and 
excitement of Tate's early critical writing derive from 
the suspense of search. Tate continually seeks an answer 
to the problem of knowledge; in that search he examines and 
rejects the solutions of other critics and philosophers.
1. Sense and Sensibility in Modern Poetry (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1950) > p. 3^4-•
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His final assertion is not so much an answer as an 
indication that the answer must lie in a certain direction. 
The protagonists of the poems, too, are seekers; and 
their search leads them to a dramatic situation of great 
tension, a situation historically determined and one from 
which there is no escape. There is no resolution, because 
there can be no resolution. The protagonists of the poems 
are trapped in the frozen lake of history, a lake that 
suspiciously resembles Dante's ninth circle of the Inferno 
where the sinners lie buried in ice "sounding their teeth 
like storks." If Poe's latent vampire symbols imply a 
dehumanized sensibility, Tate's frequent allusions to 
Dante's Inferno might imply an infernal sensibility that 
views modern society as hell. More than once Tate affirms 
the damnation of modern man as a present reality: "Is the 
man of letters alone doomed to inhabit thnt city? [Baude­
laire' s fourmillante cite ] No, we are all in it. . .The 
special awareness of the man of letters. . .he brings to 
bear on all men alike: his hell has not been 'for those 
other oeople:' he has reported his own."
But there is this great difference between Tate 
and Dante: Dante's sinners are dead; Tate's protagonists 
are"undead." Dante wrote a Divine Comedy in which
2. "The Man of Letters in the Modern World," Collected 
Essays, p. 38^*
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redemption is possible for the worst living sinner;
Tate writes a human tragedy in which just and unjust are
damned alive.
There is in Catholic dogma no room for histori­
cal determinism, for death in life. The fruit of the 
Crucifixion and of the Resurrection is the "death of 
death, the ruin of hell." Presumably Tate accepted the 
dogma of God's universal salvific Will when he accepted 
Catholicism. He must also have accepted the doctrine of 
free will and of efficacious grace. These three doctrines 
leave little room for death in life, for a damned society. 
Tate's acceptance of Catholicism implies, then, a rejec­
tion of historical determinism. With this rejection he 
lost the key character of his major poems, the histori­
cally determined protagonist. He could no longer write 
either a criticism of crisis or a poetry of crisis. With 
the forced abandonment of the poetry and prose of crisis 
(of exploration), he had to turn, if he were to write, to 
a poetry and prose of exposition. In Catholicism he dis­
covered truth and there was nothing to do but share that
truth, expose it to others.
Certainly Tate tried to do exactly this. He 
failed, I believe, because his poetic and critical sensi­
bility is one of exploration, one that demands - or that
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haa come to demand from long exercise - a crisis for 
inspiration. In the Catholic vision of life there are no 
Tatean crises. The only irrevocable and inescapable evil 
is final impenitence. In Catholic dogma there is no Golden 
Age; man is limited, is fundamentally the same in any age, 
but in any age in which he lives grace sufficient for 
salvation is present if he but wills it.
Unlike his great mentor, Eliot, whom he 
followed into orthodoxy, Tate has not found orthodoxy a 
fruitful muse. Why? In what way does Tate differ from 
Eliot? In that Eliot even in "The Vv^ste Land" is not too 
far from orthodoxy, not too removed from a poetry of expo­
sition. He concludes "The ^aste hand" with fragments of 
orthodoxy, with the beginnings of hope: "Datta," "dayad- 
hvam," "damyata," and the line "These fragments I have 
shored against my ruins." In his conclusion Eliot points 
out the way to escape "The Waste Land." Tate, until his 
conversion, never even hints at the possibility of escape 
from our modern hell. Conversion for Eliot constituted no 
revolutionary change, and so he could continue to write 
from a different but not radically different point of view. 
But conversion for Tate demanded a complete reversal of 
position, a chang® from pessimism to optimism, from despair 
to hope, from determinism to freedom. It demanded, perhaps,
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more than his artistic sensibility was capable of sustain­
ing, the acceptance and defense of a position neither 
emotionally nor rationally coherent with his former 
views.
Exactly what Tate expected to find in Catholic 
orthodoxy I cannot say. If he had hoped to discover 
some modern Dante, he was sadly disillusioned. In "Ortho­
doxy and the Standard of Literature” he voices that dis­
enchantment. He addresses the problem of the modern 
Catholic writer and asks why such a writer is not like 
Dante. His answer has a familiar ring: ”He suffers 
from a certain disjunction of belief and experience."^ 
Apparently even orthodoxy is not enough to overcome 
modern dissociation. As the cause of this Catholic 
dissociation Tate offers something more specific and 
less Irrevocable than historical determinism; namely, the 
standards of society and the interference of the clergy. 
Tate is none too optimistic about changing either, but of 
the two clerical interference seems to be the more in­
transigent: "The subject of the imaginative writer is 
necessarily men as they are behaving not as they ought
3. "Orthodoxy and the Standard of Literature,” Mew Repub­
lic. CXXVIII (January 5, 1953), 2ip.
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to behave. For this reason, there is a standing quarrel 
between the imaginative writer and the Church. It will 
continue forever. . .Our clerical friends are constantly 
telling us that there are certain aspects of the human 
condition that are better glozed."^ Tate continues in 
the same depreciating tone. The Catholic poetry 
magazine, Spirit, Is to him (and to anyone else who has 
bothered to read it) pretty awful. The verse of the 
would-be poets is vague and piou3 and could be written 
even by Baptists.
The standard of literary taste among Catholics 
is atrocious; Tate exemplifies his point by the popularity 
of Cardinal Spellman's The Foundling. He treats the poor, 
illiterate Cardinal rather severely. Perhaps Spellman 
read Tate's article and took his advice to heart. At any 
rate, he has written no more novels. Tate concludes his 
remarks on Catholic literary ta3te with two suggestions 
for raising its standards: books and poems should be 
judged not by their subject matter but as works of art; 
and the Catholic critic and reader should not seek out 
statements of doctrine (the fallacy of the message hunter) 
but should look for "doctrine experienced."
U. Ibid
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All in all, "Orthodoxy and the Standard of 
Literature" is a rather slender essay that does little 
more than point out the obvious. The Foundling, a 
sentimental second-rate novel, was written by Cardinal 
Spellman to raise funds for an orphanage. I rather 
suspect that most Catholics bought the book for much the 
same reason they contribute to the Community Chest - it 
was for a good cause. The clerical reviewers of the 
Cardinal's diocesan newspaper naturally praised the 
book. The more serious Catholic reviews - America, 
Commonweal, Thought - tactfully avoided all mention of 
the book. Tate might have been more Just had he done the 
same thing.
However, it is not what Tate says but what he 
does not say that slants the article. Tate fails to give 
the whole case. In 1952 Graham Greene's The End of the 
Affair was selected by the Catholic Literary Guild as the 
outstanding Catholic novel of the year, I do not intend 
to weigh the merits of this choice; this is not the point. 
The point is that Greene's novel of marital Infidelity 
could hardly have been selected by reason of Its subject 
or statement of doctrine or treatment of women as they 
ought to be. Greene and Evelyn Waugh in England, Francois
139
Mauriac and Bernanos in Prance, Gironella in Spain, J.F. 
Powers in America have not been writing about man as he 
ought to be, neither have they been glozing man's capacity 
for evil, I do not intend to write an apologia for 
Catholic literature, but merely to point out that Tate 
is either unfair or uninformed. We agree that The 
Foundling is a poor book, that the poetry in Spirit is 
pretty awful stuff, that the clergy often pontificate 
upon subjects about which they know nothing. All this 
tells us very little about Dante and the modern Catholic 
writer. There are, I suppose, in every religion some who 
prefer to read the Cardinal Spellmans and the Edgar Guests. 
I imagine there were members of the clergy who dis­
approved of Dante and members of the laity who preferred 
the prevalent version of The Foundling. All that this 
tells us is what we already knew, that fifty percent of 
the population is below average. The modern Catholic 
writer has a problem, but Tate has not seen it. Is not 
the real problem the definition of Catholic writer? I 
believe the definition entails more than membership in a 
Church. The Idiot, no matter who wrote it, is more pro­
foundly Catholic than The Foundling, The Cardlnal, or Tom 
Playfair. But I am wandering from the point which is that 
Tate in this article is unoriginal, overly obvious,
incomplete, and unfair or uninformed.
Perhaps Tate's error is that he expects the 
Catholic writer to be different. If he does, he has 
never quite rid himself of the higher myth of religion.
I am not at all certain that the serious writer, in 
opposition to the propagandist, should be different 
because of his religion. If Frost and Lowell, Mauriac 
and Gide, Greene and Golding write about man as he is and 
not as he ought to be, how are they to differ?
However, I may be unfair and may expect too
much from a short and perhaps hastily composed article.
But ’’Christ and the Unicorn" is an address delivered upon
an important occasion, the Third International Congress
for Peace and Christian Civilization held in Florence,
/
Italy, June 23, 19^1+. The other speakers were Well-known 
authorities in the fields of philosophy, theology, 
patristics, history, political science: Etienne Gilson,
M. C. D'Arcy, Jean Danielou, Robert Grosche, and Guido 
Piovene. In this assemblage and on this occasion we might 
expect an exceptional effort from Tate, and to speak truth 
his address is in no way mediocre. The style is one of 
classical balance: urbane but dignified, learned but 
modest, profound but lucid. Style and content are in 
perfect harmony. As the thought clarifies and reaches a
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conclusion, so too does the formerly opaque metaphor of 
the unicorn clarify and illustrate perfectly the thought. 
The address reveals Tate at his rhetorical best in perfect 
classical control of both content and structure.
The problem which he considers is the crisis 
in the unity of culture and revelation. He quickly dis­
misses obvious and local manifestations of this crisis as 
superficial and symptomatic of a deeper malady. He con­
siders American materialism to differ in no wa.y from 
European materialism, and American separation of Church 
and State to be founded upon the French concept of the 
Utopian State. Both Europe and America are haunted by the 
same demons, Gnosticism and Manichaeanlsm,? The Gnostic 
demon tempts man to pride of intellect, to the dream that 
unaided reason can achieve a Utopian state.
5. Tate's use of these terms seems to me to be highly per­
sonal. Most theologians would be hard put to distin­
guish Gnosticism from Manichaeanism. Both systems 
attempt to find a positive source of evil in order to 
preserve the sanctity and transcendence of God. Both 
are religions of salvation based upon knowledge, and 
both regard the world and the body as evil. Gnosticism 
states that man's only refuge is in a very lofty God, 
the great Silence and the Abyss, and that man must wait 
for gnosis, for only by this higher and mystical knowl­
edge can he gain heaven. Manichaeanism too states that 
man is 3aved by nous. The apocatastasia or return to 
the original staFe Ts a liberation of the good substance 
(light self) from the evil substance (dark self). The 
systems seem essentially the same - both tempt man to 
pride of intellect.
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The second demon, Manichaeanism, follows the 
first and tempts man with the failure of the Utopian 
state (it always fails) to complete pessimism, to the 
belief that man is totally corrupt and can be controlled 
only by the slave state.
Another name for the Utopian demon is Gnosti­
cism, or the belief in the omnipotence of reason in 
the political order. The perspective that this 
second name for Utopia opens up is known to us all.
What we are perhaps not so familiar with is the 
part played by another demon who supervenes upon 
the failure of the rationalistic society: his name
is Manicheeism, the twin brother of Gnosticism.
When the belief in the perfectibility of man in 
and by means of a rationalistic society ends in 
slaughter, we go to the other extreme; and, deciding 
that man is not merely imperfect but actually a 
vicious imbecile, we frantically call in the kind 
of order represented by the omnicompotent state.
The western world knows by this time that it cannot 
have the Gnostic society. Its present agony is an 
agony of fear lest it have to accept the Manichean, 
or Communist, society.6
Tate sees the modern state as faced with a false 
dilemma, the choice of Gnosticism, which it knows will fail, 
or Manichaeanism, which it recognizes as evil. According 
to Tate, the dilemma is false because Gnosticism and Mani- 
chaenism are not two horns of a dilemma but one. Both are 
unrealistic concepts of the State; one is too optimistic, 
the other too pessimistic. The Gnostic-Manichaean demon
6. "Christ and the Unicorn," Sewanee Review, LXIII (Spring,
1955), 178.
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is a unicorn that attacks the state from two sides. The 
fallacy of the dilemma is obscured by historians who divide 
East against West. The conflict is not geographical and 
exterior; it is spiritual and interior.
What, then, is the work before us? It is not 
a work which we can limit to the historical task of 
’’defeating Russia.” Russia once defeated in another 
great Manichean war, where should we then be? Should 
we not have to defeat Russia in ourselves? Some of 
our intellectual confusion comes of the part we have 
consented to play in the historical melodrama foisted 
upon the twentieth century by Spengler and Toynbee, 
who have pitted East against West in a relativist 
fantasy of equal civilizations equally doomed: 
and this has helped to abort our true sense of what 
we are. The adjective in the phrase "Western 
Civilization” is not substantive; it is merely 
geographical; and all that it allows us to do is 
to stare blankly at points of the compass.7
To escape the Gnostic-Manichaean unicorn, the 
VTest must choose, according to Tate, the Christian State. 
Only by this choice can Western society be saved from 
false Utopianism or Communism. The choice is a realistic 
one that promises neither too much nor too little. Christ
did not promise Heaven upon earth, but He did promise that
the Gates of Hell would not prevail.
If the choice of the Christian State seems easy
in theory, it is not so in fact. The choice involves
7. Ibid., p. 180.
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more than human volition:
The problem Is not, of course, so simple; and 
that is the trouble. Choice, I take it, is an 
action of the free will, and the will is not free 
unless it is informed by a prior activity which our 
forbears on both sides of the Atlantic taught us to 
acknowledge as Irace. For men in the Christian 
tradition, perhaps for all men in advanced societies, 
the simplicity of natural grace is inadequate; we 
require as the dynamic synthesizer of our cual 
nature the activity of a higher power: Divine Irace, 
which can be fully known only through the Christian 
Revelation. Without this unique prime mover of the 
moral will we have a limited choice. We are faced 
with a dilemma either horn of which leads to dis­
aster; or we may oscillate between the horns, or 
even try to impale ourselves upon both at the same 
moment. °
Briefly stated, Tate's solution to the problem 
of the unity of culture and revelation is: to avoid
excessive confidence in human re ason (Utopianism) on the 
one hand, and excessive pessimism (Communism) on the other; 
and to choose the realistic mid die ground of the Christian 
State. In this simplified form - and it is, I believe, a 
valid simplication - Tate is stating the obvious truisms: 
avoid evil and do good, and jja medio at at vlrtus. It may 
not be a bad thing for a speaker limited to a fixed time to 
do nothing but state obvious truths. I have no argument 
with truth, no matter how obvious, but  ^ do object to an
8. Ibid., pp. 176-79.
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oversimplification that distorts the truth. We have seen 
that Tate is prone to oversimplify historical and philo­
sophical causes, to blame one or other man - Descartes, 
Emerson, Dewey - for results brought about by a complex 
series of causes. In ’’Christ and the Unicorn” he reems to 
me to oversimplify his solution, the choice of the Christian 
State. I do not understand, nor does Tate explain, the 
term ”natural grace." Nor am I sure what Tate means by the 
need of "Divine Grace” to choose the Christian State. Is 
he speaking of Christ, the Church, or the State? He omits,
I believe, a necessary distinction: to make an act of 
faith in Christ requires the assistance of God's grace; 
to make a choice of a form of government does not. More­
over, Tate omits a second necessary distinction between the 
perfect society of the state and the perfect society of 
the Church. The purpose of the state is terrestial, the 
common good of its citizens; the purpose of the Church is 
celestial, the eternal salvation of its members. Christ did 
not promise, as Tate seems to imply, that the Gates of Hell 
would not prevail against the state, but that they would 
not prevail against His Church. What Tate says is clear, 
and he says it eloquently; but he sacrifices exactness for 
a false clarity. His solution has the ring of a pat cate­
chetical answer applied to a set of circumstances to which
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the answer is not suited. It is too simple, too innocent
9of complexity. Whatever complexity Tate's address may 
seem to have derives not from the thought but from the use 
of learned terms (Gnosticism and Manichaeanism), and from 
the clever unicorn metaphor. Tate, in attempting to 
simplify, confuses two orders: the order of nature and the 
order of grace.
This same oversimplification with its resultant 
confusion is present in another Catholic address of Tate’s, 
"The Man of betters in the Modern W o r l d . T h e  address
9. Tate's description of "Divine Grace" as a "dynamic
synthesizer of our dual nature" is not exactly correct 
and implies a concept of grace condemned by Pope Pius 
XII in his encyclical Humanl Generis. Tate seems to be 
saying that disintegration of the human personality 
can be cured only by grace. If he means this, he is 
implicitly denying the distinction between the natural 
and the supernatural. Grace is a supernatural (Hffc of 
God which is in no way due to human nature. Tf, however, 
human nature is incomplete, is dissociated because with­
out grace, then grace is due to that nature to complete 
it. In short, grace is not sun rnatural but natural. 
However, we should pardon Tate this lapse. Even so 
excellent a theologian as P^re Henri DeLubac made the 
same error. I do, however, question Tate's prudence 
(and humility) for his cavalier treatment of such a 
difficult and technical point.
1G. Collected Essays, pp. 379-393.
contains many excellent things presented in a strikingly 
urbane and lucid style. I shall not attempt to summarize 
its contents; many of the ideas on the fragmentation of 
society caused by Descartes's abstractionism (again the 
great historical simplificationi) we have already seen.
Of particular interest is Tate's distinction between 
communication and communion, the theme of his address:
"A marked difference between communication and communion 
I shall be at some pains to try to discern in the remarks 
that follow.” (p.380) For Tate, communication is the use 
of language as a means to something other; it is partial 
and incomplete communion: '’Communication that is not also
communion is incomplete. We use communication; we 
partlcipate in communion.” (p.3®5) Tate is not so clear 
in defining communion, and his use of the word is ambigu­
ous. Thus he tells us: "Neither the artist nor the states
man will communicate fully again until the rule of love, 
added to the rule of law, has liberated him." This rule 
of love necessary for communion is realized "only through 
the love of God.” (p.386) From this it would seem that 
Tate is speaking of the supernatural order, an order 
dependent upon God's action on the individual will. He 
seems to say that without God's gift of charity communion
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among men is impossible. But later in hi3 address he uses 
communion in a sense totally different and unprepared for; 
he anplies it to the literary order. Thi3 non-defined use 
is extremely confusing. Is communion an act of religion 
or is it a literary device? Is literature itself a reli­
gious act?
Another way of looking at the question, What 
do we propose to communicate and to whom? would 
eliminate the dilemma, withdrawal or communication. 
It disappears if we understand that literature has 
never communicated, that it cannot communicate: from 
this point of view we see the work of literature as 
a participation in communion. Participation leads 
naturally to the idea of common experience. Perhaps 
it is not too grandiose a conception to suggest 
that works of literature, from the short lyric to 
the long epic, are the recurrent discovery of the 
human communion a£ experience, In a definite place 
and at a definite time. (p.388)
What Tate says sounds very lofty and religious, 
but what exactly does he mean? Is communion a natural act 
or a supernatural act? If natural, why does Tate intro­
duce it with supernatural overtones? Does it depend upon 
God or upon literature? If upon literature, must the 
writer be inspired as were the authors of the Bible? Does 
literature address itself to the mind of man as knowledge 
or to his will as a motivation to love? Tate, I believe, 
confuses orders; in Hulme's terms, he spills religion. He 
extends his term "communion" too far. The word in itself
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contains the connotation of sacramental communion, the 
union of Christ with the individual soul. Tate extends 
this connotation to the denotation of the word, not to 
denote the union of Christ and the individual, but the 
union of individual to individual. He further compli­
cates the issue by introducing the love of God. In so 
doing, he confuses rather than elevates the position of 
the man of letters in the modern world. Tate may have in 
mind an analogy of the human to the divine order. By fail 
ing to make it explicit, he fails into a kind of intel­
lectual synaesthesia.
I am aware that this theory of "communion" 
through literature is not peculiar to Tate. W. K. Wim- 
satt, Jr. lists its proponents and gives an excellent 
summary of the theory.
And so I move to a third possibility for modern 
criticism, a recent challenge to the expansive and 
didactic myth which is a kind of opposite to a new 
'communication' theory --not a theory of means, 
but a theory of the most terminal thing possible.
The persons I chiefly associate with such a theory 
are Allen Tate and Father William Lynch, the editor 
of Thought» and Malcolm Ross, . .To speak broadly, 
the new theory is a new olea for concreteness in 
answer to exorbitant didactic claims, Just as in 
the 1920 the neo-classic poetics of the verbal 
object was a reaction against the hazy horizontal- 
ism of both romantic feeling and socio-real crusad­
ing. The new theory, as I understand it, is a plea 
for a kind of substance in poetry, something more 
solid, more real, and better, than the hollow symbol,
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the merely phenomenal grandeur of myth. Hence 
the new something has to be something showing 
a better claim to historicity. The argument seems 
to say that just as Christian sacramentalism and 
the sacramentally symbolic view of the universe 
differ from the mythic view in their having an 
actual world and both a general immanence and a 
specific Incarnation of Cod in the world, so a 
sound poetry, and especially a sound Christian 
poetry, ought somehow to be a more substantively 
real thing than the apparitions of the post­
symbolist phases,11
Wimsatt is not entirely sympathetic with this 
theory and has difficulty in understanding its real mean­
ing. I concur completely with his final judgment: "but 
on the other hand, what could the new substantive and in- 
carnational theory of poetry mean? Except that the only 
good and genuine poem is Christ Himself? Or the Mystical 
Body of Christ in the Church itself?"12 The fact that 
Tate is not alone in confusing literature and religion, 
does not exonerate him. He seems to me in his essay to 
do with theological terms what he once did with philosophi­
cal - to fall to make the necessary distinctions, to demand 
that one term have a complexus of meanings. Tate's use' of 
"communion" is analogous to his use of "see." This syn­
detic use of words may be permissible in poetry; in prose
11. "Criticism Today* A Report from America," Essays in 
Criticism, VI (January, 1956), 13.
12. Ibid., p. 15.
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it is an unwarranted violation of clarity opposed to the 
most basic concept of exposition. It is either deliberate 
obfuscation or initial misunderstanding of the terms 
involved. I do not wish to accuse Tate of deliberate 
obscurity; I do, however, think that he is fuzzy in his 
theological thought. What he attempts in this essay is 
beyond his knowledge of the subject. Before-he attempts 
to fuse two orders, he should thoroughly master both* At 
the time of the composition of "The Man of Letters in the 
Modern World" he was not yet master of both literature and 
theology. He may be now.
What conclusions can we draw from Tate’s Catho­
lic essays? In strict honesty, very little. The evidence 
is too slight. In these essays Tate seems to be somewhat 
ill-at-ease with Catholic concepts. He obviously knows 
the terms of Catholic theology but his use of them is 
slippery and confused. His statement that there is no 
free will without divine grace (in "Christ and the Uni­
corn") is, I believe, an example of this slippery use. The 
denial of free will is the Manichaean heresy condemned by 
St. Augustine and the Church; the denial of the necessity 
of grace is the Pelagian heresy also condemned by August 
tine. The Catholic position is that the will is free with­
out grace and remains free even when moved by gface.
Tate’s position is neither Pelagian nor Manichaean but a
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fusion of the two - a unicorn. It is reversal of the 
Catholic position from freedom with grace to no freedom 
without grace. The point is a fine one - even Augus­
tine admits this - and T ‘-te can be easily excused for 
slippintr on such thin ice. He might, however, have been 
more prudent had he informed himself better before 
venturing into such a specialized subject. In any 
event, Tate has not added to his Catholic essays. Per­
haps he has been warned off by lynx-eyed clerics eager 
to spot heresy. Perhans he has found the Catholic 
atmosphere uncongenial and uninspiring to his particular 
genius. I am inclined to favor the latter view. For a 
poet and critic of crisis, possession of dogmatic truth 
must pose a very real problem. Tate whose unique genius 
is one of exploration may well find exposition impossible. 
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that since his 
conversion he has produced very little; a few scattered 
reviews and three parts of a long poem as yet uncompleted.
In concluding this section on Tate's criticism 
I should like once more to summarize his thought. His 
basic assumption is that Eliot*s principle of dissociated 
sensibility is a fact in modern society. Tate began in 
the late twenties to search for the cause of this gratui­
tously assumed fact. He studied his own Southern tradi­
tion and from his study formulated the principle of 
tradition's dependence upon total cognition. He then
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faced an epiatemologlcal problem, the definition of total 
cognition and of the conditions necessary for its 
existence. Total cognition Tate decided is a fusion of 
abstract and concrete, of intellection and sensation; it 
is reality "seen" whole. The act of cognition he compared 
to seeing, an act simultaneously intellectual and sensate; 
and he posited as a necessary condition for this act: 
first, the myth of religion; later, the myth of history. 
Neither myth, Tate said, is available to modern man. The 
impossibility of total cognition for m o d e m  man (because 
of historical determinism from which he cannot escape),
Tate considered to be the modern crisis, the inescapable 
dilemma. In this crisis he placed the protagonists of his 
fiction and poetry.
Anplying his epistemology to poetry, he held 
the essential quality of poetry to be total knowledge.
Using this principle as a criterion, he judged that poetry 
to be complete which contains total knowledge, a complete 
vision of the world. Such complete poetry, he concluded, 
is impossible in the twentieth century because the modern 
poet is incapable of total cognition.
Upon discovering Maritain in 19U9, Tate adopted 
a new system of thought, Thomism, He abandoned his con­
fused and confusing epistemology and historical determinism, 
but retained Eliot’s principle of dissociation which he 
restated in Thomistic terms. In Thomistic terminology he
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also restated his theory of poetry as knowledge. To 
distinguish complete from incomplete poetry, he introduced 
the distinction of the angelic from the symbolic imagina­
tion. He considered neither the angelic nor the symbolic 
imagination to result from historical circumstances but 
rather from the misuse or the correct use of Thomistic 
abstraction. By imitating in the composition of poetry 
the cognitive process, Tate concluded that even a modern 
poet could write complete poetry, poetry rooted in con­
crete reality.
With Thomistic epistemology Tnte solved two 
problems: the problem of total knowledge in the modern 
period and the problem of a complete poetry in the same 
period. With his acceptance of the Thomistic solution, 
which made both total knowledge and complete poetry 
realizable realities even for modern man and the modern 
poet, Tate abandoned as unreal the crisis which had in­
formed his criticism, fiction, and poetry - the crisis 
of the impossibility of vision, of total knowledge in 
the present age. W'ith the abandonment of his core 
epistemological situation, Tate implicitly renounced his 
own early poetic technique. "The Symbolic Imagination" 
is a preface to a new kind of poetry. "The Maimed Man," 
"The Swimmers," and "The Buried Lake" are examples of this 
new poetry, a poetry of exposition rather than explora-
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tion, of possession rather than crisis; a poetry that 
begins with concrete reality and moves through allegory 
to anagogic vision.
In 1951 Tate entered the Catholic Church.
From a Catholic perspective he wrote the three not quite 
satisfactory essays we have considered and three parts 
of a long poem. Since 1953 he has published no poetry 
and very little criticism. In 1958 he co-edited with 
Lord David Cecil Modern Verse in Engllsh: 1900-1950, &n 
anthology of English and American verse. Tate assembled 
the selections and wrote the introduction to the American 
section of the anthology. In his introduction, which we 
considered in Chapter II, he seem3 to return to his early 
position that total knowledge and complete poetry are 
impossible in the modern age; he carefully avoids the use 
of both Thomistic philosophical and Catholic theological 
terms. In recent reviews - one on the occasion of Faulk­
ner's death,^another a review of Donald Davidson's The
nr 15Long Street,•LL^ a third on the Southern novel - he returns 
to his early themes on the South: regionalism and pro­
vincialism, the necessity of tradition, the myth of the
13. "William Faulkner," New Statesman, LXIV (September 28, 
1962) , 1+08.
ltf. "The Gaze past, The Glance 8re3ent," Sewanee Review, 
LXX (Autumn, 1962), 671-73. ---------------
l5. "The Novel in the American South," New Statesman,
LVII (June 13, 1959), 831-32.
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Old South as a Golden Age.
Tate's present state of mind is, then, somewhat 
ambivalent; he hovers in a no-man's land between an ortho­
doxy which he cannot or does not fully embrace Cor, at 
least, finds inconvenient and uncongenial), and a certain 
nostalgia for his own literary past (his thought on 
tradition, myth, dissociation, and a Golden Age of vision). 
Apart from a rare bookreview he has published nothing and 
seems content to busy himself with his lectures at the 
University of Minnesota and to act as the elder statesman 
of American letters. However, this apparent inactivity 
of receint years may be deceptive; Tate may be at work on 
hid long-promised critical study of Poe; he may be near­
ing the completion of the long poem begun in 1952. But 
until he publishes one or both or something unexpected, 
we must conclude that his productive period is at an end.
It was a long and fruitful period extending from 1928 to 
1951; a period of criticism, fiction, and poetry; a rest­
less, searching period with a problem at its center - the 
problem of knowledge, the search for vision in an age of 
perception. Perhaps, having at last found an answer to 
his problem, Tate now feels that he can rest in the posses­
sion of the long-sought-for "seeing."
Under the summer'3 blast 
The soul cannot endure 
Unless by sleight or fast 
It seize or deny its day 
To make the eye secure.
easons of the Soul," Poems, p
SECTION II
FICTION
Two short stories and one novel comprise the 
whole of Tate's fiction, a quantity so limited as to 
be ignored by most critics or considered as an exercise 
practiced for the sake of his poetry.^" Among the many 
commentators on Tate's poetry and criticism only Bradbury 
cursorily and inaccurately considers the short stories. 
Tate's novel fares somewhat better. In addition to the
usual short notices, there are three serious studies of 
The Fathers: those of Meiners, Bradbury, and Mizener. 
Slight though Tate's fiction may be and neglected by the
critics, yet it is not unimportant. It serves as an
excellent transition from his criticism to his poetry, 
and is itself worthy of consideration.
In the detailed study of Tate's criticism in 
Section I, we have seen his concern with the traditions
1. "It is possible that his fine historical novel of the 
antebellum South, The Fathers (1938) • has served Tate 
sieve for draining-o7f this long-nourished interest 
into the more flexible formal unit of experience of 
the story."
Koch, Ojd. cit., p. 373.
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of the Old South and with the problem of knowledge. The 
Southern past is the subject matter of the short stories 
and the novel; the problem of understanding that past is 
the theme of all three. Closely allied to Tate's theory 
on history and cognition is his theory of literature as 
knowledge* Only literature, he holds, can provide a true 
and complete vision of reality. It is, I believe, Tate's 
intention to present in these three fictional works that 
complete vision of the past which abstract and formal 
history cannot provide. If wo recall the distinction 
formulated by Tate in "Religion and the Old South," we 
might say that he intends to view the past qualitatively, 
not quantitatively.
Tate's fiction is an excellent example of his 
theory embodied in artistic form. And because the 
fictional form is larger and more leisurely than is that 
of his compact lyric poetry, the symbols and dramatic 
situations are more obvious. The repeated references to 
vision - "beetle-like eyes," "vacant eyes," "eyes staring 
into space" - in both "The Immortal Woman" and The Fathers 
are symbols of abstractions of modern cognition that also 
appear in the poetry. The use of aimless circular motion 
as a symbol of the purposeless direction of modern society 
appears in the fiction a3 does the use of night and darkness
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as symbols of evil and incomprehension. For example the 
action of the first part of The Fathers (the "Pleasant 
Hill" section) takes place in broad daylight to indicate 
that Lacy Buchan, the narrator, fully comprehends it.
As the action becomes more involved, the symbolic 
twilight- and night-scenes increase and Lacy becomes 
more and more perplexed and confused, comprehends less 
and less of the action. The use of light and darkness 
to symbolize comprehension and perplexity is obvious in 
the novel. It is not so obvious in Tate's poetry, and 
unless the reader is aware of the meaning of the symbols, 
the poems appear incomprehensible. Above all else, Tate's 
fiction emphasizes his epistemological center, his In­
variable and constant concern with the problem of knowl­
edge.
CHAPTER I
THE MIGRATION
Tate’s short story, ’’The Migration, though 
published a year later (193U) than "The Immortal Woman," 
is much the inferior of the two stories. Of it Bradbury 
writes:
As fiction "The Migration" is not impressive. The 
form is pure narrative -- all "pictorial" in Henry 
James's terms, nothing "scenic. There results 
no presented drama, no reader commitment. Since 
the style is a sparse antipoetic recreation of 
mid-nineteenth-century agrarian prose, no special 
interest accrues from diction without metaphor 
and without i n t i m a c y . ^
I agree with Bradbury that "The Migration" 
is not impressive. It lacks complexity and tension. It 
is narration of the simplest kind, a series of chrono­
logical events. By way of theme Tate develops his idea 
that the best virtues of hi3 Southern tradition derive 
not from the feudal class, not from the idle and new 
rich, not from the poor whites, but from the hard-working 
and hard-headed Scotch-Irish middle class stock.
1. Yale Review, XXIV (September, 193U)* 83-111•
2. Op. clt., p. ll+S.
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The events are narrated by Rhodam Elwin, 
eldest son of Rhoda Elwin. They purport to be a 
biography of his father, "a remarkable man," but they 
involve the entire family and whole strata of Tidewater 
society. The narrator begins with his father's birth, 
in County Antrim, Ireland, in 17^2. Rhoda Elwin was of 
the poor Scotch-Irish tenant class and at thirteen^ 
after his father's death, was forced to make hi* own 
way in the world. After working a year in Bristol, he 
begged passage on a tobacco ship and landed in Port 
Tobacco, Maryland, in November 1757. He was apprenticed 
to a cabinetmaker in Annapolis for six years and during 
this time managed to save seventy pounds sterling. Work­
ing as his own man, he added four hundred pounds to this 
sum and in 1770 married Miss Emily Ransom and settled 
with her on a farm near Fredericksburg. He entered the 
War of Independence a private and returned a captain. 
Later, because of a dislike for the feudalism in 
Virginia and because of the Western boom, he moved to 
Edgecombe County, North Carolina, "a State less ridden 
by aristocratical habits and traditions." From 1788 to 
1797 he cleared his holdings and expanded them to a 
thousand acres. In the latter year his bounty claim was 
certified: a little over three thousand acres lying in
Summer County, Tennessee. In 1796 with two other 
families he moved to this bounty claim, subdividing and 
selling to the other families certain sections. Here 
at about sundown of August 23» 1820 Rhoda Elwin died.
At his request they carved upon his tombstone: "Farewell 
my wife and children all / I am gone away beyond recall / 
Ask not for me it is in vain / You call me to your side 
again."^
Obviously this brief outline of the story omits 
much, but it should reveal that in this rags-to-modest- 
riches saga there is no attempt at character delineation. 
All is narrated from the extraordinarily unsophisticated 
point of view of Rhodam Elwin. Elwin thinks in singulars 
and sees only events and concrete details. He never 
generalizes, never draws conclusions from the events he 
narrates. He "sees'* his life exactly as it is, not as an 
abstract series of causes and effects. Rhodam's vision 
of reality is qualitative not quantitative.
If we recall Tate's dread of the abstract 
statement, we may be able to read this narrative as a 
series of concrete universals, or as a series of external
16i*
facta that manifest an interior atate. Tradition for 
Tate was something lived rather than something expressed 
through abstractions; and "The Migration" is the narra­
tive of a living tradition, Tate’s own.
V.Tiat elements compose this tradition? Rhoda 
Elwin is cautious and independent; he has excellent 
prudential judgment; he has modest ambitions and a 
strong sense of obligation to his land. He detests the 
tobacco farmers, opportunists who would ruin the land 
for the sake of quick wealth. At the time of his death 
the tradition established by him and others like him is 
already beginning to crumble and the county was "filling 
up with tobacco-makers and Baptists." The only irony 
ever expressed in this simple man’s life appears in his 
death-bed admonition to the freed Negro and then to his 
grandson, "Chew tobacco if you will but never grow it."
A deep respect for education is a part of this 
tradition. Young Elwin attends whatever primitive school 
is available and his final accomplishments are not in­
significant: he knows no Greek but he can read any Latin 
author at sight. Religion plays a less important part; 
it is a type of free-wheeling and liberal Methodism which 
allows boys to know women by the time they are fourteen
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bat forbids them to touch a virgin: "My father's views 
on the subject were simple and direct. Never take the 
maidenhead of a young lady whose family might conceivably 
be friends of your own family, and if possible never 
touch a virgin at all."^ Though not puritanical this 
tradition wears a certain somber stolidness that seeks 
out the good solid middle-class virtues and avoids 
excesses in economics and religion, politics and social 
life. It is a kind of natural via media to the good life.
In this bare narration of events one family 
becomes, then, typical of the best in Tate's own origin 
and tradition; and the events, innocent of rhetoric, 
argue their own case.
Is Tate successful In what he attempts here? 
Certainly he has carefully researched his material, and 
has described minutely and exactly the details of food, 
camp meetings, local superstitions, the Negro slave life 
and its practices. One feel3 that Tate must have studied 
old bills of sale, agrarian records, details on the con­
struction of houses and barns, on the planting of crops, 
the market value of them and innumerable other details.
All this exact scholarship he employs to give verisimili­
tude to the simple, solemn narration. 1'hat troubles the
lj.. Ibid. , p. 96,
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reader, however, is a lack of coherence in the narra­
tion, The larger outline is simple and clear enough, 
a chronological account of movement. It Is the develop­
ment of the static sections that is incoherent. The lack 
of selectivity, the mass of seemingly unrelated particu­
lars in each paragraph destroy any unity of impression 
which Tate may have intended. Some sections of the 
narrative read like a term paper from which the writer 
is unwilling to omit the slightest particle of his re­
search. In brief, the matter does not seem to be 
imagined nor grasped as a totality. Much of the detail 
is necessary to give verisimilitude but much more seems 
needless and weighs down the narrative. Tate's imagina­
tion works best (as will be immediately demonstrated from 
"The Immortal Woman.") when confined within more limited 
boundaries and controlled by a more complex and difficult 
form.
Tate is not successful in "The Migration."
He does not select; he amasses too many details and fails 
to relate them coherently. He establishes no complica­
tion and advances the narrative in time and place only.
He writes a narration that has motion but no action, that 
has extension but no beginning, middle, and end.
But though "The Migration" may be a failure,
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yet it is not a waste. The details that Tate assembled 
so patiently, he will use to better advantage in The 
Fathers. In writing of hi3 own Southern tradition in 
"The Migration," he is almost naively uncritical. He 
approves of everything in the tradition. By the time he 
writes The Fathers, some four years later, he will have 
reassessed his tradition in more thoughtful and objective 
terms, will have come to realize that even in the Old 
South there was a latent evil suppressed by a rigid 
social system.
But "The Migration" is of interest for more 
than its impressive research. In the story Tate drama­
tizes his theory of knowledge. Why does Rhoda Elwin never 
draw a conclusion, never generalize from particular 
incidents? Why does Tate, a conscious and skilled artist, 
heap detail upon detail? Does he merely attempt "a 
sparse antipoetic recreation of mid-nineteenth-century 
agrarian prose" as Bradbury concludes? I think not.
Rhoda Elwin is a type of integrated man; unlike modern 
dissociated man he "sees" events not quantitatively and 
abstractly but qualitatively and concretely. He views 
the past as a temporal sequence, not as a series of 
causes and effects. Rhoda Elwin is the antithesis of
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modern man who perceives life as an abstraction. Elwin 
sees life as a fabric woven from a thousand details and 
events. Elwin, the narrator, writes as he knows, and he 
knows reality whole and total.
Tate creates a fictional character who narrates 
the events of a fictional family for a reason. Follow­
ing his theory of literature as knowledge, he believes 
that he can communicate in fiction a truth of the past 
which he could not communicate in history. The style, 
the wealth of detail, the absence of generalizations may 
not be successful, but they are deliberate. "The Migration" 
derives directly from Tate's epistemology.
CHAPTER II
THE IMMORTAL WOMAN
"The Immortal Woman"^ is a remarkable first 
story -- one of Tatefs most successful achievements.
It possesses a Jamesian complexity that demands close 
reading, for each detail is significant. Even so care­
ful a critic as Bradbury -- one of Tate’s most intelli­
gent and, perhaps, best critics -- has misread the 
story. Despite his remarkable synthetic grasp of Tate's 
ideas, he seems to have read "The Immortal Woman" too 
rapidly and to have overlooked or completely missed 
certain essential details. Bradbury writes: "The point 
view in this story provides an immediate challenge, for 
the narrator, a Civil Wrar veteran invalided, comes from
the North, of an impoverished Pennsylvania family now
2
located in Georgetown."
Bradbury fails to note the age of the old 
house, the narrator's boyhood wanderings through the 
Smithsonian, the Fisheries, the Army Medical Museum. He 
also fails to note that one of Aunt Charlotte's friends,
1. Hound and Horn, VI (July, 1933), 592-609.
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Mrs. Ritter, drives a Cadillac. Finally, he fails to 
note that the narrator "came back from overseas, para­
lyzed." By missing these details, he has missed the 
point of view. John Hermann, the narrator, i3 a World 
War I veteran, and the point of view is that of one of 
Tate's typical protagonists: a man of the twentieth
century looking back into the nineteenth.
Bradbury's misreading of the story results 
from two oversights. The first concerns the narrator.
John Hermann is a rare phenomenon in Tate's Imaginative 
work. He is a man of the present capable of comprehend­
ing the past but afraid to do so. Unlike the protagonist 
of the "Ode to the Confederate Dead," he actually can 
and does penetrate the past. Secondly, Bradbury misses 
(or neglects to mention) the significance of Hermann's 
war injury: he is a maimed man, incapable of entering 
fully into life, but not incapable of observing it. He 
Is symbolic of intelligent and sensitive twentieth-century 
man, trapped between two worlds -- "paralyzed." Men of 
this kind are, like Lacy Buchan of The Fathers, "strad­
dling two ages." Too sensitive to accept their own age, 
they are barred by time from entering the past. Her­
mann's Injury is a symbolic wound of time, a wound that 
the entire modern age bears. These misreadings lead
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Bradbury to misinterpret the meaning of the story:
"The story's ending turns what has been ostensibly an 
indirect chronicle of a life, and a disturbed way of 
life, into naked allegory.""^
What Joes Tate attempt in this story1? First, 
he attempts realism in the description of character and 
action. Next he attempts to give to this literal level 
a secondary meaning so th'<t each concrete detail and 
each action has a symbolic or allegorical significance. 
Thirdly, he attempts an amazingly complex point of view 
in which there are three levels of comprehension: that 
of Aunt Charlotte, who understands nothing, who experi­
ences nothing beyond sense data; that of Mrs, Dulany, who 
knows the cast but cannot relate it to the present; that 
of the narrator or central intelligence, who finally 
comprehends all. Fourthly, he attempts an outer-inner or 
subject-object form according to which the action of the 
story moves from the street back to the invalid in the 
house and back again to the 3treet, It is the order of 
cognition; the object seen, the object reflected upon, 
the object comprehended. In a sense, the story is an
3. Ibid., p. 150
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allegory of human knowledge in which Charlotte represents 
sense knowledge, Mrs. Dulany memory, and Hermann the 
intellect reflecting upon and unifying both into compre­
hension or understanding. Be this as it may, the action 
or conflict of the story is resolved when the inner 
observer, John Hermann, is united to the outer object, 
the "Immortal Woman," in total comprehension. Last of 
all Tate attempts to create a special atmosphere or tone 
to give his story credence, and by this mood to focus 
the reader's attention upon certain significant details.
Since the atmosphere of the story is the most 
easily recognized achievement, it might be well to re­
verse the above order and to consider this first. Tate 
creates and emphasizes a mood of isolation and of aliena­
tion that recalls Hawthorne. The 3cene is a single de­
caying street in Georgetown where only the leaves renew 
themselves, where "the same damp trickle has held to the 
same patch of grey moss as long as I can remember."^
Time has become static in this changeless street, and pa3t 
and present merge oddly into one in the trees, a symbol 
of continuity: "They know something that we never hear
JL|.• "The Immortal Woman," p. £92.
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and they contain years that we cannot see." The invalid 
narrator and his aunt are isolated and alone: "We see
few people. Nothing happens. We never visit and no one 
comes to our house. I think none of the neighbors ought
it %to be living here. Again and again Tate emphasizes 
through a series of concrete details this cut-offness, 
this social, physical, even temporal isolation. It seems 
needless to enumerate instances. One image, however, 
deserves notice for it recalls Quentin Compson in The 
Sound and the Fury whose watch ticks away with the hands 
torn off. Unlike Faulkner's hero, Tate does not quite 
murder time, but he does arrest it: "But to be there with
them together, the old lady and the old house - that is 
to be entirely alone, with my watch ticking on my wrist, 
and arrested in time....the re should be the student, the 
gate, and my watch ticking; then my watch ticking alone.
The focal point of the 3tory is an empty house 
and an old woman in black who comes each autumn to sit and 
look at the house. The fact that Hermann is an invalid, 
that the street is isolated, that he and his aunt are poor 
and have no visitors explains his great fascination with
5. Ibid., p. 593.
6. Ibid., p. 60lj..
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any change, any movement on the street. His own injury, 
bits of information from his boyhood (like the afternoons 
spent wandering through the Smithsonian), his sensitive 
reaction to beauty, to light and shade, his gentle 
patience with his silly old aunt indicate a poetic sensi­
tivity.
To make the story credible, Tate had to create 
a creditable narrator; one with sufficient time and reason 
to study the seemingly insignificant comings and goings 
of an old woman; with sufficient perception to interpret 
these events. John Hermann, a sensitive cripple, is the 
ideal narrator and central intelligence. Tate devotes 
less attention to the other inhabitants of the house,
Aunt Charlotte and Mrs. Dulany, because their function is 
less important to the plot. The characters who appear 
on the street - the old woman, her husband, a doctor, a 
young man - Tate describes in visual terms only because 
they are seen but never heard. Naturally "see” and all 
its verbal variations are bound to appear in a story in 
which the narrator observes life from a second-story win­
dow. However, on the second page of the narrative, while 
giving an exact visual description of the old Georgian 
house, the narrator says, "I have never seen the inside." 
This opaqueness of the Interior of the house is repeatedly
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emphasized throughout the story. At the conclusion of
the story the narrator says, "I had seen into the old
house, and there was the old lady, that cavernous bird
of passage, across the street." The expanding awareness
of the narrator is externalized through visual imagery.
Each time he describes the old lady he adds some visual
detail. He sees at first only the most obvious details:
"Stringy, dead-looking grey hair fringed the edge of the
small black hat that she wore close to her temples, and
her thiok glasses gave her eyes a fixed stare. She seemed
to sink into the faded anonymity of the street." Later
he views her in action talking to her husband and to the
doctor, and he hears her name spoken by the negro driver
(the single sound from the street), "Miss Jane." As the
narrator learns more, he sees more, and when the old
lady next appears he notes her walk and other concrete
details that tend to become more symbolic with his increase
of understanding: ". . .it struck me for the first time how
she walked - as if she were being propelled from outside,
by a force that she neither knew nor could control - like
a dressmaker's form in the sewing-room, moving with an 
8
even glide. Next he notes, "The crazy stare through the
7. Ibid., p. 595.
8. Ibid., p. 59ij-.
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thick rimless glasses - she had merely been put together 
by all past generations, and she saw no need of doing 
anything about it; I mean that she could not have known 
she had a self."9 As Hermann's comprehension increases, 
the visual details which he notes become more and more 
symbolic of the Old South: "The ole lady was as good as
ever. . .like the old house, . .in a kind of perfection
I had not known before."10His final statement is one of 
full comprehension, of total vision: "Damnation had read 
itself out to me. . . .  Though I knew it was impossible 
I could not bear to think of her dying in the old house.
I kept thinking foolishly enough, that 3he might be 
saved. But she had no place to die. She could neither 
die nor live."
To the extent Hermann sees, he knows. When he 
fails to see, he fails to know: "There are times when my 
sight grows dim and my head whirls; I grip the wheels of 
my chair, move a few feet very rapidly; objects begin to 
reappear. I think I know things only in a c t i o n . T a t e  
does not limit this relationship between sight and compre­
hension to his narrator. Mrs. Dulany's "right eye suddenly
9* I b ■» P* 597.
10. Ibid., p. 607.
11. Ibid., p. 612.
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squints, and that side of her face twitches spasmodically 
until she holds it a moment with her hand." Aunt Char­
lotte "looked up, her eyes blank, like a surprised 
beetle."
The narrator, John Hermann, finally compre­
hends the symbolic meaning of the old woman and the old 
house. However, his aunt and Mrs. Dulany do not, and Tate 
represents their incomprehension by faulty vision. "When 
Aunt Charlotte broke the silence 1 knew that I had heard 
everything that Mrs. Dulany had said: I was brought up
sharply against the innocence of my poor aunt, who had 
heard not a word of it, I mean really heard it. And yet 
I was convinced that Mrs. Dulany herself, could the ques­
tion have entered her mind, would have seen nothing that 
was not perfectly plain. I knew, however that as Aunt
Charlotte spoke Mrs. Dulany was squinting her eye, and
12her face was twitching."
Tate's use of a triple level of comprehension 
resembles, for example, James's device of expanding aware­
ness employed in The Ambassadors. Lambert Strether begins 
on the lowest level of awareness, that of Waymarsh. His 
awareness quickly expands to that of Maria Gostrey, Little 
Bilham, Chad, and finally to the near perfect awareness 
of Madame de Vionnet. Similarly, Tate's narrator begins
12. Ibid., p. 609
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at the lowest level of awareness, Aunt Charlotte’s. From 
her he learns only vague and surface details, that the 
house has long been vacant and that the old woman has 
been coming every autumn for years. Then Mrs. Dulany 
enters the action. Although she is not old enough to 
have been a part of the tradition of the old South, yet 
she does remember that tradition. She lived in the years 
of its decay; like Lacy Buchan of The Fathers, she 
’straddles two ages.” And because she was never integrated 
into that tradition, she, like Lacy, has faulty vision, 
incomplete awareness. But she does possess the awareness 
of memory, and John nermann learns from her, combines what 
she recalls with what he observes, and arrives at full 
comprehension.
Thus, as John Hermann looks out of the window 
and observes the figures below, Mrs. Dulany reminisces to 
Aunt Charlotte about the house across the street; and the 
movement of the story shifts from what is seen from the 
window (the outside) to what is overheard of Mrs. Dulany’s 
reminiscences (the inside). Finally the inner narration of 
memory and outer details are fused by intelligence into 
total comprehension. The narrator realizes that the old 
woman and the house are terrible because they both possess
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a perfection of a former age which is now out of time and 
out of place; they represent a deracinated tradition.
The woman's gliding walk symbolizes the fixed culture of 
the old South. Her inner fury, her perfection "as perfect 
as a cyclone, as terrible, with the same suffocating 
vortex inside” is awesome only to the abstract mind of 
the modern narrator. But Hermann is compassionate and 
with regret he realizes that the large man, her husband, 
comes no more for her because he is dead; dead too is the 
doctor. Hothing of the past remains for her; she and the 
house are alone - anomalies from another age. The "new" 
man who comes for her, a younger relative, is "like a 
tower of new brick” and the simile recalls the mechanical 
similes used by Faulkner to describe Popeye. This new 
man symbolizes abstract, industrial society. Unlike the 
older man, he sees nothing but a useless old house and a 
helpless old woman, and he leads her away into oblivion.
Tate has combined in this intensely complex 
story two methods, that of James and that of Joyce. To 
exact Flaubertian detail and naturalistically motivated 
characters, he has added a deeper meaning of symbol. The 
story can be read upon the first level; here detail is 
never forced to fit symbol, yet the symbol is there. Aunt 
Charlotte is a giddy old woman, but she is also a symbol
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of the obtuse modern age with blank vision and "aimless" 
motion. Mrs. Dulany is caught between the traditional 
past and the traditionless present; she represents 
transition. The narrator is the sensitive modern man, 
trapped in time, "paralyzed,1* incapable of action but 
capable of understanding the perfection of the past.
"The Immortal Voman" is an entirely successful 
story. It is also an example of Tate’s fascination with 
the problem of knowledge. The framework of the story, 
the crippled, confined narrator observing from his window 
events occurring outside, is an analogy of the process of 
cognition: the inner mind observing external data. The 
three persons within the house are analogous to the three 
cognitive faculties: Aunt Charlotte represents sensation; 
Mrs. Dulany, memory; John Hermann, the unifying power of 
intellect. As he does in "The Migration," so too in "The 
Immortal Woman" Tate stresses the Importance of concrete 
visual detail in the process of cognition. Full compre­
hension, total knowledge is not abstract; it is rooted in 
the concrete singular. Hermann "sees" when the visual 
details become symbolic. (Recall Tate's enigmatic phrase, 
"we know the world through the hovering fly." He demon­
strates the meaning of this phrase in "The Immortal Woman.") 
When the external object ceases to be merely visual and 
becomes a symbol of something else, we have "seen" the 
world; we have total knowledge.
CHAPTER III
THE FATHERS
Arthur Mizener, writing in Accent almost ten 
years after the publication of The Fathers, notes that 
the book "sold respectably in both the United States and 
England, perhaps because people expected it to be another 
Gone With the Wind. T h e  ladies who expected a Rhett But­
ler and Scarlet O'Hara from Tate must have been cruelly 
disappointed in George Posey and Susan Buchan and, I 
imagine, sadly confused by the whole novel.
And if the general public found The Fathers 
disappointing, no less so did the reviewers. Generally 
they dislike the book, find it lifeless, too symbolic, too 
abstract. They regard the point of view of the narrator, 
Lacy Buchan, as a clumsy and stale convention. They judge 
the characters to be abstractions; and one critic dis­
covers a certain sinister and undemocratic note in Tate’s
p
treatment of the Civil War, Even those critics who approve 
the book with faint praise give the impression that they
1, "The Fathers and Realistic Fiction," Accent, VII (Winter, 
19U7), 101.
2. Time, XXXII (September 8, 1938), 68.
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do so not because of the merits of the novel but because 
of Tate's fame as a poet. An occasional reviewer quite
■i
obviously has not even read the book.J Few critics, 
though, are as forthright as Mina Curtiss who damns The 
Fathers to that class of books which ”reread anywhere 
between ten and fifty years later, seem doubly dated, 
first with the deadness of the period they tried to 
reproduce and secondly with the 3tyle and mannerisms of 
the time in which they were written.
The Fathers was not a popular success but it 
has not fallen into the limbo of unread books. Quite 
contrary to the judgment of Mina Curtiss, with the pas­
sage of time the novel has come to be appreciated and 
understood, and now enjoys a certain modest success. In 
I960 it was reissued by Alan Swallow in America and by 
Eyre and Spottiswoode in England. In 19U8 it was trans­
lated into French by Marie Canavaggia under the title 
Lea Ancetres; and in 1963 by Marcella Bonsanti into the 
Italian, I Patri.
3. New Yorker, XIV (October 1, 193$)» 65. The anonymous 
reviewer refers to the "warmth” of Tate's characters, 
a peculiarly inappropriate word to apply to Tate or his 
characters.
U. Nation, CXLVII (October 8, 1930), 356.
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And just as popular acclaim has increased over 
the years, so too has critical acclaim. The first and 
perhaps best study of Tate's novel was Arthur Mizener's 
nThe Fathers and Realistic Fiction." It is an excellent 
piece of criticism, comprehensive without being super­
ficial, penetrating without being limited. Mizener con­
centrates upon the plot of the novel, the action involving 
a conflict of personalities and a conflict of cultures.
His intention is to rescue the novel from the realm of 
"lyric and personal response to experience." His careful 
analysis of the plot justifies his final judgment: "The 
motive of The Fathers' action is a meaning, and the life 
of that meaning is action. It is an imitation of life."^ 
Bradbury studies The Fathers with a care equal 
to Mizener's; however, his final evaluation is not as 
favorable. He appreciates the novel's complexity, the 
sound plot, the careful writing, the pervading myth of 
the South. He sees the novel as an index of Tate's 
strengths and weaknesses as a creative artist. The weak­
nesses, he believes, derive from Tate's lack of a sense 
of "felt life*? consequently he cannot create convincing 
characters (George Posey, Jane Posey, Susan and Lacy Buchan 
and the minor characters tend to lapse into lifeless 
abstractions); nor can he describe an emotional crisis in
5• 0 »^ cj^ t. , p. 109.
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convincing terms. Bradbury concludes that, interesting 
though The Fathers may be, yet it is not satisfactory 
fiction: "Fiction requires an intuitive feel for the
living, an ability to project into other and essentially 
foreign lives. In these senses, Tate is inherently 
weak."6
Meiners has written the most recent and longest 
study of The Fathers.^ He is heavily dependent in his 
analysis upon Mizener; in fact, his outline of the 
symbolic mode is almost a paraphrase of Mizener's study. 
His main purpose, however, is to refute Bradbury's accusa­
tion that the novel lacks "felt life." To do so, Meiners 
stresses the dual point of view of the narrator, Lacy 
Buchan; some scenes Lacy describes as a participator, as 
a boy of seventeen; other scenes he describes in retro­
spect, as an old man looking back to the events of his 
youth. Meiners apparently feels that this explanation of 
the narrator's point of view answers Bradbury's objection, 
for if the characters seem abstract or symbolic or unreal, 
they seem so to Lacy too. He sees them as symbols and so 
he describes them as symbols. Inconsistencies in charac­
ters Meiners explains away in the same fashion; at one
6. Op. cit. , p. 156.
7. Op. cit., pp. 81-96.
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time the young Lacy sees and describes; later the older 
Lacy remembers and describes. The explanation is neat, 
perhaps so neat that it causes Meiners to contradict him­
self. For example, he admits that George Posey's daughter 
is annoyingly unreal, is too much like Pearl of Hawthorne's 
Scarlet Let ter. VJhy, I wonder, should he find this a 
fault? After all, if Little Jane is unreal and like Pearl, 
isn’t she so because Lacy Buchan sees her as unreal and 
like Pearl?
Mizener gives us an excellent analysis of the 
plot of The Fathers; Bradbury explores the use of symbols; 
Meiners stresses the point of view of the narrator and 
attempts to explain away the weaknesses which Bradbury 
notes. Excellent; though these studies are, yet they are 
incomplete. No one of these three critics attempts an 
analysis of the main characters in The Fathers; until this 
is done, Bradbury's objection that the characters are mere 
abstractions seems to stand unanswered. I should like to 
center my discussion of the novel on the two main charac­
ters, Lacy Buchan and George Posey, because such a dis­
cussion will not repeat the work of other critics and will 
be a useful means of relating the novel to Tate's central 
epistemological problem. However, before beginning the 
analysis of Posey and Buchan, I think a brief summary of 
the novel may help to make the analysis more intelligible.
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Tate Is explicit enough In his Intention: "I
wished to make the whole structure symbolic In terms of 
realistic detail, so that you could subtract the symbol­
ism, or remain unaware of It without losing the literal 
level of meaning, but If you subtract the literal or
Q
realistic detail, the symbolic structure disappears.
The narrator of The Fathers Is Lacy Buchan, an 
elderly doctor who relates events In which he participated 
fifty years earlier. He limits his narration to a four­
teen month period beginning with the death of his mother 
and ending with the suicide of his father. He devides bis 
narration Into three sections according to the movement of 
the central action: Pleasant Hill In Fairfax County, Vir­
ginia; Washington, D. C., during the hectic pre-Clvll War 
days; and a return to Pleasant Hill during the war itself.
In the first section, Lacy describes not only the 
way of life of the Buchan family (his father Major Buchan, 
his sister Susan, his brother Semmes on the family planta­
tion, Pleasant Hill), but he also reflects upon the whole 
social structure of antebellum Virginia, He prepares the 
reader for the ultimate destruction of that society (symbol­
ized In the burning of Pleasant Hill) by Indicating Its
8. "Introduction," The Fathers (Denver: Alan Swallow, I960), 
pp. lx-x. I shall cite the pagination of the quotations 
given in the body of the text.
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deficiencies. Pleasant Hill is a civilized world con­
trolled by a strict public code of honor which so 
subordinates personal emotions to custom that the indi­
vidual no longer acts or feels outside the ritual of 
society. Antebellum Virginia presents a static society 
that carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. 
Lacy Buchan seems to say that its destruction by the North 
is accidental. Virginia is already dying, and the Civil 
War but hastens its inevitable death. The malaise of 
Virginia is, according to Lacy, reducible to an episte- 
mological flaw, the inability to conceive of change, to 
realize that any other kind of life is possible: ’’People 
living in formal societies, lacking the historical imagina­
tion, can imagine for themselves only a timeless exist­
ence.” (p.80)
Into this rigidly formal society which lives by 
ritual rides George Posey, an entirely personal man, 
guided by no code, living by no ritual, subject only to 
his violent emotions. Posey begins a series of violations 
of the Virginia code which culminates in a demand for the 
hand of Susan Buchan. Major Buchan is unwilling to permit 
the marriage, but he i3 helpless before Posey who ignores 
the ritual of the code. Posey marries Susan; and with the 
marriage begins the slow, tragic decline of the Buchan 
f amily.
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At Posey’3 urging the has become involved in 
some mysterious but highly profitable transactions be­
tween the North and South) the Buchans leave Pleasant Hill 
and take up residence in Washington, D. C, With this 
change in setting, the narrator, Lacy Buchan, begins the 
second section of the novel, "The Crisis." In Washington 
Major Buchan remains unchanged; his perfect courtesy and 
daily reading of the classics are oddly at variance with 
the hectic conditions in the capital city. Gradually his 
family begins to break up. Semmes, and later Lacy, joins 
one of the hastily formed Virginia brigades. The Major 
forbids this, firmly believing that he and all like him can 
remain neutral, can continue to live the same tranquil 
life of pre-war days. His sons refuse to obey him; and, 
heart-broken and bewildered, Major Buchan returns to 
Pleasant Hill alone. Lacy moves into the Georgetown home 
of his brother-in-law, George Posey. This move marks the 
beginning of the third section of the novel, "The Abyss."
The Posey house at Georgetown is like something 
from one of Poe's Gothic tales. The Poseys are isolated 
eccentrics cut off from the world and from each other.
Mad Uncle Jarman Posey is writing a universal history (Lacy 
compares him to Roderick Usher); George Posey's mother and 
aunt remain sealed in their rooms. Susan, Lacy's sister 
and George's wife, is gradually losing her control in this
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mad, too personal world. Nothing In her Pleasant Hill 
background with Its public code of honor and ritual, 
prepared her for this Isolation. Then Lacy falls In love 
with young Jane Posey, George’s sister, also loved by 
Semmes Buchan. Susan cannot tolerate the thought of 
another Buchan damned to her grotesque life, and she 
urges Yellow Jim, Negro half-brother of George, to rape 
Jane. He does so, and Semmes, acting predictably accord­
ing to his code of honor, kills Jim. George Posey, act­
ing unpredictably as always, shoots Semmes. Susan goes 
mad; Lacy wanders off in a state of shock, somehow finds 
hl3 way back to Pleasant H m  and lapses into a coma for 
six weeks. He awakes from his illness to learn that his 
father has hanged himself when the plantation was surround­
ed by Yankees. George Po3ey, violent as always, strikes 
the Yankee Colonel, who retaliates by burning Pleasant 
Hill to the ground. The novel ends with Posey leaving 
for Georgetown and Lacy returning to his brigade.
This skeletal outline of the action gives no 
indication of the novel's great complexity. The Fathers, 
apart from its value as a novel, is a remarkable work in 
that nearly everything Tate has written or would write is 
in it: the Flaubertian attention to detail of "The Migra­
tion," the Joycean symbolism of "The Immortal Woman," the
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Ideas expressed in his essays on tradition, prose ver­
sions of many of his poems, and the symbols and images 
of his poetry - night, darkness, aimless motion, the 
vortex, water, the panther, the vague eyes representing 
abstractionism. And binding all the divergent elements 
together into a unity is Tate's epistemology. Indeed, 
the novel can be called a tragedy of incomplete knowledge. 
Lacy, even after fifty years of reflection, does not 
fully understand the events he narrates. Major Buchan 
is driven to suicide because he cannot comprehend change; 
Susan Posey goes insane because she cannot understand a 
way of life different from that of Pleasant Hill; George 
Posey murders his brother-in-law, drives his wife mad and 
his father-in-law to suicide because he cannot understand 
them nor himself.
But it is not the complexity of the novel, not 
the symbols, not the ideas that need defense. The review­
ers, and specifically Bradbury, criticize Tate's lack of 
"felt life," his inability to create a convincing charac­
ter. If this accusation is true, no amount of complexity 
can compensate for it. The critics sympathetic to Tate 
concentrate, perhaps too much, on the symbolic mode and 
ignore Tate's very real ability to create characters who 
are psychologically convincing. To illustrate Tate's 
ability, I should like to consider the two main characters
191
of The Fathers, Lacy Buchan and George Posey. Both have 
symbolic significance, but both are far more than 
symbols; they are psychologically convincing characters.
As has been already stated, Lacy Buchan writes 
from a dual point of view, the immediate present of 
the boy and the reflective past of the old man. Within 
this framework Tate's control of time is both unusual 
and interesting. The novel does not, especially in the 
"Pleasant Hill" section, follow a forced chronological 
order. Like Proust, Lacy notes Bergson's distinction 
between mechanical and psychological time, and he follows 
the latter in his recherche du temps perdu. The past of 
psychological time is tied in memory to events and sen­
sations of no significance, and thus "a whiff of salt 
fish" can recall the death of Lacy's mother; or the 
events of the past are attracted like bits of metal to 
a magnet around some great revelatory scene of almost 
traumatic force, Lacy writes, "I mark the beginning of 
my maturity with a scene, and another marks its comple­
tion, and you will understand that neither of them properly 
speaking was an experience of my own, but rather something 
sheer, out of the world, easier to bring back than the 
miseries and ecstacies of my own life. To this day I can 
see without effort the dark moustache of dead Mr. Jackson 
lying in Colonel Ellsworth's blood, the two bloods 
mingling there at the foot of the stairs." (p.117-18)
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The scene is unforgettable because it synthe­
sizes into one moment of startling awareness a whole 
series of events both past and present. Just a3 all the 
bits of information and moments of incipient awareness 
gained from others merge into a unity of total awareness 
for Lambert Strether when he sees Chad and Madame de 
Vionnet on the river, so, too, for Lacy almost forgotten 
things which have touched only bis sense awareness are 
recalled and are understood at a deeper level of aware­
ness in this scene. The scene unifies and makes compre­
hensible in Lacy's psyche what had existed before only 
in time.
Lacy is aware not only of the significance of 
the great illuminating scenes but of the lesser import 
of psychological association. Early in the narration he 
remarks, "In my feelings of that time there is a new 
element - my feelings now about that time: there is not
an old man living who can recover the emotions of the 
past; he can only bring back the objects around which, 
secretly, the emotions have ordered themselves in memory, 
and that memory i3 not what happened in the year i860 but 
is rather a few symbols, a voice, a tree, a gun shining on 
the wall - symbols that will preserve only so much of the 
old life as they may, in their own mysterious history, 
consent to bear.*' (p. 22)
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This is obviously a statement of Eliot's objec­
tive correlative; it also reasserts the symbolic level 
of the novel, but it does more. The objects that func­
tion as symbols and that so much annoy Bradbury and 
fascinate other critics, are real, existential objects; 
but, more important, they are facts of psychological 
consciousness. This inner-outer duality of the literal 
level of the novel manifests an extraordinary imaginative 
control of the subject matter, a writing at once on the 
level of pragmatic experience and of psychological associ­
ation. Tate is not unlike Joyce in employing this 
duality, and while reading Tate one recalls the soap in 
Bloom's pocket and the stream of associated ideas that 
flow from his consciousness of it.
From the care that the author lavishes upon 
Lacy, upon the subtle logic of his memory, upon his ex­
panding awareness, we should begin to recognize that 
Lacy and Lacy's mental processes are a central focal 
point of this story. The action is significant, but 
Lacy's reactions to that action are more significant.
Lacy is caught between two worlds, "Pleasant Hill" and 
the new "Crisis." Both worlds hover perilously on the 
brink of the "Abyss." How does Lacy resolve the con­
flict? He does not; and this, I think, is Lacy's unique
191+
tragedy: the tragedy of modern man as Tate sees him,
the tragedy of the protagonist of the "Ode to the Con­
federate Dead," of John Hermann in "The Immortal Woman." 
Lacy knows too much to accept his father's inadequate 
code; he admires and loves the violent, codeless George 
Posey, the man of direct and immediate action, but he 
realizes only too well George's tragic faults; he knows 
too much to accept either - and so he accepts nothing.
George Posey, as the central character of the 
novel's action, is of fascinating interest. Posey is far 
more than what Lacy sees, far more than a symbol. He is 
difficult to understand because he is so uniquely com­
plex. George is enormously gifted. His physical appear­
ance is striking; his courage, horsemanship and marksman­
ship are superb. These remarkable physical attributes 
alone would make him a romantic beau ideal, but his 
qualities of intellect and will are even more remarkable. 
He has great financial ability; he is perceptive of people 
and situations. He sees with great clarity through the 
code of Pleasant Hill, of the Major, of John Langton. The 
Code is too ridiculously unreal to merit more than his 
contempt. Since he is alone and codeless, he realizes 
that neither side in the Civil War is totally right. His 
intellect is unmoved by his emotions. However, since it 
is necessary to choose sides, he serves the South with
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great skill and with great financial gain to himself.
But he remains uncommitted to the Code of the South, 
just as he once had judged with withering scorn the 
overly innocent Virginians who "do nothing but die and 
marry and think about the honor of Virginia," so in 
the greater conflict he sees with equal clarity and 
scorn the inadequacy of the Confederacy: "Mr. Semmes,
your people are about to fight a war. They remind me 
of a passel of young 1uns playing prisoners' base."
(p.137)
Lacy is soon infected by Posey's clarity of 
vision and comments upon his family code, "We are like 
children playing drop-the-handkerchief; the conventions 
make the emotions that we are willing to die for, as 
children eagerly run themselves to exhaustion round a 
ring." (p.l80)
But for all his gifts, George Posey is flawed.
If this character flaw, which makes him an essentially 
tragic figure, is merely a static symbol, then both George 
and the novel are failures. But Posey is more than a 
symbol; he lives his own secret life and that life has 
its own warped psychology.
Posey cannot surrender to any accepted code of 
manners or of conduct; he must always receive "the shock
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of the world at the end of his nerves.” His reaction 
to any given situation is one of immediate and violent 
action, an action confined and controlled by no code, 
by no system understood by o&hers. Posey is alone, is 
entirely personal, is uniquely singular; and since the 
singular is incomprehensible to men who know by means 
of unlversals, Posey remains a mystery to his father-in- 
law, his brother-in-laws, even to his wife. He is a 
failure as a lover for, locked in his own ego, he is unable 
to share. Why?
Posey suffers, I believe, from a form of hubris 
which, as in the heroes of Poe's tales, manifests itself 
in a hypertrophy of intellect and will. Since he lacks 
sensibility to link him to the world of men, his intellect 
and will extend themselves beyond human moral limitations. 
George is always sincere, sincere with a horrifying, in­
human sincerity. In an essay written ten years later,
Tate was to give a description of Poe that could easily 
be applied to Posey: "He is like a child - all appetite
without sensibility; but to be in manhood all appetite, 
all will, without sensibility is to be a monster: to feed
spiritually upon men without sharing with them a real 
world is spiritual vampirism.
9. wOur Cousin, Mr. Poe,” Op. cit. , p. I4.69.
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The similarity is, I think, not accidental.
Twice Tate mentions Poe in the novel, and compares the 
Posey home in Georgetown to the House of Usher. George’s 
uncle, Jarman Posey, is "a kind of Roderick Usher, whose 
nerves could bear whatever reality they received from the 
dormer windows at the top of the house. There is much 
less fantasy in Poe’s creation than most people think: 
Usher was just like Mr. Jarman.” (p.178)
The Posey family is a symbol of the locked-in- 
ego, one which Lacy doe3 not hesitate to explain to us: 
"The Posey ladies were not eccentric, not 'two peculiar 
old ladies,' but rather excessively refined sensibilities 
that had let their social tradition lapse in personal 
self-indulgence in which a draught under the door, the 
light sifting through the blinds, the remote threat of 
rain - into which, of course, they would not have ven­
tured - became the overwhelming concerns of life.” (p.lQl^ .) 
The family is a symbol, but it is a sociological fact as 
well and this fact has its psychological effects. There 
is more Freud than Eliot in the brutal father and the 
neurasthenic mother to whom George is almost unnaturally 
devoted. George Posey may be a complex mass of conflict­
ing traits, but he is a psychologically convincing charac­
ter created with great inner logic. George really is 
sincere; he never intends evil: "It is never, my son,
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hla intention to do any evil but he does evil because he 
has not the will to do good." (p.267) It is this 
privation of good, a privation of human sensibility that 
flaws George. He is a tragic figure, and there is a 
great sadness in his final words to Lacy after his moment 
of self-realization: "It's not far enough . . . George­
town." (p.306) Having finally realized that he has 
destroyed the entire Buchan family, he also realizes 
that like Uncle Jarman he is incapable of too much reali­
ty, and he withdraws into the sealed-in life of his 
youth.
Both Lacy Buchan and George Posey are, I be­
lieve, thoroughly satisfying characters. They themselves 
and many of their actions can be interpreted as symbols, 
but they are also characters in depth who think and act 
according to the inner logic of their own psychological 
dispositions. They are not puppets jerked about irre­
sponsibly by the author to demonstrate hi3 theories.
I have said that The Fathers is a tragedy of 
insufficient knowledge, of flawed cognition. Each of 
the characters fails because of a lack of perception, 
because of his inability to comprehend persons and events. 
But in this novel Tate extends hi3 epistemology beyond 
the confines of North and South, traditional and modern
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society. He extends it to include all men of all times, 
and in this way he gives to The Fathers a universal 
significance. He makes lack of knowledge the tragedy 
of man himself. Man in every age attempts to build a 
Pleasant Hill, a defense against evil, and he is 
erroneously optimistic that he has succeeded. This false 
optimism that ignores the existence of evil is civiliza­
tion: "Excessively refined persons have a communion with
the abyss; but is not civilization the agreement slowly 
arrived at, to let the abyss alone?" (pp.185-86)
It is not accidental that Tate concludes his 
novel with a section entitled "The Abyss." The failure 
of the old South, the failure of the new North, both are 
the refusal to recognize man*3 ineradicable evil. This 
essential flaw in the comprehension of reality opens the 
door to the ultimate triumph of the abyss.
At one point in the narration Lacy a3ks, "Why 
cannot life change without tangling the lives of innocent 
persons? Why do innocent persons cease their innocence 
and become violent and evil in themselves that such great 
changes may take place?" (p.5) The answer to his question 
is found in the metaphor of night. It Is a lengthy medi­
tation but one central to Tate's thought and certainly 
central to the meaning of the novel;
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There are days when we consciously guide 
the flow of being towards the night, and our 
suspense is a kind of listening, as if the absence 
of light, when it comes, will be audible just be­
cause sight and touch are frustrated. Of course 
this is what we all know. But how many of us
know that there are times when we passionately
desire to hear the night? And I think we do hear 
it: we hear it because our senses, not being 
mechanisms, actually perform the miracles of 
imagination that they themselves create: from 
our senses come the metaphors through which we 
know the world, and in turn our senses get 
knowledge of the world by means of figures of 
their own making. Nobody today, fifty years 
after these incidents, can hear the night; 
nobody wishes to hear it. To hear the night, 
and to crave its coming, one must have deep 
inside one's secret being a vast metaphor
controlling all the rest: a belief in the
innate evil of man's nature, and the need to 
face that evil, of which the symbol is darkness, 
of which again the living image is man alone&
Now that men cannot be alone, they cannot bear 
the dark, and they see themselves as innately 
good but betrayed by circumstances that render 
them pathetic. Perhaps some of the people in 
this story are to be pitied, but I cannot pity 
them; none of them was innately good. They were 
all, I think, capable of great good, but that 
is not the same thing as being good. (pp.218-19)
The lesser failures in knowledge on the part of 
the characters manifest their single great failure, the 
failure to recognize the existence of evil. Neither the 
great sincerity of George Posey nor the code of Pleasant 
Hill is adequate protection against the abyss of evil, for 
the abyss is already within man. This is the tragedy of 
The Fathers and it is the universal tragedy of man.
In elevating his epistemology to the perception 
of good and evil, Tate gives to The Fathers a universal
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significance. He places it in the American tradition 
of Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain who view the eternal 
dilemma of man good but not wholly good, who see, as 
does Virgil, the lacrimae rerun.
SECTION III
THE POETRY OF ALLEN TATE
Twentieth--century America has been labelled 
with numerous sociological and psychological epithets - 
"The Lonely Crowd," "The Status Seekers," "The Age of 
Analysis," "The Age of Anguish." Tate would, I suppose, 
admit the validity of any or all of these epithets; but 
he would view them as symptoms of a more essential dis­
turbance - pragmatic knowledge. Because the twentieth 
century is the age of imperfect knowledge, it is an 
isolated, rootless age. The scientific and pragmatic 
perception of reality abstracts life from livelihood, 
means from ends, past from present, practical from 
contemplative, virtue from action; it fragments man’s 
life and it fragments society; it creates a vast, in­
human, mechanized hell.
This modern hell is the subject of all of 
Tate's poetry prior to his conversion. The tortures he 
describes vary - urban life, terrified incomprehension, 
blind optimism, - but they are always the tortures of 
hell; and Tate, like a modern Dante, leads his reader
I
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from circle to circle; but unlike Dante, Tate discovers 
no escape, for Tate believes that total cognition alone 
can liberate man from m o d e m  hell and total cognition in 
the present historical situation is impossible. Tate's 
poetry is highly cerebral, but it is not without passion, 
the savage indignation of the intellectual viewing hopeless 
chaos. At its best, it possesses a cold rational fury that 
is unique, immediately identifiable, and capable of an 
almost prophetic grandeur. At its worst, it is querulous 
and irritable.
Tate, like many modern poets, is never far 
from satire, for his poetry can be read as a penetrating 
and disturbing analysis of the modern ego. But Tate 
cannot maintain the objectivity necessary for successful 
satire. He becomes tragically involved in what he scorns; 
and, like a refrain, despair echoes through his work. It 
is this tone of desperate intellectuality that gives to 
his poetry its toughness of fiber and philosophic density. 
Tate is never content to examine surface manifestations 
of the modern malaise. He sees twentieth-century society 
as sick and knows that the disease has dozens of external 
symptoms. He is irritated and disturbed by these symptoms, 
but he traces them all to one fundamental disease, to 
flawed cognition. Tate is philosophic in that he seeks a
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basic cause, a principle of unity.
If we apply the problem of the One and the Many 
to Tate's poetry, imperfect knowledge would be the One and 
the multiple fragmentations resulting from this Imperfect 
cognition would be the Many. Although he does not offer 
a solution to the modern crisis, yet he does offer a 
philosophic principle of unity. Tate's epistemological 
center gives consistency to his poetry; the problem of 
knowledge is either the dramatic situation or the implied 
theme of all of hi3 pre-Gatholic poetry. Prom this problem 
derive the images: Plato's Cave, a symbol of the shadow
world of abstraction; excessive white or yellow light, a 
symbol of the quantitative vision of science; night and 
twilight, symbols of the partial vision or blindness of 
modern man; motion, symbol of the directionless action of 
modern life. Tate uses the sea and water as Amoldian 
symbols of wholeness and integrity. However, his use of 
water can be ironic like Eliot's in "The Waste Land" - 
the water that could save, drowns or becomes a hell of 
frozen ice.
The recurrent Christ images - "the long-gestat- 
ing Christ" and "The Holy Runt" ("Fragment of Meditation," 
p.87), MIn Christ we have lived" ("Causerie," p.80),
"every son-of-a-bitch is Christ" {"Retroduction to American
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History,11 (p.7ii), "mummy Christ” ("To Denis Devlin," 
p.52) - have an obvious shock value.1 Do they indicate 
a basic concern with religion in Tate's early poetry?
Many commentators feel that they do and thst the unifying 
center in all of Tate's work, both before and after his
O
conversion, is religious or moral. I disagree with this 
opinion. Tate often uses religious concepts and images 
(we have already seen his use of good and evil in The
Fathers). As I attempted to show in Section I, religion 
(and all the various shades of meaning which the word 
implies), is for Tate a means to cognition. Even after 
his conversion, his thinking on religion is not exact.^ 
Tate's thought is always dangerously near to the Socratic 
fallacy that man can be saved by knowledge alone. It is
1. As I have already indicated in Section I, I shall use 
the most recent edition of Tate’s poetry, Poems (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, I960) when quoting.
To avoid a cumbersome use of footnotes, I shall cite 
the name of the poem and the page in the body of the 
text.
2. As we have already seen in Section I this is the opinion 
of Meiners, Bradbury, and - with qualifications - Foster. 
It is also the opinion of Katherine Bregy, "Allen Tate: 
Paradoxical Pilgrim," Catholic World, CLXXX (November, 
195^) $ 121-25 and of Sister Mary Be m e t  t a, "Allen Tate's 
Inferno," Renascence, III (Spring, 1951)* 113-19.
3. See the analysis of "Christ and the Unicorn," Section 
I, Chapter IV.
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the failure of modern man to recognize good and evil, his 
failure to recognize Christ that Tate bewails because 
such failures are manifestations of inadequate cognition. 
Tate concentrates upon the intellect to the neglect of the 
will; cognition, not volition, is for him the essential 
act by which man is integrated and saved. I hope to make 
this distinction between religion and cognition clearer in 
the explication of Tate's poetry, specifically in the 
explication of "The Cross." The subject of the poem is 
the most basic Christian symbol; the theme, however, is 
epistemological, not religious.
Since the theme and dramatic situation in Tate's 
poetry are always the same, I have divided his poems 
according to subject matter: time, death, fragmentation, 
and religion. In each of the chapters to follow I will 
explicate two poems which I have selected because they 
exemplify Tate's better work, and because they have not 
been treated or have been treated inadequately by other 
commentators. In the fourth chapter on religion, I shall 
explicate the three sections of the long poem begun after 
his conversion. The proportion of space devoted to these 
last poems may seem inordinate, but it is Justified, I 
believe, by the fact that no critic has given them more 
than passing notice.
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Explication is, at its best, difficult to 
follow. Tate's poetry by reason of its density and its 
obscure and personal metaphors is particularly difficult. 
All of the poems explicated may be found in the appendix, 
and I would su rgest that each poem be read before reading 
the explication. In the explications themselves, I may 
seem to belabor the meaning of the poem. My reason for 
doing so is that many of Tate's critics by their vague 
remarks add little to the understanding of poems already 
difficult because of their compression. Tate, faithful 
to his own epistemological doctrine of "seeing" thought, 
attempts to compress abstract ideas into visual symbols. 
If the idea or ideas contained in the symbol are missed 
by the reader, the poem remains an unintelligible jumble. 
There have been many studies of Tate's poetry and many 
explications of his poems, but one critic writing in 1961 
still finds them difficult and obscure.^ The poems are
"I think much of that difficulty of Tate's poetry 
will remain, no matter how familiar the ideas may 
become. Cleanth Brooks, as he relates Tate's poems 
to intellectual themes from Tate's essays, says that 
this is necessary since 'the surface of the poem, in 
its apparently violent disorder', may carry the 
unwitting reader off at tangents. This may be so, but 
I am not sure that the reader can avoid being carried 
off no matter how much he learns about Religion and 
the Old South." John Thompson, "Allen Tate 1961," 
Poetry, XCIX (November, 1961), 121.
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difficult but I hope to show that they are neither obscure 
nor unintelligible.
In explicating the poetry, I hope to make 
even more evident the basic epistemological center of 
Tate's thought. The discovery of the theme or dramatic 
situation of a poem is, however, only the beginning of 
criticism. Consequently, I shall not limit my analysis 
to this single aspect of the poems, but shall attempt, as 
I did in Section II on Tate's fiction, to consider the 
poems in their entirety.
CHAPTER I
TIME
In both "The Mediterranean" and "The Wolves," 
Tate is concerned with the concept of time, the complete 
and simultaneous knowledge of past and present. As we 
have seen in Section I, Tate believes chat such a unity 
of past and present was once possible in a traditional 
society. In "The Mediterranean" the modern protagonists 
achieve this unification of time in a fleeting vision of 
the heroic past, but because they are modern men, they 
cannot retain the unification of past and present and 
sadly return to the isolated and quantitative time of the 
present age.
In "The Mediterranean" Tate treats an apparently 
insignificant event, two men sailing across a wide bay 
into a tranquil cove; but the real subject of the poem 
is the escape from the unheroic and isolated present into 
the heroic and integrated past. Somehow the protagonists 
(referred to only as "we") experience a momentary vision 
of the past but the vision fades and they must return to 
the present, to a country that from its description seems 
to be the modern South. In this poem, Tate dramatically
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presents his ideas of qualitative and quantitative time 
and the problem they create. The exact visual imagery 
of the poem is a symbol of intellectual vision, a "seeing" 
thought. The actual motion of the boat is symbolic of a 
movement back into the past. The modern protagonists,
"we," move from the quantitative time of the present age, 
"time's monotone," through the "margin" into "antiquity's 
delay," the qualitative time of the past. The "secret 
need" of rootless, modern man is nourished by the past, 
by the "very plates Aeneas bore." The aimless motion of 
a society without purpose is "derelict," and the protago­
nists out of m o d e m  society, having at last discovered 
the past, "Drop sail, and hastening to drink all night /
Eat dish and bowl to take that sweet land ini" Aeneas and 
his men by devouring the plates removed the curse of the 
Harpies. Momentarily the curse is removed from the men out 
of "time's monotone," but the curse is only briefly lifted: 
"We for that time might taste the famous age / Eternal here 
yet hidden from our eyes." (This inability of man to fuse 
present and past in one "smooth essential flow" is a fre­
quent theme in Tate's poetry.)
The protagonist of the "Ode to the Confederate 
Dead" cannot taste the past even briefly; he can but praise 
the vision of the dead, can but see the present, "Cursing 
only the leaves crying / Like an old man in a storm." He,
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modern man, f1a mummy in time/’ cannot see for he too is 
cursed, "the patient curse / That stones the eyes.1 
I p.22)
In the "Horatian Epode" the poet has escaped the 
monotone of the present by way of Webster's vision of 
good and evil In The Duchess of Malfl, but the present 
reasserts itself "And the katharsis fades in the warm 
water of a yawn." (p.72) In the Autumn section of 
"Seasons of the Soul" the poet cannot regain even his own 
past. In a dream-like vision, he sees father, mother, and 
others like ghosts who cannot see him, "Who had no look or 
voice / For him whose vision froze / Him in the empty 
hall." (p.33) Like the lover on the train in "Retroduction 
to American History," modern man locked in his ego has no 
spiritual vision, "His very eyeballs fixed in disarticula­
tion." (p.75)
In "The Mediterranean," however, the "landless 
Wanderers" have escaped, have achieved the unification, if 
but passingly, of past and present. As a result, their 
forefathers "live" and the "Ocean" is "breathing," a living 
symbol of spiritual communion. But as in Keats' "Ode to a 
Nightingale" the vision fades, so too does this vision 
falter; and the stanza which began in sound and image with 
such joyous tranquility "Let us lie down once more by the 
breathing side / Of Ocean, where our live forefathers
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sleep / As if the Known Sea still were a month wide,” 
suddenly halts with, "Atlantis howls but is no longer 
steep!” The sibilants, the sharp caesura, the final 
bathetic "steep” all bring an end to the vision. The 
protagonists return to the present to "the fair land"
(the m o d e m  South) that will "unman our conquest," a 
present without vision or hope because modern science 
has "cracked the hemispheres with careless hand." The 
final stanza concludes with a richness of imagery, a 
heaviness of vowels, and a smooth forward flow that is 
almost Keatsian. But again the sharp caesura, the in­
ternal rhyme, and the punctuation bring the languid move­
ment to a violent halt. The final "in that land were we 
born" is a lament. Louis Rubin sees in this concluding 
stanza a harmony between poet and nature: "A scene has
been described; the ultimate act is one of contemplation."^ 
Vivienne Koch has a different view: "The poem ends with
a vision of the fecund and luxurious exhaustion of the 
South - the South conceived as the inheritor of classical 
culture by a kind of mystical primogeniture."^ Both read-
1. Louis Rubin, "The Concept of Nature in Modern Southern 
Poetry," American Quarterly, IX (Spring, 1957)* 65*
2. Op. clt., p. 367.
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ings have a certain validity. However, the last two lines 
of stanza eight and the whole of stanza nine seem to come 
as a forlorn answer to the question asked in the caption,
1 Quern das finem, rex magne, dolorum?"3 There has been a 
momentary escape from sorrow, but the final answer of the 
poem is "numquaml" Because modern man has shattered the 
union of the past and present by destroying the myth of 
history, there will be no end to his sorrows. The "bara- 
rous brine / Whelms us to the tired land.” The momentary 
vision fled, we return to a world where history gives no 
vision but "pares / The nails of Catullus, sniffs his 
sheets, restores / His ’passionate underwear.’" (Retroduc- 
tion to American History," p.7U)
In form, "The Mediterranean" exemplifies Tate at 
his best. The first four quatrains are one descriptive 
sentence. The fifth asks a question; the sixth and seventh 
present a partial answer. The first two lines of the 
eighth quatrain interrogate the present; the third line
3. I am indebted to Lillian Feder for locating this line in 
the Aestid* She discovers Tate's change of laborum to 
dolorum. I do not agree with her thesis that Tate is a 
classical poet, but her article is stimulating and 
original. "Allen Tate's Use of Classical Literature," 
Centennial Review, IV (Winter, I960), 89-lllj..
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explains the impossibility of solution, end the final 
line and the ninth concluding quatrain in one unbroken 
sweep give the woeful answer to the central problem of 
the poem. There seems little need to belabor the metrics. 
They are handled with consummate skill. Caesural pause, 
rhetorical and metrical stress, the variation of vowel 
sounds - all make one wonder why critics have spoken of 
Tate's rough and tortured verse. What does seem to 
emerge from the form is that Tate is most successful when 
he confines his subject matter to strict and careful 
pattern. The dramatic quality of the poem, the accurate 
visual imagery which functions, as does Joyce's, on both 
a realistic and a symbolic level, the action itself again 
achieving a dual function, the classical allusions to 
Aeneas and to Odysseus fuse into an amazingly concrete 
and complex whole. This is, nerhaps, as close as art can 
come to the concrete universal,
Tate's approach to time in "The Wolves" is 
slightly different from his treatment of it in "The Medi­
terranean." In the latter poem, the unifying vision of 
the protagonists is a conscious though momentary omei 
In "The Wolves" the protagonist is subconsciously aware 
of a racial memory, of a traditional guilt. In this poem 
Tate emphasizes the fact that man's total consciousness 
must embrace both past and present. Since modern man's
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flawed cognition cannot consciously effect this unifica­
tion, his subconscious self reminds him of his racial 
past. The lucid but abstract perception of modern 
science may attempt to isolate man in a fixed moment of 
time, but because man’s existential reality includes 
more than the isolated moment, he is ill at ease and 
haunted in his neat, abstract, and partial concept of 
himself. His subconscious self hints to him by dreams, 
myths, and symbols that there is another room to the 
self, a room containing beasts that his conscious and 
rational self refuses to recognize.
There is in Tate’s poetry a recurring theme of 
racial, not personal, guilt in which the protagonists 
share as they share in tradition. The protagonists of 
the guilt poems are only subconsciously aware of in­
herited guilt. It is a stigma born into the conscious 
self by the blood, by dreams, by fear, by the night.
Thus in "Sonnets of the Blood" the poet writes, "this 
prowling of the cells, litigious love / Wears the long 
claw of flesh-arguing crime." (p.166) In the third sonnet 
of the series he is more explicit: "Dignity's the stain /
Of mortal sin that knows humility." (p.l67) At time, like 
a Hemingway hero or a Macbeth, he complains, "I've done no 
rape, arson, incest, no murder / Yet cannot sleep." (Cau-
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serie,H p.78) In "A Dream" a nine-year-old boy, the man 
he is to be and his great-grandfather all seek out the 
devil who is suspiciously like Edmund Wilson ("none so 
unbaptized as Edmund Wilson the unwearied / That sly 
parody of the devil"), and the boy's dream ends with a 
shattering consciousness of guilt: "Spoke from the deep
coherence of hell - / The pines thundered, the sky blacked 
away, / The man in breeches, all knowledge in his stare, /
A moment shuddered as the world fell." (p.i+ii) In the 
classically beautiful "Ode to Fear," the guilt is clearly 
original sin, "God's hatred of the universal stain."
(p . 101+) Try as they will, men can never quite blot out 
the sense of guilt from their subconscious. It haunts them 
even though they "Tuck in their eyes and cover the flying 
dark with sleep like falling leaves." ("Ditty," p.109)
Only the living-dead, like the after-dinner speaker in 
"The Meaning of Death," rid themselves of It. Thus the 
living-dead lover in "Retroduction to American History," 
"Ticket in hand, he pumps his body / Toward lower six, for 
one more terse ineffable trip, / His very eyeballs fixed 
in disarticulation. The berth / Is clean; no elephants, 
vultures, mice or spiders / Distract him from nonentity: 
his metaphors are dead." (p.75)
It is difficult to trace Tate's poetry to Freud's
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archaic vestiges or to Jung's "collective a priori beneath 
the personal psyche." Nowhere in his critical prose does 
Tate refer to either of those hypotheses. However, it may 
prove an interesting and enlightening introduction to 
"The Wolves" to quote from Jung. He has described a 
personal dream in which he wanders from story to story 
in a house, each level nob® ancient than the former. He 
comments, "It was plain to me that the house represented a 
kind of image of the psyche - that is to say, of my then 
state of consciousness with hitherto unconscious additions. 
Consciousness was represented by the salon...The ground 
floor stood for the first level of unconsciousness. The 
deeper I went, the more alien and the darker the scene 
became. In the cave, I discovered remains of a primitive 
culture, that is, the world of primitive man within myself
...a world which can scarcely be reached or illuminated by
, fill-consciousness.'
The dramatic situation of "The Wolves" finds the 
speaker alone in a room separated by a "white door" from 
"wolves in the next room waiting." The situation is 
established in a single sentence of six free iambic pentam­
eters. The seventh line comprises two simple sentences 
which give universality to the situation and emphasize its
If. C. 0. Jung, Memories, Dreams. Reflections, (New York: 
Pantheon Boots, 1961), p. 160.
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terror: "It has all been forever. Beasts claw at the
floor." The speaker has consciously "brooded on angels 
and archfiends," but has never consciously brooded upon 
the latent depths of evil within himself: "But no man has
ever sat where the next room's / Crowded with wolves."
Again the conscious self of the speaker looks outward 
toward the heavens, "And whistled when Arcturus spilt his 
light." There is an irony in the use of "Arcturus," the 
Bear Star, for even in conscious contemplation of the 
heavens, the subconscious animal symbolism projects itself 
and man must return to "the wolves." Why? For "this / Is 
man," and "The day will not follow night." The speaker 
then makes the symbolism of house, door, wolves and star 
explicit. For man there is no escape from what he is; he 
must face the truth of his situation, his ancestral guilt. 
The poem close# with a terrifying image, one almost anti­
thetical to the dead lover on the train whose berth was 
free of vultures, mice, and spiders. Man must consciously 
pass through the "white door" into the subconscious and 
accept what he is, the existential whole, not only the 
conscious image of himself: "go to the door, / Open It and
see whether coiled on the bed / Or cringing by the wall, 
a savage beast / Maybe with golden hair, with deep eyes / 
Like a bearded spider on a sunlit floor / Will snarl - and
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man can never be alone."
Tate has created a remarkably eerie and dream­
like atmosphere, one not quite so delicate as de la 
Mare's "The Listeners," but not unlike it in tone. He 
establishes this tone not by a verse pattern and rime 
scheme but by the use of symbol and rhetoric; by a 
studied balance of periodic and tersely emphatic sentence 
structure; by symbol combined with explicit statement.
The horrifyingly beautiful final image and the concluding 
statement at once climax and summarize the method. The 
final "and man can never be alone," is immensely sad in 
its falling hopelessness.
This poem is, perhaps, one of the most success­
ful examples of Tate's unpatterned verse. The success 
arises from a carefully constructed rhetoric and a con­
trol of symbol that compensates for its lack of form.
This freer mode of "commentary" as employed by Tate shows 
to its best effect in the short poems.5 When he employs 
it in longer poems - poems that is like "Causerie" which 
run to more than thirty lines - he too often tends to 
lose his sustaining power, and his poems become a series
5. Howard Nemerov divides Tate's poems into essence (the 
strictly patterned and controlled poems) and "commen­
tary" (the more formless and discursive poems), op. 
cit., p. 53.
of brilliant fragments interlaced by too topical, too 
personal allusions. The lofty Swiftean scorn descends 
to mere scolding. The "Ode to the Confederate Dead” is 
a brilliant exception to his usual performance.
It might be noted that although Tate scorns 
Edmund Wilson13 Freudianism, yet he must have been aware 
of the great influence that the new science of psycho­
analysis had had upon literature from the 201s onward.
What is unique in T i e  is his imaginative use of this 
matter. By analysis Freud had attempted to resolve the 
anxiety that arises from an id-ego conflict. Jung, 
through dreams and myths, sought to arrive at a basic 
racial memory or experience underlying the conscious 
knowledge of the persona, Tate, intentionally or not, 
uses the same method, not to liberate man from anxiety, 
but rather to force him to the acceptance of guilt. It is 
a technique th t follows almost as a scholion from Tate's 
theory of tradition and of time. To men deprived of dogma 
and of belief in God, Tate presents the psychological 
proof of the existence of evil. If we cannot have abso­
lute good, at least we can settle for universal evil.
It should be noted that in both "The Mediterra­
nean" and "The Wolves" Tate establishes a problem, the 
epistemological problem of total knowledge. He confines
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the problem in these poems to the full awareness of time. 
In the former poem the protagonists are aware that a 
conscious and total grasp of time in the present age is 
impossible. In the latter poem, the protagonist is 
equally aware that his conscious knowledge does not in­
clude his total self; he realizes that to know himself 
(and man) as he is, he must enter into his subconscious 
self, must open the door to the next room and accept what 
he finds, his own racial past.
CHAPTER II
DEATH
Like Time, the grinning death skull haunts 
Tate's poetry. One has but to scan the titles of his 
poems to see how many treat the subject. Even in poems 
that do not treat it directly, death is introduced in the 
figures of speech: "as if the sleepy dead / Had never
fallen to drowse" ("To a Romantic," p.139); "And the 
sapphire corpse undressed by Donne" ("Progress of 
Oenia," p.llj.8); "A corpse is your bedfellow" ("Retroduc- 
tion to American History" p.75). The ever-present allusion 
direct or otherwise to death or to death-in-life may be 
the quality in his poetry that encourages critics to com­
pare Tate to Donne.
What, one might a3k, is the reason for this morbid 
concentration? Death in Tate's poetry seems to have at 
least three functions: it shocks the reader into an aware­
ness of the inadequacy of his philosophy; it is the begin­
ning of reality - "Time begins to elucidate her bones," 
("Obituary," p.162); and it is used to emphasize the life- 
in-death theme - "Our property in fire is death in life" 
("Sonnets of the Blood," p.167). The answer to the ques-
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tion in MThe Oath" - "Who are the dead?" is Implied in 
Lytle's oath: "Then Lytle turned with an oath - By God
it's true]" (p.107). Lytle and the questioner are the 
living-dead. "The leaning of Death " is a life of 
shadow without substance: "In a long night when learned
arteries / Mounting the ice and sum of barbarous time / 
Shall yield, without essence, perfect accident. / We are 
the eyelids of defeated caves." (p.1214.). In "The Anab­
asis" the fear is lest we "Should join, before our 
place, / Death's long anabasis." (p.133). In "To a 
Romantic" the reader is told "The dead are those whose 
lies / Were doors to a narrow house." (p.139).
It is the first function, to shock the reader, 
that Tate intends to use in hi3 early (1921}.) and much 
admired "Death of Little Boys." Seemingly the poem 
presents the dilemma caused by the death of a little 
boy - the universal "boys" becomes singular in the third 
stanza - but as we might suspect, the crisis centers upon 
the observer's loss of emotional control, upon his inabili 
ty to grasp and to comprehend the "event." Like the lover 
on the train, "his metaphors are dead."
The first quatrain might be deceptive were it 
not for the title. The death that little boys, "patient 
at last," accept like sleep has a shocking effect upon the
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committed observer. It "will rage terrific as the sea; / 
Their bodies fill a crumbling room with light." The 
event can be, if understood, a cause of enlightenment.
The observer becomes one with the dead boy ("Gold curls 
now deftly intricate with gray"), and he stares in fear 
through the window upon "one peeled aster," the universal 
symbol of death. The third stanza limits the death to 
one boy by its concrete detail, "the ultimate dream" 
creeping upward but "round his sturdy belly gleam / 
Suspended breaths, white spars above the wreck." In the 
fourth stanza, as the "guests come in to look" and 
manifest stereotyped sorrow ("turn down / Their palms"), 
the protagonist loses all control; his world totters about 
him, "Reels like a sailor drunk in a rotten skiff." 
Whatever the allusion is here - many possibilities have 
been suggested; Hamlet, Milton, Poe, Hans Anderson, Rim­
baud - the total disintegration of the observer is 
obvious, A kind of idiot response follows: "The bleak
sunshine shrieks its chipped music then / Out to the 
milkweed amid the fields of wheat." Then the answer that 
is no answer, insane incomprehension is followed by inane 
motion: "There is a calm for you where men and women / 
Unroll the chill precision of moving feet." From the 
first stanza the poet has established an ironic anti-
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thesis. The single source of tranquility, of light, of 
solidity is the dead boy. But the observer’s world is 
"crumbling," "torn in two," "fear," and the final 
"delirium" invade it. The modern protagonist cannot 
comprehend death; he has no answer to its question.
He can only escape from it by routine motion, "the chill 
precision of moving feet." Without the greater myth of 
religion or the lesser of history, even the most signifi­
cant event is incomprehensible to him. He cannot know.
The form, pentameter quatrains, is strictly 
controlled; the diction is highly concentrated and 
demands the closest attention. For example, the little 
boys "surrender their eyes immeasurably to the night."
The unexpected use of the adverb, "immeasurably," concen­
trates the reader's attention upon the act of dying and 
away from the expected but vaguer "night." It prepares 
the reader for the final irony, that death immeasurable 
in the best of circumstances can certainly not be 
measured by turned-down palms and chill, precise move­
ment. Each line demands its context: "Qold curls now
deftly intricate with gray" is meaningless without "you... 
torn in two," which reveals personal involvement and is 
further explained by "extends a fear to you." Tate makes 
no abstract statement, but the poem is no less intellec-
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tual for all that. The density and compression of the 
imagery force the universal into the concrete dramatic 
situation. If abstract clarification is to be had, it 
must be earned by the reader's contemplation of the 
experienced poem.
As has been emphasized before, the reader of 
Tate's poetry must not expect a neat division of theme 
and subject matter. The subject matter may vary but the 
theme remains constant. In "Death of Little Boys" Tate 
dramatized modern man's inability to comprehend the event 
of death. "The Meaning of Death" explains, perhaps, the 
reason for that incomprehension.
Howard Nemerov discovers in Tate two general 
3orts of poetry: "The first is reflective, meditative,
rhetorical in manner, executed often in a considerably 
distorted blank verse and given over to the explicit dis­
cussion of theme: such poems as ’Causerie,1 'Fragment of
a Meditation,’ and 'Retroduction to American History' are 
of this kind. The other manner is characterized by 
brevity, concision, great formality of rime and meter and 
(for the reader) those difficulties which must go with 
subtle thought of which the connections are allowed to 
remain implicit by a kind of lyrical absolutism: 'Ode to
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Fear,1 'The Traveler,' 'The Paradigm,' 'The Cross.
"The Meaning of Death" and its antithetical 
poem "The Meaning of Life" fuse tk:ese two modes: the 
rambling commentary of the body of the poem is concluded 
by an image of great power and concentration. The cap­
tions of the two poems indicate only the method of 
commentary, "An after-dinner speech," and "A monologue," 
In the latter poem the poet seems to say that life needs 
no commentary: "There's that other / Which may be
called the immaculate / Conception of its essence in 
itself." The modes of commentary upon life vary, but 
life itself is an enormous, blind force that needs no 
explanation, that neither needs to comprehend nor to ex­
press itself. Tate concludes the rambling commentary 
with an image of great power: "One's sense of the proper
decoration alters / But there's a kind of lust feeds on 
itself / Unspoken to, unspeaking; subterranean / As a 
black river full of eyeless fish / Heavy with spawn; with
1. 0£. cit., pp. £3-5^.
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a passion for time / Longer than the arteries of a 
cave.” If this is life, we may begin to suspect that 
death is pure commentary, pure decoration.
The title of "The Meaning of Death" is 
ironical for what the after-dinner speaker is attempting 
to define is a way of life; what he does describe is Tate's 
conception of death: "Let that be life - time fall3 no
more." Apparently the speaker is addressing the modern 
world that would reduce all things to the clear and 
distinct ideal of Cartesian abstractionism. Light becomes 
in the poem the symbol of this mathematical ideal: "Let
light fall, there shall be eternal light / And all the 
light shall on our heads be worn." At this point in the 
poem, the speaker admits a concession: "Although at eve­
ning clouds infest the sky / Broken at base from which the
2. Cleanth Brooks explains this image in the following 
manner: "The blood is associated with 'lust,1* is
subterranean (buried within the body), is the source 
of 'passion.' The reference to the fish may be also 
a fertility symbol. But the fish are 'eyeless' 
though 'heavy with spawn.' The basic stuff of life 
lacks eyes -- cannot see even itself; and filled with 
infinite potentialities, runs its dark, involved, 
subterranean course." ojd. cit. , p. 1 0 6.
lemon sun / Pours acid of winter on a useful view."
The "acid" and the "useful view" would seem to express, 
as does the black river image in "The Meaning of Life," 
a favorite but never too explicit theme of Tate13, that 
the super-ego of modern optimism can never quite 
suppress the "unspeaking subterranean" force of the id. 
Again and again Tate creates a nightmare atmosphere in 
his poems, a dream world in which past, present, and 
future,merge into one. At ni^it "lucent madness" 
emerges from the subconscious to 3hake our rational 
sanity. In his "Ode to Fear" Tate discovers truth and 
memory and a sense of universal guilt in the emergence 
of the subconscious that night brings: "Night peering
from his dark but fire-lit head / Burns on the day his 
tense and secret light. / Now they dare not gloss your 
savage dream, 0 beast of the heart." (p.103)
In "The Meaning of Death" evening brings to the 
speaker's timeless world a "lemon sun" that sours his 
superrational vision. But the speaker, and presumably all 
of us his auditors, refuses to heed the warning of the 
subconscious, and he reverses the "lemon sun" image and 
turns its acid light upon the past. He "would have more 
than living sight." He repudiates time, repudiates the
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vulgar past with its "vice and virtue, hard sacrifice 
and crime." The glare of his ominous light turns to 
the future ("Tomorrow"), and the verse itself suddenly 
tightens to regular iambic couplets that echo the joyous 
note of Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality."
But even in this rapturous vision of a future freed from 
"the past, its related errors, coarseness / Of parents, 
laxities, unrealities of principle," the speaker is 
trapped by the memory of his own past when at night his 
mother taught him "the mixed modes of an ancient fear."
Again he admonishes his audience to "think of 
tomorrow." It is to be a time when "desire and act" are 
reduced to "simplicity" founded upon the "best hypothe­
ses." "Ritual" will be avoided lest it "corrupt our 
charity." All, even charity, is to be useful in this 
world. The final image links the poem to its counter 
poem, "The Meaning of Life." The opposite of life is 
"when learned arteries / Mounting the ice and sum of 
barbarous time / Shall yield, without essence, perfect 
accident. / We are the eyelids of defeated caves."
As in "The Oath," the final irony here is the 
speaker’s inability to recognize hia own death. The modern 
"angelic imagination" has rendered all clear, has destroyed
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personal guilt, the "universal stain," evil, ritual, 
tradition, the subconscious. By removing the essence, 
it has reduced men to zombies, the living-dead appearing 
only to have life. The modern age has sealed the cave 
of life with its "black river full of eyeless fish / 
Heavy with spawn." This i3 the meaning of death.
The mode of commentary gives to this poem a 
certain freedom and an almost flaccid clarity. However, 
the mode of commentary is more successful in this than in 
other like poems. Tate gives to the poem a tight unity 
of theme and links various sections to each other by his 
use of light imagery. As in "The Meaning of Life," he 
concludes the poem with an immensely powerful and compli­
cated image that by its very density accomplishes "the 
immaculate / Conception of its essence in itself." This 
final image almost justifies the poem but not quite. The 
formlessness, the lack of strong rhetoric, the absence of 
tension reduce the poem, save for the final image, to a 
near prose statement.
In both "Death of Little Boys" and "The Meanir^ 
of Life" Tate's subject is death - the real death of a 
boy, the spiritual death-in-life of the modern optimist 
blinded by the too-bright, abstract light of science. In 
both poems the theme is the flawed vision of the protago**
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nist. In "Death of Little Boys," the protagonist cannot 
comprehend the great reality of death and hides his con­
fusion in aimless and routine motion. In "The Meaning of 
Life," the after-dinner speaker is a living-dead man who 
is too blind to recognize his own condition. Although 
he ironically imagines his zombie existence to be the 
fullness of life, yet his subconscious self troubles his 
ignorance with an insinuating fear which he dismisses as 
childish. He is so blind that he mistakes error for truth 
and truth for error.
All modern men (according to Tate) suffer from 
incomplete knowledge. The more sensitive and perceptive 
moderns like the protagonists of "The Mediterranean" at 
least realize their predicament. Less perceptive moderns 
like the after-dinner speaker are totally unaware of their 
tragically flawed cognition.
CHAPTER III
FRAGMENTATION
By now the reader must be aware that in Tate1a 
tragic vision of life all problems are aspects of one 
great problem. Life in modern society is hell, bat hell 
has a variety of tortures and increasing depths of 
misery. Tate, like Dante, would lead us by descending 
circles to the very core of hell. He will not mislead 
"the banker and the statesman into the illusion that they 
have no hell, because as secularists, they have lacked 
the language to report it." Nor will he spare himself; 
he, too, is trapped In the modern dilemma, "his hell has 
not been for those other people: he has reported his
Part of this hell is modern man’s horrible 
inner fragmentation. With no inner principle of unity, 
he is like an idiot with no values, with nothing but time­
less, unrelated (because there is nothing to relate to) 
sense experience. "The idiot greens the meadow with his 
eyes, / The meadow creeps implacable and still; / A dog 
barks, the hammock swings, he lies. / One two three the
1. "The Man of Letters in the Modern World," oj>. clt. , 
p. 381+.
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cows bulge on the hill." (’’Idiot," p. 157) 3enjy Compaon 
of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury is modern man, the 
living dead; "now in the idiot’s heart a chamber stinks /
Of dead asters." Unreal scientific abstraction has 
caused this hell: "Being all infinite, function depth
and mass / Without figure, a mathematical shroud."
("Last Days of Alice," p.116) Science has turned us into 
"Plato's kept philosopher, / Albino man bleached from the 
mortal clay." ("More Sonnets at Christmas," p.55) Our 
unreal society exists by the logic of hell, by an insane 
rationality: "in an age of abstract experience, fornica­
tion / Is self-expression, adjunct to Christian euphoria, / 
And whores become delinquents; delinquents, patients; / 
Patients, wards of society. Whore3, by that rule, are 
precious." ("Causerie," p.82)
Of the many forceful presentations of this theme, 
Yvor Winters finds "The Subway" to be one of the best:
"The feeling is quite specific and unparaphrasable, but one 
may indicate the nature of it briefly by saying that it is 
a feeling of dignity and of self-control in the face of a 
situation of major difficulty, a difficulty which the poet 
fully apprehends."
2. Yvor Winters, Primitivism and Decadence (New York: Arrow 
Editions, 1937), p. I*.
235
"The Subway" 13 a sonnet, and again we note 
Tate*3 masterly control of a difficult form. But even 
the use of this form is a subtle irony, for the problem 
presented in the octet finds no solution in the sestet. 
The octet is an imaginative vision of the subway. It 
begins with an exact detail, "accurate plunger," but the 
description becomes progressively more hellish and less 
and less concrete. By the fifth line the "accurate 
plunger" has become a "musical steel shell / Of angry 
worship." The direction of the descent is clearly fixed 
by the closing line of the octet, "Into the iron forest­
ries of hell." The imagery of the octet has become pro­
gressively more violent, progressively leas controlled, 
until it achieves the ultimate violence of this final 
line.
The octet is at once a cause and a symbol, a 
3ymbol of the quantitative abstraction of space that i3 
modern society, a mechanism that extends and extends even 
to hell itself. It is a cause of the emotional state of 
the protagonist described in the sestet. Having emerged 
from the "iron forestries of hell," he Is "broken." The 
ever expanding quantity without quality has shattered his 
rationality, so that he too has "become geometries, and 
glut / Expans ions... In the cold revery of an idiot."
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In "The Subway" Tate dramatizes his theory of
quantity without quality, of provincialism without 
3
regionalism. The modern mathematical mind abstracts 
quantity from total reality; because this concept of 
quantity is abstract, it is capable of infinite theoreti­
cal extension. The builders of the modern city attempt to 
realize this unreal mathematical abstraction in the reality 
of urban life. The result is a vast, impersonal, mecha­
nized hell. The protagonist of "The Subway" having been 
plunged downward into a seeming infinity of depth, 
emerges from the subway to discover the same infinite 
extension in the steel skyscrapers: "Dense altitudes
tangential of your steel." Below and above the protago­
nist is an infinite extension of steel. He cannot compre­
hend this infinity, cannot retain his personal identity 
in this impersonal world which seems insane to him. Dazed, 
his consciousness merges with the limitless expansions, 
and he loses sanity. The last word of the poem's final line 
is "idiot."
The theme of "The Subway" and of "The Last Days 
of Alice" (pp.115-116) is the same. "The Subway," however,
3. See Section I, Chapter I, pp. l^ 0-l(.3
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is a far more successful poem. The restricting sonnet 
form forces Tate to compress and control his theme. He 
limits the poem to cause and effect - the ride on the 
subway and the protagonist reduced by it to idiocy. The 
poem is dramatic and powerful; it needs no commentary 
and Tate provides none. "The Last Days of Alice" (thirty- 
two lines) has a less restricting form which allows Tate 
to expand his theme. He does so by too much commentary, 
too many images, and too many restatements of the same 
theme. As a result, he loses control and the poem loses 
its force and coherence. "The Subway" is proof, 1 believe, 
that Tate is most successful in his poems of exact and 
limited form. The theme of "The Subway" provides one more 
proof that the center of Tate’s work is epistemological: 
modern man is fragmented, is broken by a false, abstract 
perception of reality.
"The Cross" may seem an odd companion piece to 
"The Subway" - a dramatization of the hell that is mecha­
nized life. Both poems are, however, related in theme, and 
"The Cross" presents but another aspect of the fragmenta­
tion of modern man, the dichotomy between faith and reason, 
the awful fissure in the soul torn by doubt and grasping 
at hope. It is not a religious poem even though its subject 
is. In it Tate writes from the perspective of non-belief,
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not from belief. In the second line of the poem he 
establishes the sceptical position of the protagonist:
"I cannot see the whole of it.'1
"The Cross" contains several submerged allusions 
to scripture: "I have come to cast fire upon the earth 
and what would I but that it be kindled," and "For God 
so loved the world, as to give his only begotten son; 
that whoever believeth in him may not perish, but may 
have life everlasting." The latter quotation is almost 
a prose paraphrase of the problem posed in the poem.
In establishing the point of view of the pro­
tagonist of the poem, we must remember that Tate's 
poetry and fiction usually have two types of protagonists. 
There is the stone blind modern optimist like the speaker 
in "The Meaning of Life." More frequent, however, are 
protagonists like John Hermann, Lacy Buchan, the speaker 
in the "Ode to the Confederate Dead," and in "The Mediter­
ranean," sensitive men who realize their tragic situation. 
The protagonist of "The Cross" is of the latter type, a 
recorder of a problem to which there is no possible solu­
tion.
In the first three lines of the poem Tate 
establishes the position of the protagonist and involves 
him in a universal dilemma. Faith is a "place" - a 
position of belief from which "some men" survey reality.
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This i3 not the position of the poem's narrator: "I cannot
see the whole of it / Nor how I camethere." The speaker 
faces the same crisis as the protagonist of the "Ode to 
the Confederate Dead," and of Lacy Buchan in The Fathers, 
but a crisis resulting from another and more universal 
situation. Some men still live within the Christian tra­
dition; they know. The "I" of the poem doesn't know, can­
not ever understand how he became involved in this crisis. 
His partial acceptance or knowledge of the Christian tra­
dition is involuntary.
Having established his own position, the pro­
tagonist clarifies and extends it. He locates this "place" 
in time by the brilliant volcano image. The image has 
undoubted reference to the events of Good Friday, the 
darkness that covered the earth. This event, the death 
of Christ, was cataclysmic; it reversed history, contra­
dicted all that men had formerly lived by. The violence 
of the event is reenforced by the violent imagery, a 
reversal of the Good Friday darkness, a kind of inverse 
analogy by which the Christian message bursts so blindingly 
upon the pagan world as to render that world's light 
black. The sun, center of that Mediterranean world'3 
culture, a "kingly sun" deified by the pagans, is blotted 
out by the brighter Son of God. But not all saw His
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brilliance. The sun is "hateful night” only "For those, 
once seeing, turning back.” Their predicament is a bit 
like that of Keats’ knight in "La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” 
the world of the imagination destroyed for him the world 
of reality. For those who have seen (believed) the 
Christian message, there is no return to pagan naturalism. 
"He who takes his hand from the plow and looks back is 
not worthy of the kingdom of heaven.” The protagonist and, 
by extension, modern man are not in this position. They 
have never seen the whole of it, have never believed or 
disbelieved.
In two quatrains Tate has established the pro­
tagonist's position and has by means of a violent image 
given the historical reason for this position. The decep­
tively simple tetrameter iambics are handled with great 
skill. Tate shatters regularity in lines four and five 
by a substitution of spondees and trochees in the initial 
feet. The shift in rhythm emphasizes the violence of the 
event.
The third quatrain is regular in metrics and 
abstract in imagery. It is a causal statement, the reason 
why those who have seen cannot turn back: "For love so
hates mortality / Which is the providence of life / She 
will not let it blessed be / But curses it with mortal
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strife." The word "love" is ambiguous, for all love, 
even profane, hates mortality. Donne's lovers are for­
ever attempting to circumvent death, to make their love 
immortal. Love of life, too, hates mortality; thus 
Achilles could tell Odysseus that it was better to be a 
slave in the world of men than king of the world of 
shades. The love mentioned in the poem has direct 
reference, I believe, to the love of Christ which will 
not allow man to wallow in mortality, which brings not 
peace but a sword. This love promises immortality to 
those who believe: "And everyone that liveth and be- 
lieveth in me shall not die forever."
The fourth quatrain concludes the sentence begun 
in the third with a striking image: "Until beside the
blinding rood / Within that world-destroying pit / - Like 
young wolves that have tasted blood, / Of death, men 
taste no more of it." Lines one and two of the quatrain 
explain and clarify the initial image of the poem,
"Flame burst out of a secret pit." The flame that stands 
above the pit is the cross; the pit is the love of God 
that is "world-destroying" because it destroys pagan 
naturalism.^ The "wolves" image is of immense power. It
L(.. Meiners reads "secret pit" and "world-destroying pit"
to mean hell. His interpretation would have Christ com­
ing to the world from hell. I do not think that the con­
text justifies this interpretation, ojd. cit. , p. 1/4.8 .
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is totally unexpected and yet perfectly just. It Is 
metaphysical in the sense that it is a logical extension 
of the "blinding rood," (blood is to the wolves as im­
mortality promised by Christ is to men). It acts both 
as a brake and a shock that force the reader to rethink 
the abstract proposition. The "blood" relates directly 
to the cross and suggests the blood of the Lamb in which 
men have been washed. From what have the wolves or men 
been weaned? From the easy naturalism that makes a god 
of this world: "The kingly sun to hateful night / For 
those, once seeing, turning back." The wolves once 
weaned can never return to the milk of naturalism which 
cannot promise immortality.
The fifth quatrain states the crisis of the 
poem, a crisis that applies not to all men (for some 
know) but to men who, like the protagonist, "cannot see the 
whole of it / Nor how I came there," The dilemma is not,
I believe, moral, not a choice between salvation or damna­
tion. Rather is it a cognitive dilemma. Was Hamlet's 
crisis moral or intellectual? Was it his belief in the 
"canon 'gainst self-slaughter" that deterred him from 
suicide or rather was it the possibility that the canon 
might be true, "the fear of something after death"? If he
had had faith, the problem never would have presented 
itself to him. If the protagonist of the poem and others 
like him really saw this as a choice between salvation and 
damnation, they would possess faith. It is their not see­
ing the choice that presents the problem. So here on the 
edge of the grave, "All life before in the black grave," 
they face the last alternatives of life - mortality or 
immortality - when mortality itself is no longer theirs to 
choose, "without a life to save." There is in this qua­
train a metaphysical punning with words. Life is not "be­
fore" but behind; ironically only the grave is before them. 
Life is used three times: twice to signify its opposite,
death, and once to signify life In the more metaphysical 
sense of existence demanding explanation. In these ex­
tremes man is blind; he has been blinded by the cross, he 
has been weaned from natural salvation. The line "Being 
from all salvation weaned" follows "without the life to 
save" or mortality, and logically relates to and clarifies 
the "young wolves" image explaining from what they have been 
weaned. The next image, "A stag charged both at heel and 
head" harmonizes in tone with the hunter wolves and repre­
sents man's predicament. Modern man's blindness makes him 
sceptical of immortality, but hi3 Christian tradition
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destroys his hope of pure naturalism* Neither pagan nor 
Christian, he is at bay.
The concluding lines - ’’Who would come back is 
turned a fiend / Instructed by the fiery dead" - 
reinforce the dilemma. Even if those blind and in so 
severe a plsce had evidence of immortality - evidence 
from the returning dead - they could not or would not 
believe. The Hamlet-like situation recalls Hamlet's own 
particular problem in accepting the ghost as his father. 
The gospels emphasize the 3ame idea that for those who do 
not believe even the dead returning to warn them would 
not be enough: "And he said to him: If they hear not
Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe, if one 
rise again from the dead."^
"The Cross" does not present a moral problem but 
an intellectual one. Modern men, like the protagonist, 
can neither accept nor reject the Cross. Concerning the 
ultimate questions of life they are torn by indecision.
For them Christianity is a curse, for it gives none of the 
consolation felt by those who know, and yet its very
5* Meiners offers a different interpretation: "It is not 
possible to escape the world-destroying pit nor to 
think one's way out of it. Once there, the inhabit­
ants - those I imagine who have earlier faced 'the last 
alternatives' and have failed to deal with them - make 
certain of our loyalties by making our forms identical 
with theirs." op. cit., p. 1$2 ,
V
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historical existence makes impossible a return to pagan 
life. Like Wordsworth they can well say, "I’d rather be 
/ A Pagan, suckled in a creed outworn." Even the title 
of the poem is ironic; the Cross really is a cross to 
modern man. The antique pagan was a fan happier man 
than is the modern sceptic.
Of the poem's imagery Frederick Morgan writes, 
"What should be clear is that the imagery of 'The Cross’ 
is a sort diametrically opposed to that of Ezra Pound or 
William Carlos Williams, or of a lesser poet like Theo­
dore Roethke. For in Mr. Tate's work, it is not the image 
that is sharpened, but the insight that is the result of 
the image interacting with the thought...In these poems 
the image hardly ever retreats (as it does so often in 
Auden, for example) to the politeness of mere illustra­
tion."6
The images of the poem are, I believe, highly 
successful because they derive from the thought. They are 
violent; they are unexpected but they are perfectly just. 
Each is a startlingly concrete realization of an abstract 
statement. Each tends to force the reader to pause, turn 
back upon the idea and reapply it to the image. In the
6 . Frederick Morgan, "Recent Verse", Hudson Review, I 
(Summer, 1914-8) , 263-6I4..
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context the image cluster is also just: "blood,"
"wolves," "stag," "weaned" flow from the basic situation, 
a violent one. And although these images are not linked 
one to the other by strict logic, yet one tends to 
clarify and reinforce the other. Thus "weaned" clarifies 
and reinforces "blood," "stag" reinforces and is re­
inforced by "wolves."
The poem is perfectly controlled by the strict 
and exact use of syntax. Tate uses the present participle 
six times. This use of the verbal binds the poem into a 
tightly coherent unit, and forces the reader to carry the 
thought from quatrain to quatrain, for at each occurrence 
of the participle he is forced back to the noun modified.
The poem is not easy, but it is not obscure. Its syntax 
is perfectly ordered, but it is a syntax that demands care­
ful reading.
Finally, the poem seems to owe some of its un­
doubted success to the precision of the abstract thought. 
With the crisis clearly in mind, the reader is able to 
appreciate the beauty and suitability of the images. The 
images in turn reinforce and deepen the meaning of the 
thought, metamorphizing, as it were, the abstract into the 
concrete. The poem is a brilliant success.
Both "The Subway" and "The Gross" treat fragmenta­
tion in modern society. The former poem views urban life -
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itself a result of partial and abstract knowledge - as 
the cause of the protagonist’s loss of sanity. The latter 
poem dramatizes the predicament of modern man who can 
neither accept Christianity nor return to pure paganism. 
Both poems emphasize the fact that the fragmentation of 
modern life results from flawed cognition, from insuffi­
cient knowledge.
This third chapter concludes the treatment of 
Tate's epistemological problem, a center of unity in his 
work from 1927 to 1953* After his conversion, Tate 
ceases to write a poetry of exploration and begins to 
write a poetry of exposition. In his post-conversion 
poetry Tate writes from the perspective of faith, from 
possession of the truth. His poetry of possession is less 
dramatic than his pre-conversion poetry; it is a poetry of 
reflection upon and reassessment of the past. In form it 
is allegorical narrative written in Dante's terza rima.
The epistemology upon which this poetry is based is Tho- 
mistic, that developed by Tate in his essay on Dante, "The 
Symbolic Imagination."
CHAPTER IV
RELIGION
In 1952 and 1953 Tate published the first, 
third, and sixth parts of a proposed long poem, "The 
Maimed Man," "The Swimmers," and "The Buried Lake." He 
omitted "The Maimed Man" from Poems, published in I960. 
All three parts are written in terza rima, all begin with 
a classical invocation, and all are deeply allegorical. 
Sections I and VI are dream allegories; Section III is 
the narrative of an event in the poet's boyhood. It 
seems to be the poet's intention to review the actual and 
poetic experiences of hi3 life ("Where Myrtle twines with 
Laurel") with the eyes of a new vision, that of faith.
No longer does he search for a solution to the problem of 
knowledge; he now attempts to express the faith he pos­
sesses .
"The Maimed Man"^ is both a poem and a retrac­
tation, almost in the classical tradition of Chaucer, 
Boccacio, and other Medieval writers. The poet rejects
1. Allen Tate, "The Maimed Man," Partisan Review, XIX 
(May-June, 1952), 265-67.
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and repents the past and announces a new approach to his 
art. The invocation is involved and somewhat ambiguous. 
"Laurel," the symbol of reason, is invoked; "Myrtle," the 
symbol of sense, is rejected. The Blessed Virgin as 
"Morning Star," and "that first mother1 who returned the 
maid" is to be viewed by reason. The poet in the tra­
dition of the ascetics and mystics would be freed from the 
domination of 3ense by means of mortification: "Teach me
to fast / And pray, that I may know the motes that tease / 
Skittering sunbeams are dead shells at last. / Then, time­
less muse, reverse my time; unfreeze / All that Iw as in 
your congenial heat." Freed from sense, led by reason, he 
reverses time to review his past and somehow in the review­
ing to do penance, "to appease."
The invocation completed, the poet turns to an 
experience of his youth. He begins realistically enough 
("as I sauntered down our street"), but quickly changes to 
dream-allegory, and sees "a young man there, headless, 
whose hand / Hung limp." However, he experiences no terror 
at the sight of this s >ectre. Upon closer observation he 
sees that "The Unbending Citizen" is not only headless 
(without intelligence) but that his heart is visible and 
"Blue grass instead of feet grew in the slot," (rooted in 
Southern tradition). It then becomes clear from the poet’s
250
worda to the stranger that this is the poet himself or a 
vision of himself. The poet interrupts the narrative at 
this point with a second invocation which he concludes 
with a prayer, "and let me touch the hem / Of him who
spread his triptych like a fan,"
He then returns to "The Scarecrow" and discovers 
who he is in another dream vision: "I did not know until
I saw in the waving mirror. . .a black trunk without
bloom / Body that once had moved my face and feet. /
My secret was his father, I his tomb." The poet then 
rejects his former pride and those things upon which it 
was based, his poetry, his atheism, his pride in family, 
his ideas about qualitative time: "iambics willed and 
neat," "God’s image made uncouth," "Shade of pompous 
youth, / Clutched shades forbearing in a family well,"
"and could not tell / Natural time."
Having rejected this false past and "modest hy­
brid," he once again addresses the "Virgin Muse." In the 
past he had played "swimmer of night." Now he would be 
led "up a deeper stream," to become a "Swimmer of Noon­
day." From the emphasis he places upon Virgin, the muse 
of this and the other two sections would seem to be the 
Virgin Mary. The ambiguous "Mother of silences" of 
"Season of the Soul," has become the Mother of God.
But apart from a new perspective of belief,
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what does the poet (Tate) propose to do, for thia section 
ia an introduction to a ’’long poem”? He proposes to write 
a new type of poetry and he rejects his former "willed"
(or perhaps "angelic") iambics and his corruption of 
"natural" time. He rejects his epistemological theme and 
proposes to write not only from a new perspective of belief 
but from a new intellectual perspective, an Aristotelian- 
Thomistic rationalism that demands that the roots of vision 
be anchored in sense.
"The Maimed Man" appeared in 1952. From 19(4-9 to 
1951, Tate wrote three highly significant essays: "Our
Cousin, Mr. Poe," "The Angelic Imagination," and "The Sym­
bolic Imagination." They reveal a strong neo-Thomistic
2
influence especially that of Gilson and Maritain. In 
Thomism Tate discovers a solution to his epistemological 
problem. From Dante he learns how to apply Thomi3tic 
principles to poetry. Dante, as a good Thomist, rooted his 
symbolism in the common thing. He realized that the human 
intellect and will are committed by feeling to the accidents 
of St. Thomas. Only the angelic mind suffers none of the 
limitations of sense. Modern poets (presumably Tate would 
include his own early verse) make this error of angelism:
2. See Section I, Chapter III.
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"Another way of putting this is to say that the modern 
poet, like Valery or Crane, tries to seize directly the 
anagogical meaning, without going through the three pre­
paratory stages of letter, allegory, and trope."3
Presumably, then, "The Maimed Man" and the two 
poems that followed it are attempts by Tate to realize 
creatively the Thomistic principle, "Nil in intellectu 
quod non prius fuit in sensibus," to write a symbolic 
poetry like Dante’s, a noetry of allegory with a clear 
action "which is one thin^, but always seen in at lea3t 
two ways."^ His new poetry is to be a poetry of humility; 
"Its humility is witnessed by its modesty. It never be­
gins at the top; it carries the bottom along with it, 
however high it may climb.
Do "The Maimed Man," "The Swimmers," "The Burled 
Lake" achieve this goal, the retention of the common ob­
ject in the anagogic vision?
Before answering this question, it might be well 
to consider "The Swimmers" and "The Burled Lake" in some 
detail. The first of these poems forms the third section
3. "The Symbolic Imagination," Op. cit. , p. AplL(., footnote 6. 
1*. Ibid., p. 1*2£.
5. Ibid.
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of the longer poem; the second is the sixth section of the 
not-yet-completed whole.
"The Swimmers" in title and in content is alle­
gorical, and narrates one action seen "in at least two 
ways." The title of the poem is an appropriate noun for 
the five boys, and an allusion, perhaps, to the "swimmer" 
of "The Maimed Man." Again, the form is Dante’s terza 
rima but, unlike the dream-allegory of "The Maimed Man," 
"The Swimmers" is an objective narrative. The location, 
Montgomery County, and the time, July, 1911* are exactly 
specified. The invocation in a series of lines weighted 
by vowels and smoothed by liquids establishes the theme: 
"Replenish me the spring of love and fear / And give me 
back the eye that looked and fled / When a thrush idling 
in a tulip tree / Unwound the cold dream of the copper­
head." Tate advances the narrative with colloquial dic­
tion and exact concrete description; he describes himself 
with a pun, "and Tate, with water on the brain."
The five boys see a posse of twelve riders.
Later the posse returns, "all but the leader. It was 
night / Momently and I feared." Presumably the leader was 
Judas and the posse has hanged a Negro. At this point the 
clarity of the narrative dissolves and the syntax becomes 
needlessly obscured: "eleven same / Jesus-Christers un-
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membered and unmade, / Whose Corpse had died again in 
dirty shame.” The sheriff and a stranger drag the body of 
the hanged man back along a dusty road to town. Tate, 
suddenly alone (how or why is not too clear) follows the 
"three figures in the dying sun" to the public square.
The concluding stanza lapses into an almost Ransomesque 
cuteness. I cannot but feel that the feminine rhymes are 
inappropriate and the public admission of guilt vague and 
unprepared for.
The Christ symbol in modern literature is fre­
quent enough to be almost trite. Faulkner's use of it as 
a quasi half symbol or not fully completed metaphor seems 
more powerful and really more profound than Tate's too 
explicit allegory. When everything is diagrammed and noth­
ing left unsaid, we wonder if, really, all this was worth 
saying, or, rather, had not been said often and well be­
fore: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of
these ray least brethren, you did it to me."
A second problem arises from this explicit alle­
gory: both llttera and figura, as Tate himself demands,
must be almost mathematically clear. Here one may ask why 
Judas was the leader of the posse and how the twelve 
apostles crucified Christ. Exactly what does the leader's 
desertion symbolize? Of course, the apostles as sinful men 
shared in the universal guilt, but how does the leader's
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disappearance symbolize the unique crime of Judas? Is not 
the capitalized "It" referring to the Negro's body an un­
earned grammatical trick to stress the Christ symbol?
Joseph of Arimethea and Nicodemus in removing Our Lord's 
body from the cross and placing It in a tomb performed an 
act of love and adoration. What exactly is the act of the 
sheriff and the stranger who drag the corpse back through 
the dust? It might be mentioned in passing that "horny" 
to describe the feet of the corpse is a cliche after Wal­
lace Stevens' "The Emperor of Ice Cream." Some of Tate's 
pre-Catholic moroseness appears in "sullen fun / Savage as 
childhood's thin harmonious tear." Why, we wonder, is it 
sullen and savage for five boys to go swimming in the dead 
of summer?
The poem, then, seems to fail technically 
because of a lack of consistency and clarity in the narra­
tion (littera), and because of somewhat unnecessary 
ambiguity in the allegory ( figura) . Even the verse seems 
uncertain, and the variation of end-stopped and run-over 
lines, of masculine and feminine rhymes, seems to exist more 
for the sake of the form than for rhetorical or metrical 
emphasis. Finally, the slender narrative does not seem to 
earn the response that the allegory would demand. The poem 
borrows profundity and vision from the gospel narration.
256
In a sense, Tate plays upon a stock religious response in 
his reader. "The Swimmers" contains beautiful, individual 
lines, but it fails both as narrative and as allegory.
"The Buried Lake" is a dream-allegory of the 
poet’s life dedicated to the "Lady of light." The caption, 
"Ego mater pulchrae dilectionls, et timoris, et agnltlonis, 
et aanctae spei" (I am the mother of fair love, and of 
fear, and of knowledge, and of holy hope) is from Ecclesl- 
asticus, in which the mother represents Truth; in the 
Catholic liturgy, however, the quotation is applied to the 
Blessed Virgin and is a frequent refrain in the prayers 
recited on her feast days. The order of the poem is the 
reverse of the caption; the poet experiences sin, fear, 
and death before attaining pure love. In an unreal hell, 
the hotel of a dream, into whicn the poet is admitted by 
Cerberus, "where a sick dog coughed out a sickly cark / To 
let me in," he attempts to exercise his art ("to play my 
violin"), but carnal, impure love ("Small dancing girl") 
silences his art. He then attempts philosophy ("My friend 
John Locke" - a symbol of false knowledge), but this too 
fails him ("And went as mist upon the browning air"). 
Another attempt at art ("the grey sonata") is interrupted 
by a "stately woman." As the poet holds her in his arms, 
she turns into a "searching skull whose drying teeth / 
Crumbled me all night long and I was dead." This seems to
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be an allusion to St. Paul's "By sin death entered the 
world,*1 It is also the poet's first encounter with fear. 
The poet is in a desperate condition of spiritual blind­
ness ("while sight within me caved"), and is deprived of 
grace ("All grace being lost"). Then Santa Lucia, Holy 
Light, comes to him. He first resists her music, then 
attempts to misinterpret it into a nature or vegetation 
myth; finally he accepts It: "Light choir upon my shoul­
der, speaking Dove," The poet has by way of impure love, 
sin, fear, and death finally attained the "fair love, 
knowledge, and holy hope" of the caption through Divine 
Revelation and grace: "The dream is over and the dark
expired. / I knew that I had known enduring love."
It is now eleven years since Tate published "The 
Buried Lake." The once promised "long poem" may never be 
completed and we have only three fragments to judge. From 
these three it is impossible to imagine the Intended nature 
of the unified whole. But the fact that Tate in I960 pub­
lished only parts three and six, rejecting part one, seems 
to indicate that he intends them to stand as complete poems. 
He himself tells us that they "are nevertheless complete in 
themselves."^
6. "The new poems, 'The Swimmers' and 'The Buried Lake,' 
though parts of a larger whole, are nevertheless com­
plete in themselves; so I ventured to include them 
here." "Note," Poems, [p. vii].
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This may be significant. Modern poets have been far more 
successful with short lyrics than with longer poems. Per­
haps the rejection of formal logic and of traditional 
rhetoric has rendered impossible the order and coherence 
necessary in a long poem. Instead we have ontological 
chunks, existential fragments. Only in the novel and 
drama have the moderns been able to present a sustained 
vision.
Allegory demands the most exacting and painstak­
ing order. Each simile, each action become lesser frag­
ments that form the whole mosaic. No critic of Dante is 
more aware of this than I3 Tate, but awareness Is not 
achievement. Dante's precision and clarity on the literal 
level, which merges into a unified vision on the allegori­
cal level, are wanting in Tate's three fragments. "Blue 
grass in the Slot" Is not exactly Dante's "common object." 
Exactly of what it is a figura (Eliot's "Hollow Men," 
Yeats's "A Tattered Coat Upon a Stick," Kentucky blue 
grass) is not clear.
Presumably Tate wrote these fragments from the 
viewpoint of the Christian vision of reality. Are they 
really Christian? Has an Aristotelian-Thomistic rational­
ism baptized Tate's poetry? Although the Blessed Virgin is 
invoked, though faith, grace, love, fear, the Christ symbol 
inform these poems, still they do not to me seem entirely
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Christian. The form may be Dante’s terza rima; the vision 
is not his. Tate’s vision, like that of so many modern 
writers, is one of bleak pessimism.
Tate had long been troubled by our generation's 
loss of the sense of evil. Dante and the Church of Dante 
never denied the existence of evil, and it is their defini­
tion of evil as the negation of good that Tate seizes upon. 
It is not without significance that his religious sensi­
tivity has discovered inspiration only in the effects of 
sin, as "The Cross” and "The Swimmers" manifest. His 
essentially Platonic or Manichean sensitivity that concen­
trates upon the negation of good rather than upon good, 
that lingers in shadow rather than in light seems to me to 
be an Albigensian distortion of the essentially joyous 
Christian vision. He seems insensitive to the historic and 
spiritual fact that Christ has risen and is triumphant over 
sin and death. He seems to ignore Paul's Epistles, and 
proceeds as though the gospels concluded their narration on 
3ood Friday. The pagan me miserum never once moves toward 
the Christian Alleluia.
Both in form and in content Tate's three Catholic 
poems are unsuccessful. The form fails both in the clarity 
necessary for allegory and in the use of the terza rima.
The content - intended to be Catholic - is too bleak and
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pessimistic to be completely Catholic. It would appear, 
then, that Tate's reputation must stand, at least as of 
now, upon his poetry of unbelief. He is essentially a 
poet of anger and of anguish whose singularly hopeless 
vision of modern life achieves tremendous power when con­
fined and controlled by strict form. His imagination 
seems most excited when faced with a no-exit situation, 
a crisis from which there is no escape. His conversion 
may have presented him with a personal exit, but it has 
not helped his poetry.
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION
In each chapter of this section I have 
explicated and evaluated the poems considered, attempt­
ing to treat only Tate's mere successful poems. In 
this final evaluation, I shall of necessity, repeat some 
of my former observations; but I feel that the more 
general remarks which I am a bout to make are supported 
by the close study of the corpus of Tate's poetry. I 
shall divide this critique into matter and form, into 
what Tate says and how he says it.
Tate's view of reality is singularly macabre; 
it has a certain monotone that shades down to gray or 
black. In spite of the frequent light symbolism, there 
is no light here, only the glare of hell. In "Dover 
Beach" the misery and anguish of Arnold are relieved by 
the existence of love. Not so the tragic vision of Allen 
Tate. Forceful and violent as are some of his poems, still 
the whole corpus begins to read like a prolonged commentary 
upon Milton's "But cloud instead and ever-during dark /
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Surrounds mo, from the cheerful ways of men / Cut off." 
Kenneth Burke judges the central flaw of Tate's poetry 
to be its unrelieved funereal tone: "In poetry with
religious hankerings, we get austere purgatorial moods 
(forgetful that, whatever this world is, it i3 not wholly 
the disembodied state of purgatory). . .seeing everything, 
as it were, as a projection, or attenuation of the mood 
one might feel when delivering or hearing a funeral ora­
tion.
It may not be unjustified to pause for a moment 
to examine the validity of Tate's judgment of modern life. 
He tells us that it is a hell and that this hell exists 
In spite of our inability to recognize it or to express 
it. Yet thinkers more profound than Tate judge our modern 
society quite otherwise. Karl Barth seriously doubts that 
behind the official facade of the Middle Ages there was 
more sincerity, more happiness, more unity of life than 
there is today. The rather extraordinary religious renais­
sance both here and in Europe, the presence of outstanding 
religio-philosophical minds such as John Courtney Murray, 
Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Kung, the 
ecumenical spirit of the times would seem to indicate that
1. “Tentative Proposal," Poetry, L (May, 1937)» 100.
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the modern world is not quite the victim of science, that 
modern man is not quite 30 much a Godless Cartesian think­
ing machine as Tate visualizes him.
Modern man undoubtedly was injured by the 
industrial revolution - and undoubtedly has lost some of 
his individuality in the vast corporation for which he 
works or in the impersonal urban development in which he 
lives. The abstractionism of science, the loss of tradi­
tion may have played a part in this. It seems at least 
possible, however, that Tate may not always view reality as 
it really is, that he may be haunted by his own private 
devil compounded of Eliot, Poe, and Baudelaire. Tate's 
imagination may well be a captive in Eliot's "The Waste 
Land," unredeemed as yet by an "Ash Wednesday."
We have noted that the principle of dissociated 
sensibility is basic to Tate's thought. The same principle 
prevails in his poetry. But whose authority or what evi­
dence supports this theory? And can it justly be called a 
principle? The phrase, dissociated sensibility, is Eliot's. 
He uses it to distinguish the quality of Metaphysical from 
Victorian poetry. Eliot's insight may be valid, but it 
certainly cannot be accepted as a proven fact. Yet Tate 
never questions the truth of Eliot's statement. From his 
earliest essays consistently through the body of his work,
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he presumes the dissociated sensibility of modern man to be 
a fact. As a result, hi3 vision of modern society is 
distorted by this a priori assumption.
Finally, there is in Tate a disturbing element 
that is not easily separated or identified, an almost 
chthonic spirit which Jung calls the other face of God, 
the dark side of the God image. This Manichaean sensi­
tivity seems so to fuse good and evil that the reader 
uneasily wonders about the nature of Tate’s God, ’’sick of 
the world's rot / God's hideous face.'* ("The Eagle," p. 114)
As we noted in the explication of his poetry, 
Tate is frequently very successful in poems of tightly 
controlled form. These successful poems are, in a sense, 
an artistic realization of Tate's theory of knowledge.
Not only the dramatic situation of the poems but also the 
very form of the poems derive from his episteraology. In 
these successful poems (and in some not so successful) Tate 
eliminates abstract statement and forces the symbol or 
image to support the idea. In the successful poems the 
symbol Is recognizable to the reader. In the less success­
ful poems the symbol is an incomplete metaphor, a vehicle 
without tenor. To complete the metaphor the reader is 
forced to search for the tenor in Tate's prose. To judge 
the form of Tate’s poetry is to express a value judgment 
on moat modern poetry. Such a Judgment in the face of
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modern criticism runs the risk of appearing both extremely 
naive and extremely presumptuous, but it is supported, 
nonetheless, by the rational philosophy of our Western 
tradition.
If poetry is to be Alexandrine, a highly esoteric 
and learned system for experts, then Tate's work must stand 
in the forefront of modern poetry. He himself demands
only a knowled e of classical literature and philosophy to
comprehend and to appreciate Eliot and Donne, and, pre­
sumably, Tate. But such knowledge does not enable us - as
I sincerely doubt Tate’s does - to identify a corrupted 
single line ( "dolorum" for "laborum" in "The Mediterranean") 
from Vergil's Aeneid, or to recognize and locate a single 
verse from the Divine Comedy. We may all have a certain 
abhorrence of the scholarly footnote, but at least it is an 
honest identification. Once the critic or graduate student 
has tracked down the reference, rendered it into English, 
revealed its relevance, Tate's poem begins to become com­
prehensible. But should a poem need this explication to 
become comprehensible?
To be more specific, when the reader has read 
Tate's expository prose, has come to recognize the unique 
and untraditional terminology - "quantitative extension of 
science, qualitative value of religion" - then the indi­
vidual poems become powerful symbols of these ideas. Are
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the poems, however, comprehensible without the exposition? 
I think not. At least, they do not appear to be so to 
some of our leading critics, nearly all of whom approach 
Tate's poetry through his prose. For example, Delmore 
Schwartz devotes more than half of his study of Tate's 
poetry to an analysis of his ideas. He concludes that 
Tate's poetry cannot be read in isolation from the rest of 
his work. To be understood, a poem of Tate's must be read
O
in the context of his criticism, novel, and other poems, 
Cleanth Brooks, a strict contextualist critic, is forced 
to devote three pages to an explanation of Tate's concept 
of qualitative and quantitative time before he can begin 
his explication of "Aeneas at Washington."  ^Even in a 
highly successful poem like "The Mediterranean," there are 
certain images that must be explained by Tate's criticism. 
In explicating the poem, I was forced to return to Tate's 
criticism to explain "time’s monotone," "secret need," 
"derelict," and "We've cracked the hemispheres with care­
less hand."
2. Op. clt. , pp. i+l9 — 3®-
3. Ojd. cit., pp. 95-99.
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That men communicate with men by universally 
accepted signs may be a naive epistemology, but it is a 
traditional one. When a scientist or a philosopher needs 
a new sign, he defines it for his reader. So does Tate, 
but too often he does so in hi3 expository essays, not in 
the poem itself. His own critical tenets demand that the 
poem stand as an experienced whole. As a new critic he 
abhors the use of sociology, history, biography for 
interpretative and critical evalustion.^ But his own 
poetry, I propose, often demands either his own exposi­
tion or his own exegesis - often but not always.
The creation of a world of private symbols, the 
use of erudite and slightly varied allusions and quota­
tions may be a poetry of men speaking to angels but hardly 
of men speaking to men.
Art will always attempt to create the concrete 
universal, but it must follow the laws of human cognition 
if it is to speak to men who grasp the universal by 
abstracting it from the concrete singular. The action, 
the tension, the emotion of the artifact may be, must be
I4.. "in a manner of speaking, the poem is its own knower, 
neither poet nor reader knowing anything that the poem 
says apart from the words of the poem." "Narcissus as 
Narcissus," op. clt., p. 250.
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singular, but In a literature for men It must be expressed 
In universal signs, signs that can be recognized by the 
average literate man. If It degenerates Into a private 
language, Into esoteric symbols and highly erudite refer­
ences, It becomes, perhaps, an acrostic for critics, 
graduate students, and angels (though they must weep 
while they Intuit), but not a language of men speaking to 
men, not an artifact to be contemplated and enjoyed _ln se.
Somehow this judgment seems harsh and petty In 
the face of Tate's not Insignificant achievement. Certainly 
It Implies no derogation of his courage and unflinching 
constancy. He demands of the man of letters a knowledge, 
a precision of mind, a technical skill that are almost 
Miltonic. Nevertheless the evaluation of his work must 
be made from a traditionally rational position: that 
men can communicate to men only In language of universal 
signs ordered In recognized grammatical syntax. Tate's 
poetry often falls to do this and depends for comprehen­
sion upon his prose. When this occurs, he falls as an 
artist, for he„fails to Impress form upon matter thus 
rendering It Intelligible. The human Intellect can fall 
to comprehend being for two reasons: either an over­
abundance of reality as In Cod Who is pure act, or a de­
ficiency of reality, as Is pure matter. To use Tate's own
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image, God blind3 us by the brilliance of His being; 
matter eludes us by reason of the depth of its shadow.
Tate does not, I think, so much blind us by the clarity 
of his vision as confound us by the obscurity of his 
shade. In the shadow it is possible there is not all 
substance.
It might be more charitable and certainly more 
wise to allow Tate's friend and teacher, John Crowe Ran­
som, to express a similar judgment. In speaking of modern 
poets - "Not...Robinson, Frost, Bridges, Yeats, perhaps 
even Hopkins’* but "Pound, Eliot, Tate, Stevens, perhaps 
Auden" - Ransom says:
Being technically experienced, they have 
command of their own imagination, and 
when they seek indeterminateness of the 
positive sort, such as is denoted by the 
iconic signs, they do it directly. They 
have power, . .But they are committed 
on principle to an unprecedented degree 
of indeterminateness in the meaning, and 
their poetry is let down on that side too.
The latter indeterminatenes3 yields brilli­
ant images; but it tends to logical inconse­
quence.
The dense and brilliant yet obscure world 
of modern poets may reflect a certain initial 
ontological 3ense. Their most actual world, 
as they sense it, resists mastery, is more 
mysterious than intelligible, perhaps is 
more evil than good. It is a world of 
appearances, and suggests, for example, the 
world of Heraclitus; as if they had knocked 
the bottom out of history and language and 
become early Greeks again; but not of the 
Eleatic persuasion. . .
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Their early Greek is pluralist, rela­
tivist, and irrational. . . A thing that 
is in startling exception occurs now and 
then in the practice of every one of the 
poets: the perfect poetic phrase. This 
phrase, which may well stand isolated in 
the context of indeterminacy, will lack 
nothing that is achievable of realizing 
the virtue intended by the traditional 
technique. It is a touchstone. The 
occasion of so sudden a flight may be 
simple nostalgia, looking backward.5
And now having stated two objections against 
the corpus of Tate's poetry from an absolute position, I 
should like to qualify them, for true absolutes exist only 
in the mind of God and in Plato's world of ideas. The 
world of men is a confusing melange of good and evil, of 
success and failure. I should like to conclude this 
chapter with Tate'3 success rather than his failure. Tate, 
who has taught me by his failures as much as by his suc­
cesses, deserves this courtesy.
If the subject matter of Tate's poetry is the 
unredeemed blackness of modern hell, he has, after all, a 
right to his uniquely tragic vision. It is a vision 
shared by many modern writers, Hemingway, Pound, Eliot, to 
name but three. But Tate seems more emotionally involved 
than do any of these. His vision of a sadly unheroic, non- 
Christian modern world is made doubly tragic because of his
5>. The New Criticism, pp. 33^-35-
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sense of tradition. Once the world was Christian; once 
men did live a full and unified life. The impossibility 
of ever reentering that lolden Age is Tate's peculiar 
tragedy. He sees himself and his age in a no-exit situa­
tion. Much of the violence of his poetry derives from 
this despair. Whether or not we agree with this vision 
is not the point, it is Tate'3 vision; it was almost the 
ze l t g e l a t of the late twenties and early thirties; and 
Tate remains its most powerful spokesman.
Though tragic in his vision to the point of 
monotony, Tate is never frivolous, never decadent. His 
concern is with great issues, with "last alternatives."
He is intellectually too honest and has too much artistic 
integrity to attempt facile solutions as does Archibald 
Macleish. There is a hard intellectualism in Tate's 
poetry that saves even inferior poems from triviality. 
Always we feel, as does Blackmur, that his poetry is 
"troubled by knowledge that has not quite got into it."^ 
Because of this knowledge that hovers just beyond the 
poem, even the unsuccessful poems seem more significant 
than they are.
When the knowledge does get into the poem, the 
result is brilliant. It gets into most of the poems that
6. Ft. P. Blackmur, Language as Gesture (New York: Har- 
court, 1952), p. 357.
I have discussed here, short poem3 of enormous power, 
perhaps the greatest of which is "The Gross." In this 
poem absolute classical control of diction, syntax, and 
form fuses the apparent irreconcilables, the ontological 
image and the abstract statement, into one perfect unit. 
In this poem everything is there; we need no explication 
from the essays. It is an artistic whole. In such 
Intense short lyrics a3 "The Cross" Tate is at his best; 
he attains an almost perfect control and a tremendous 
tension from the violent but successful concretizing of 
the abstract. If he fails to do this in the longer poems 
it is, perhaps, because such tension and such control can 
not be sustained. But even in his less successful poems, 
he gives us shockingly powerful images and hauntingly 
flawless lines as perfect as any In our language: "When 
the thrush idling in the tulip tree / Unwound the cold 
dream of the copperhead."
CONCLUSION
Tate’s career as a man of letters in the 
modern world from 1927 to 195>3 has been a continuous 
search for a solution to the problem of knowledge. He 
began the search when he accepted Eliot's supposition of 
the fragmentation of modern society. To establish the 
cause of modern disintegration, Tate investigated the 
integrated society of the old South. He theorized that 
the old South had been an integrated culture because it 
had possessed a total vision of reality, a mode of knowl­
edge that grasped past and present, concrete circumstances 
and universal concept in a single act of cognition. This 
Southern mode of cognition consisted, according to Tate, 
in some form of subjective-objective dualism - a religious 
myth and an image arising from the soil. (The conditions 
necessary for total knowledge vary, but the duality is 
consistently postulated.) Thus Tate discovered an episte- 
mological cause for what he assumed to be an existing fact. 
If the cause of the old South's integration was total 
cognition, the cause of the fragmentation of modern society 
must be partial cognition. In his investigation of the old 
South Tate had discovered an explanation for the fact of 
modern fragmentation; he had not, however, discovered a
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solution for this modern crisis. On the contrary, he 
concluded that total cognition in the present age is 
impossible, that modern man is historically determined 
to imperfect knowledge and, consequently, to fragmenta­
tion.
Tate made the tragic condition of modern man 
the dramatic situation of the protagonists of his fiction 
and poetry. The protagonists desire desperately to com­
prehend the past, to understand death, to believe in 
Christ; they desire to "see” as men saw in the past, but 
they know that they cannot. They know that in the modern 
"arrogant circumstance" vision is impossible, that for 
them there is no way "to make the eye secure."
Tate applied his epistemology not only to the 
dramatic situation of his poetry but also to its form. 
Perfect knowledge is "seeing," the grasp of the uni­
versal and the singular in one act of cognition. If 
"seeing" is impossible for modern man, at least the 
modern poet can imitate in his poem the act of "seeing." 
In his poetry Tate imitated this ideal act of cognition 
by compressing his syntax, eliminating abstract statement, 
and forcing the symbol or image to contain the idea. By 
eliminating the statement of the idea, he embodied in the 
symbol both the universal and the singular; in one act he
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attained, as It were, total knowledge. Often he achieved 
great success In this compressed form - perhaps when 
either the idea or the symbol is easily available to his 
reader. Occasionally he failed and his unsuccessful 
poem is like an uncompleted metaphor demanding an ex­
ternal referant.
Tate founded his aesthetics upon his episte- 
mology: man grasps complete knowledge of the world 
through great literature, for great literature enables 
man to see the universal in the singular symbol, to see 
the world through Dostoevsky's "hovering fly." Great 
literature, however, is impossible in the modern world, 
for the modern writer has flawed cognition and can embody 
only a partial vision of reality in his work.
In 19ij-9 Tate discovered Thomism and in 
Thomistic epistemology he found a solution to his problem 
of knowledge - the abstraction of the universal concept 
from the singular object by an act in which both the 
intellect and the senses participate. Applying his new­
found epistemology to poetry, he labelled poetry based 
upon imperfect cognition "angelic." In condemning "an­
gelic" poetry, he implicitly condemned his own poetry and 
rejected his earlier technique. Poetry based upon 
Thomistic epistemology he labelled "symbolic," and praised 
Dante as an exemplary practitioner of this perfect poetry.
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In 19^2 Tate began a long Catholic poem In 
terza rima. "The Maimed Man," "The Swimmers," and "The 
Buried Lake" presumably are "symbolic" poetry based upon 
Thomistic epistemology. These .three post-conversion 
poems are, like Tate's pre-conversion poems, written 
from an epistemological perspective. They differ from 
the earlier poems in that their epistemological position 
is not a problem but a solution, not a position of 
crisis but of possession.
With the resolution ofthe problem that had 
so long troubled Tate's thought, both hi3 prose and 
poetry acquire a certain slackness, a lack of the an­
guished tension that had characterized his earlier work.
In seeking "to make the eye secure," Tate achieved his 
greatest success. Ironically, having made the eye secure, 
he seems to have lost the inspiration that his genius 
requires.
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APPENDIX
THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Quem das finem, rex magne, dolorum?
When we went in the boat was a long bay 
A slingshot wide, walled in by towering stone - 
Peaked margin of antiquity's delay,
And we went there out of time's monotone:
Where we went in the black hull no light moved 
But a gull white-winged along the feckless wave,
The breeze, unseen but fierce as a body loved,
That boat drove onward like a willing slave:
Where we went in the small ship the seaweed 
Parted and gave to us the murmuring shore,
And we made feast and in our secret need 
Devoured the very plates Aeneas bore:
Where derelict you see through the low twilight 
The green coast that you, thunder-tossed, would win, 
Drop sail, and hastening to drink all night 
Eat dish and bowl to take that sweet land ini
Where we feasted and caroused on the sandless 
Pebbles, affecting our day of piracy,
What prophecy of eaten plates could landless 
Wanderers fulfil by the ancient sea?
We for that time might taste the famous age 
Eternal here yet hidden from our eyes 
When lust of power undid its stuffless rage;
They, in a wineskin, bore earth's paradise.
Let us lie down once more by the breathing side 
Of Ocean, where our live forefathers sleep 
As if the Known Sea still were a month wide - 
Atlantis howls but is no longer steepl
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What country shall we conquer, what fair land 
Unman our conquest and locate our blood?
We've cracked the hemispheres with careless hand! 
Now, from the Gates of Hercules we flood
Westward, westward till the barbarous brine 
Whelms us to the tired land where tasseling corn, 
Fat beans, grapes sweeter than muscadine 
Rot on the vine: in that land were we born.
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THE WOLVES
There are wolves in the next room waiting 
With heads bent low, thrust out, breathing 
At nothing in the dark; between them and me 
A white door patched with light from the hall 
Where it seems never (so 3till is the house)
A man has walked from the front door to the stair. 
It has all been forever. Beasts claw the floor.
I have brooded on angels and archfiends 
But no man has ever sat where the next room* s 
Crowded with wolves, and for the honor of man 
I affirm that never have I before. Now while 
I have looked for the evening star at a cold window 
And whistled when Arcturus spilt his light,
I've heard the wolves scuffle, and said: So this
Is man; so - wnat better conclusion is there - 
The day will not follow night, and the heart 
Of man has a little dignity, but less patience 
Than a wolf's, and a duller sense that cannot 
Smell its own mortality. (This and other 
Meditations will be suited to other times 
After dog silence howls his epitaph.)
Now remember courage, go to the door,
Open it and see whether coiled on the bed 
Or cringing by the wall, a savage beast 
Maybe with golden hair, with deep eyes 
Like a bearded spider on a sunlit floor 
Will snarl - and man can never be alone.
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DEATH OF LITTLE BOYS
When little boys grown patient at last, weary, 
Surrender their eyes immeasurably to the night,
The event will rage terrific as the sea;
Their bodies fill a crumbling room with light.
Then you will touch at the bedside, torn in two,
Gold curls now deftly intricate with gray
As the windowpane extends a fear to you
From one peeled aster drenched with the wind all day.
And over his chest the covers in the ultimate dream 
Will mount to the teeth, ascend the eyes, press back 
The locks - while round his sturdy belly gleam 
Suspended breaths, white spars above the wreck:
Till all the guests, come in to look, turn down 
Their palms, and delirium assails the cliff 
Of Norway where you ponder, and your little town 
Reels like a sailor drunk in a rotten skiff.
The bleak sunshine shrieks its chipped music then 
Out to the milkweed amid the fields of wheat.
There is a calm for you where men and women 
Unroll the chill precision of moving feet.
2^5
THE MEANING OF DEATH 
An After-Dinner Speech
I rise, gentlemen, it ia the pleasant hour. 
Darkness falls. The night falls.
Time, fall no more. 
Let that be life - time falls no more. The threat 
Of time we in our own courage have forsworn.
Let light fall, there shall be eternal light 
And all the light shall on our heads be worn
Although at evening clouds infe3t the 3ky 
Broken at base from which the lemon sun 
Pours acid of winter on a useful view - 
Four water-towers, two churches, and a river:
These are the sights I give in to at night 
When the long covers loose the roving eye 
To find the horror of the day a shape 
Of life: we would have more than living sight.
Past delusions are seen as if it all 
Were yesterday flooded with lemon light,
Vice and virtue, hard sacrifice and crime 
In the cold vanity of time.
Tomorrow
The landscape will respond to jocund day,
Bright roofs will scintillate with hues of May 
And Phoebus' car, his daily circuit run,
Brings me to the year when, my time begun,
I loitered in the backyard by the alley;
When I was a small boy living at home 
The dark came on in summer at eight o'clock 
For Little Lord Fauntleroy in a perfect frock 
By the alley: mother took him by the ear 
To teach of the mixed modes an ancient fear.
Forgive me if I am personal.
Gentlemen, let's 
Forget the past, its related errors, coarseness 
Of parents, laxities, unrealities of principle.
Think of tomorrow. Make a firm postulate 
Of simplicity in desire and act 
Founded on the best hypotheses;
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Desire to eat secretly, alone, lest 
Ritual corrupt our charity,
Lest darkness fall and time fall 
In a long night when learned arteries 
Mounting the ice and sum of barbarous 
Shall yield, without essence, perfect
time
accident.
We are the eyelids of defeated caves.
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THE SUBWAY
Dark accurate plunger down the successive knell 
Of arch on arch, where ogives burst a red 
Reverberance of hall upon the dead 
Thunder like an exploding crucible!
Harshly articulate, musical steel shell 
Of angry worship, hurled religiously 
Upon your business of humility 
Into the iron forestries of hell:
Till broken in the shift of quieter 
Dense altitudes tangential of your steel,
I am become geometries, and glut
Expansions like a blind astronomer
Dazed, while the worldless heavens bulge and reel
In the cold revery of an Idiot*
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THE CROSS
There ia a place that some men know,
I cannot see the whole of it 
Nor how I came there. Long ago 
Flame burst out of a secret pit 
Crushing the world with such a light 
The day-sky fell to moonless black,
The kingly sun to hateful night 
For those, once seeing, turning back:
For love so hates mortality 
Which is the providence of life 
She will not let it blessed be 
3ut curses it with mortal strife,
Unless beside the blinding rood 
Within that world-destroying pit 
- Like young wolves that have tasted blood, 
Of death, men taste no more of it.
So blind, in so severe a place 
(All life before in the black grave)
The last alternatives they face 
Of life, without the life to save,
Being from all salvation weaned - 
A stag charged both at heel and head:
Who would come back is turned a fiend 
Instructed by the fiery dead.
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THE MAIMED MAN
Didactic Laurel, loose your reasoning leaf 
Into my trembling hand; assert your blade 
Against the Morning Star, enlightening Thief 
Of that first Mother who returned the Maid, 
Beguiling myrtle, shake no more my ear 
With your green bough: because I am afraid
Of him who says I have no need to fear,
Return, Laurell Dying sense has cast 
Shadow on shadow of a metal tear 
Around my rim of being. Teach me to fast
And pray, that I may know the motes that tease 
Skittering sunbeams are dead shells at last. 
Then, timeless Muse, reverse my time; unfreeze 
All that I was In your congenial heat;
Tune me In recollection to appease 
The hour when, as I sauntered down our street,
I saw a young man there, headless, whose hand 
Hung limp; It dangled at his hidden feet 
I could not see how, In the fading band 
Of low light; nor did I feel alarm 
But felt, under my eyelids, grains of sand.
As, from their childhood, all men speak the charm 
And secret double of night in wakeful day,
I thought that he could never do me barm 
And gazed In stupor at the rusty play
Of light where once had stood tbe human head.
I thought what civil greeting I might say;
And could I leave the astonished oath unsaid
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That stack to my palate In a gagging lamp?
Who coaid have told If he were live or dead? 
Retreating sideways to a ragged clump 
Of buckberry bashes in the vacant lot,
I looked more closely at the purple stamp -- 
At the heart, three buttons down below the clot, 
Then down to where, the rigid shanks depending, 
Blue grass Instead of feet grew In the slot.
"If you live here," I said to the unbending 
Citizen, "It will not seem to you 
Improper if I linger on, defending 
Myself from what I hate bat ought to do 
To put as In a fast ungreening grave 
Together, lest you turn out to be true 
And I publicly lose face." What could save 
0nefs manly honor with the football coach -- 
My modest hybris, were I his known slave?
Our manners had no phrase to let me broach 
To friends the secret of a friend gone lame.
How could I know this friend without reproach? 
What a question! Whence the question came 
I am still questing In the poor boy*s curse, 
Witching for water In a waste of shame.
Thence, flow! conceit and motion to rehearse 
Pastoral terrors of youth still In tbe man, 
Torsions of sleep,In emblematic verse 
Rattling like dice unless the verse shall scan 
All chance away; and let me touch the hem 
Of him who spread his triptych like a fan.
Meanwhile the scarecrow, man all coat and stem, 
Neither dead nor living, never In this world -- 
In what worlds, or In what has essenced them,
I did not know antil one day I whirled 
Towards a suggesting presence In my room 
And saw In tbe waving mirror (glass swirled 
By old blowers) a black trunk without bloom -- 
Body that once had moved my face and feet.
My secret was his father, I his tomb.
(By I I mean Iambics willed and neat;
I mean by I God*s image made uncouth;
By eye I mean the busy, lurked, discrete 
Mandible world sharp as a broken tooth.)
And then rose In the man a small half-hell 
Where love disordered, shade of pompous youth, 
Clutched shades forbearing In a family well;
Where the sleek senses of the simple child 
Came back to rack spirit that could not tell 
Natural time: the eyes, recauled, enisled 
In the dreamt cave by shadowy womb of beam,
Had played swimmer of night -- the moist and mlldl 
Now take him, Virgin Muse, up the deeper stream:
As a lost bee returning to the hive,
Cell after honeyed cell of sounding dream -- 
Swimmer of noonday, lean for tbe perfect dive 
To the dead Mother*s face, whose subtile down 
You had not seen take amber light alive.
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THE SWIMMERS
Scene: Montgomery County,
Kentucky, July 1911
Kentucky water, clear springs: a boy fleeing
To water under the dry Kentucky sun.
His four little friends in tandem with him, seeing
Long shadows of grapevine wriggle and run 
Over the green swirl; mullein under the ear 
Soft as Nausicaa's palm; sullen fun
Savage as childhood's thin harmonious tear:
0 fountain, bosom source undying-dead 
Replenish me the spring of love and fear
And give me back the eye that looked and fled 
When a thrush Idling In the tulip tree 
Unwound the cold dream of the copperhead.
- Along the creek the road was winding; we 
Felt the quicksilver sky. I see again 
The shrill companions of that odyssey:
Bill Eaton, Charlie Watson, "Nigger'1 Layne 
The doctor's son, Harry Duesler who played 
The flute; and Tate, with water on the brain.
Dog-days: the dusty leaves where rain delayed 
Hung low on poison-oak and scuppernong,
And we were following the active 3hade
Of water, that bells and bickers all night long.
"No more'n a mile," Layne said. All five stood still. 
Listening, I heard what seemed at first a song;
Peering, I heard the hooves come down the hill.
The posse passed, twelve horse; the leader's face 
Was worn as limestone on an ancient sill.
Then, as sleepwalkers shift from a hard place 
In bed, and rising to keep a formal pledge 
Descend a ladder into empty space,
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We scuttled down the bank below a ledge
And marched stiff-legged in our common fright 
Along a hog-track by the riffle's edge:
Into a world where sound shaded the sight
Dropped the dull hooves again; the horsemen came 
Again, all but the leader. It was night
Momently and I feared: eleven same
Jesus-Christers unmembered and unmade,
Whose Corpse had died again in dirty shame.
The bank then levelling in a speckled glade,
We stopped to breathe above the swimming-hole;
I gazed at its reticulated shade
Recoiling in blue fear, and felt it roll
Over my ear3 and eyes and lift my hair
Like seaweed tossing on a sunk atoll.
I rose again. Borne on the copper air
A distant voice green as a funeral wreath 
Against a grave: "That dead nigger there."
The melancholy sheriff slouched beneath 
A giant sycamore; shaking his head 
He plucked a sassafras twig and picked his teeth:
"We come too late." He spoke to the tired dead 
Whose ragged shirt soaked up the viscous flow 
Of blood in which It lay discomfited.
A butting horse-fly gave one ear a blow
And glanced off, as the sheriff kicked the rope 
Loose from the neck and hooked it with his toe
Away from the blood. - I looked back down the slope: 
The friends were gone that I had hoped to greet. - 
A single horseman came at a slow lope
And pulled up at the hanged man’s horny feet;
The sheriff noosed the feet, the other end 
The stranger tied to his pommel in a neat
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Slip-knot. I saw the Negro's body bend
And straighten, as a fish-line cast transverse 
Yields to the current that it must subtend.
The sheriff's Goddamn was a murmured curse 
Not for the dead but for the blinding dust 
That boxed the cortege in a cloudy hearse
And dragged it towards our town. I knew I must 
Not stay till twilight in that silent road; 
Sliding my bare feet into the warm crust,
I hopped the stonecrop like a panting toad 
Mouth open, following the heaving cloud 
That floated to the court-house square it3 load
Of limber corpse that took the sun for shroud. 
There were three figures in the dying sun 
Whose light were company where three was crowd.
My breath crackled the dead air like a shotgun 
As, sheriff and the stranger disappearing,
The faceless head lay still. I could not run
Or walk, but stood. Alone in the public clearing 
This private thing was owned by all the town, 
Though never claimed by us within my hearing.
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THE BURIED LAKE
Ego mater pulchrae dilectionis, et timoris, 
et agnitionis, et sanctae spei.
Lady of light, I would admit a dream
To you, if you would take it in your hand.
Will you not let it in a gentle stream
Of living blood? How else may I remand 
Your light if not as pulse upon your ear?
Since I have dreamt this dream at your command,
If it shall bring my edge of darkness near 
I pray you do not let the edging slough 
To blind me, but light up my edge of fear.
The Way and the way back are long and rough 
Where Myrtle twines with Laurel - single glow 
Of leaf, your own imponderable stuff
Of light in which you set my time to flow
In childhood, when I tried to catch each flake 
And hold it to deny the world of snow.
- The nieht was tepid. I had kept opaque 
Down deeper than the canyons undersea 
The sullen spectrum of a buried lake
Nobody saw; not seen even by me;
And now I pray you mirror my mind, styled 
To spring its waters to my memory.
I fumbled all night long , an ageing child 
Fled like a squirrel to a hollow bole 
To play toy soldier, Tiny Tim, or the mild
Babes-in-the-Woods: sunk in their leafy hole,
The terror of their sleep I could not tell 
Until your gracing light reduced the toll.
I stumbled all night long on sand and shell 
By a lakeshore where time, unfaced, was dark;
I grazed with my left foot a pinched hotel
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Where a sick dog coughed out a sickly cark 
To let me in. Inside I saw no man,
But benches ranged the wall as round a park -
Sputtering gas-jet, ceiling without span,
Where thinning air lay on my cheek like tin;
But then exulting in my secret plan,
I laid my top hat to one side; my chin 
Was ready, I unsnapped the lyric case;
I had come there to play my violin.
Erect and sinuous as Valence lace
Old ladies wore, the bow began to fill
The shining box - whence came a dreaming face,
Small dancing girl who gave the smell of dill 
In pelts of mordents on a minor third 
From my cadenza for the Devil’s Trill,
No, nol her quick hand said in a soft surd.
She locked the fiddle up and was not there.
I mourned the death of youth without a word.
And could I go where air was not dead air?
My friend Jack Locke, scholar and gentleman, 
Gazed down upon me with a friendly glare,
Flicking his nose as if about to scan
My verse; he plucked from his moustache one hair 
Letting it fall like gravel in a pan,
And went as mist upon the browning air
Away from the durable lake, the blind hotel, 
Leaving me guilted on a moving stair
Upwards, down which I regularly fell
Tail backwards, till I caught the music room 
Empty, like a gaol without a cell.
"If I am now alone I may resume
The grey sonata" - but the box was gone;
Instead I heard three footfalls, a light broom
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Dusting the silted air, which now put on 
(Like Pier Francesca sunning a shady wall)
A stately woman who in sorrow shone.
I rose; she moved, she glided towards the hall;
I took her hand but then would set her free.
"My Love," I said. - "I'm back to give you all,"
She said, "my love." (Under the dogwood tree 
In bloom, where I had held her first beneath 
The coiled black hair, she turned and 
smiled at me.)
I hid the blade within the melic sheath
And tossed her head - but it was not her head: 
Another's searching skull whose drying teeth
Crumbled me all night long and I was dead.
Down, down below the wave that turned me round, 
Head downwards where the Head of Bjd had sped
On the third day; where nature had unwound
And ravelled her green that she had softly laved - 
The green reviving spray now slowly drowned
Me, since the shuttling eye would not be saved.
In the tart undersea of slipping ni^lit 
The dream whispered, while sight 
within me, caved,
Deprived, poured stinging dark on cold delight,
And multitudinous whined invisible bees;
All grace being lost, and its considering rite,
Till come to midmost May I bent my knees,
Santa Lucial at noon - the prudent shore,
The lake flashing green fins through amber trees -
And knew I had not read your eye before
You played it in the flowing scale of glance;
I had not thought that I could read the score,
And yet how vexed, bitter, and hard the trance 
Of light - how I resented Lucy's playl 
Better stay dead, better not try the lance
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In the living bowl: living we have one way
For all time in the twin darks where light dies 
To live: forget that you too lost the day
Yet finding it refound it Lucy-guise
As If refinding where two shadows meet,
Took from the burning umbrage mirroring eyes
Like Tellico blue upon a golden sheet
Spread out for all our stupor. Lady coming, 
Lady not going, come Lady come: I greet
You in the double of our eyes - humming
Miles of lightning where, in a pastoral scene, 
mhe fretting pipe is lucent and becoming.
I thought of ways to keen this image green 
(Until the leaf unfold the formal cherry)
In an off season when the eye is lean
With an inward gaze upon the wild strawberry,
Cape jasmine, wild azalea, eglantine - 
All the sad eclogue that will soon be merry:
And knew that nature could not more refine 
What it had given in a looking-glass 
And held there, after the living body's line
Has moved wherever it must move - wild grass 
Inching the earth; and the quicksilver art 
Throws back the invisible but lightning mass
To inhabit the room; for I have seen it part 
The palpable air, the air close up above 
And under you, light Lucy, light of heart -
Light choir upon my shoulder, speaking Dove 
The dream Is over and the dark expired.
I knew that I had known enduring love.
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